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ABSTRACTS

Interdependence: Myth or Reality?

By R. N. ROSECRANCE and A. A. STEIN

Some authors contend that interdependence is low or declining, others that interdependence is high or increasing. The present essay, offering new data on trade, investment, financial, and political sectors, seeks to draw a trial balance between such views and to show that: (1) some significant forms of economic interdependence have grown since 1913; (2) the political importance of economic interdependence has increased greatly since World War I; (3) further increases in positive interdependence among nations can by no means be taken for granted. Present uncertainty and instability is caused by the disproportion between the highly intricate and complex operation of the international economic and financial sector and the relatively rudimentary and inchoate apparatus of intergovernmental cooperation.

Decision-Making in an Authoritarian Regime: Theoretical Implications from a Mexican Case Study

By S. K. PURCELL

An authoritarian regime is defined in terms of variables that facilitate comparison with other types of regimes. The framework is applied to one particular authoritarian regime, that of Mexico. The defining variables are then used to elaborate generalizations regarding the decision-making process in authoritarian regimes in general, and in Mexico in particular. The generalizations are tested against information obtained from the study of one major decision—that of Mexican President Adolfo López Mateos (1958–1964) to implement the provisions of the Constitution of 1917 that provide for the distribution of a portion of industry's profits among the workers. Finally, a model of the decision-making process in the Mexican regime is presented and its relation to current socioeconomic and political trends in Mexico is analyzed.

The Emancipation of Chinese Women

By S. G. LEADER

The emancipation of women is an important policy problem in China. The Communist Party seeks to free women by altering marriage customs, drawing women into the labor force, providing women with a new role and image, and by offering them a political role. Policy on women tends to be emphasized during mass mobilization campaigns; it is downgraded during periods of conservative economic planning. The goal of freeing women is subordinate to the priorities of economic growth and political development: women's progress has been sacrificed for these priorities. Liu Shao-chi was criticized by Maoists during the Cultural Revolution for his conservative policies on women. But, after twenty years of nearly continuous effort, Mao admits that women have just begun to be liberated.

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The Single Party as a Subordinate Movement: The Case of Egypt

By I. F. HARIK

The single-party system under Nasser differed from the Soviet as well as the machine-politics model. The party was a collaboration movement comprised of a nationally dominant leader and local influentials of divergent social groups who formed a front within a party framework. It was transformed into a mobilization movement with a fair degree of discipline for nearly three years before it reverted to a collaboration movement in 1968. During all its different phases, the party remained politically most relevant and effective at subnational levels where it enjoyed an autonomy lacking on the national level. In short, the single party under Nasser was a mass organization whose powers were residual, community-bound, and nontransferable to national leadership roles, whereas locally it stimulated participation and involvement in community politics and contributed to intense political competition and to a high turnover rate of leaders.

East-West Tension in Europe, 1946–1970: A Conceptual Analysis and a Quantitative Description

By K. GOLDMANN

According to standard usage of the term in the social sciences, including international relations, "tension" is a psychological phenomenon. The following definition is suggested: between two actors, or coalitions of actors, tension exists to the extent that they expect conflict behavior to occur between them. Under certain conditions, fluctuations in international tension can be validly measured by means of a quantitative content analysis of public governmental statements. A type of content analysis known as the "coefficient of imbalance" is used to measure variations in East-West tension in Europe during the period 1946–1970. Yearly as well as quarterly data are presented, and tests of reliability and validity are reported.

New Perspectives on British Local Government

By H. A. SCARROW

The literature on British local government has left unanswered two major questions: (1) To what extent does there exist a system of "home rule" local government, as contrasted with a system of local administration of nationally formulated policies? (2) To what extent does there exist mass attitudinal support for "home rule" local government? Boaden provides an empirical answer to the first question by demonstrating the existence of wide variations in urban government expenditure policies, even though resources and need are held constant. A case study of the city of Sheffield, by Hampton, likewise shows the importance of the choices which confront locally elected councils. Despite its demonstrated importance, local government does not seem to rest on supportive mass attitudes. Evidence of this absence is provided in opinion surveys conducted by Hampton and by official government bodies. Strong attitudinal support for provincial government exists in Northern Ireland, as shown by a survey conducted by Rose.

Order or Movement? The Literature of Political Development as Ideology

By M. KESSELMAN

Most works about political development by American political scientists share a common political theory. Two leading examples are examined: Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*; and Leonard Binder and others, *Crises and Sequences in Political Development*. In the view of these authors, it is desirable that political power in developing nations be securely centralized and that authorities have sufficient power to suppress any challenge to their dominance. A fusion of scholarly and elite perspectives appears to occur, in which crises are viewed from the elites' point of view. Conflicts of interest between authorities and subordinates are thereby ignored; it is assumed that the government's power will be used to serve public interests. Studies in political development are thus ideological (in Mannheim's sense): their overall objective appears to be to reduce irregularity and maintain order.

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INTERDEPENDENCE: MYTH OR REALITY?

By RICHARD ROSECRANCE and ARTHUR STEIN*

ONE of the uncertainties of modern international relations is the degree of interdependence among states. Some theorists have asserted that interdependence is high and/or growing, and others have maintained that it is low and/or declining. Essentially, the debate about interdependence has proceeded in three separate phases. (1) In the aftermath of World War II, technology was heralded as the stimulus to an interrelationship among states: The world was shrinking; technological, military, and economic factors would produce interdependence even among erstwhile enemies.[1] (2) Later this conventional wisdom was challenged by Karl Deutsch and his associates, who purported to show that various economic indicators of external reference were declining.[2] International transactions were lessening relative to intranational transactions. More and more, citizens were turning to the nation-state for the satisfaction of their needs, and national economies were taking precedence over the previous international economy of the nineteenth century. This theme has recently been powerfully reinforced by Kenneth Waltz.[3] (3) In reaction to the claims of the Deutsch group, which initially predicted stalemate in European unification efforts and a greater autarchy for industrial states, new presentations of the argument in favor of interdependence have been made.[4] According to this view, interdependence among states is certainly increasing. A symposium on the international corporation partly reinforces Deutsch's view, while one on transnational processes argues

* The authors would like to acknowledge their indebtedness to Professors Richard N. Cooper, Simon Kuznets, Robert Lipsey, Thomas Willett, and Raymond Vernon, and to Mr. Brian Healy, for advice or data used in preparation of this paper. They absolve them entirely, however, from any responsibility for errors of fact or argument in what follows.

[1] See *inter alia*, Emery Reves, *The Anatomy of Peace* (New York 1946), 268.

[2] See particularly, Karl W. Deutsch, Lewis J. Edinger, Roy C. Macridis, and Richard L. Merritt, *France, Germany and the Western Alliance* (New York 1967), chap. 13.

[3] Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Myth of Interdependence," in Charles P. Kindleberger, ed., *The International Corporation* (Cambridge, Mass. 1970).

[4] See Edward L. Morse, "Transnational Economic Processes," in Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, Mass. 1972); Morse, "The Politics of Interdependence," *International Organization*, XXIII (Spring 1969); Oran R. Young, "Interdependencies in World Politics," *International Journal*, XXIV (Autumn 1969); and Richard N. Cooper, *The Economics of Interdependence* (New York 1968).

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against it.[5] The resultant of these theoretical vectors remains uncertain. In this essay we hope to offer new data and to provide a modest reconciliation of the contending claims, drawing a trial balance between them.

One of the problems in unravelling disagreements about interdependence is the absence of an agreed definition of the term. At least three different notions have been employed. In its most general sense, interdependence suggests a relationship of interests such that if one nation's position changes, other states will be affected by that change.[6] A second meaning, derived from economics, suggests that interdependence is present when there is an increased national "sensitivity" to external economic developments.[7] This "sensitivity" presumably can either be perceived or unperceived.[8] The most stringent definition comes from Kenneth Waltz, who argues that interdependence entails a relationship that would be costly to break.[9] This definition is different from the others in two senses: (1) It presumes a positive relationship between the interdependent units, such that each will suffer if the relationship is harmed; (2) relationships in which one party is affected by what another does would not necessarily be interdependent by Waltz's definition, because the effect might not be "costly." Since observers use such different definitions of the central term, it is easy to understand why they draw different conclusions about the presence or absence of interdependence in the contemporary world.

At the same time, Waltz's conclusion that interdependence is low or declining can be disputed even on the basis of the stringent definition he employs. The Waltz contentions run approximately as follows: Interdependence exists where there is a division of labor or a specialization of functions. Unlike units perform different functions or offer specialized services; they become interdependent when they perform these services for each other and when units come to rely on such specialization. On the other hand, if units are alike, they cannot offer different commodities or services; interdependence declines. Waltz

[5] See Keohane and Nye (fn. 4); Kindleberger (fn. 3).

[6] This meaning is close to that suggested by Morse and Young. Morse writes: "Interdependent behavior may be understood in terms of the outcome of specified actions of two or more parties (individuals, governments, corporations, etc.) when such actions are mutually contingent." Morse, "Transnational Economic Processes" (fn. 4), 29. See also Young (fn. 4), 726.

[7] See Cooper (fn. 4), 59.

[8] See also Robert D. Tollison and Thomas D. Willett, "International Integration and the Interdependence of Economic Variables," *International Organization*, XXVII (Spring 1973), 255-71.

[9] See Waltz (fn. 3), 205-7.

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also asserts that interdependence is lowest where like units have unequal capacities: Then, powers either cannot or do not have to take each other into account. As juridically like units, therefore, states can have little interdependence at any time and place. Since differences in *de facto* capacities among states have grown since World War II, interdependence is now at a nadir. This is not dismaying, however, for it is contended to be a "mistaken conclusion" that "a growing closeness of interdependence would improve the chances of peace."[10] To summarize this argument, interdependence is high where there are (1) unlike units; and (2) where the units are relatively equal in capacity.

A number of comments can be offered in rejoinder. First, if interdependence is taken entirely in the positive sense (where interests of states vary directly, not inversely), it is difficult to understand how a high degree of interdependence could be a cause for conflict. If relationships really were costly to break on all sides, this would be a factor for general international cooperation. Second, while it is true that interdependence may be high where there are unlike units involved in the relationship, it is by no means clear that such differentiation is the *necessary condition* of high interdependence. A most important form of interdependence, that of military alliance, arises when states offer the same defense resources to each other. By pooling their resources, they gain a joint security that each could not attain in isolation, and yet there is no necessary division of labor. Clearly such defense ties might be very costly to break.[11]

If military allies have relationships that are positively interdependent, enemies or adversaries manifest a high degree of negative interdependence in their relationships. Their interests are crucially linked in that it is assumed that if one improves his position, the other suffers. Yet, where such a high degree of interdependence (albeit negative) exists, there is no necessary differentiation of functions or division of labor. Rather, the interdependence of antagonists arises in part because rivals are alike: they compete for the same goals, utilize similar techniques, and seek to win over the same allies or to acquire the same real estate. The very continuance of competition over time, moreover, is likely to make them even more alike. Eventually, rivals may even develop certain positively interdependent goals. If they reside at the top of a hierarchy of nations, it may be a common interest to prevent any in-

[10] *Ibid.*, 205.

[11] Mancur Olson, Jr., and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," in Bruce M. Russett, ed., *Economic Theories of International Politics* (Chicago 1968).

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roads on their joint position by other states. If war is likely to result in widespread mutual devastation, they may have a common interest in mutual accommodation and coexistence.

It may also be argued that the greatest interdependency in contemporary world politics subsists among the most highly developed powers, powers whose economic systems bear the greatest similarity to each other. In military terms, these powers could hurt each other grievously; in economic terms, they have the capacity to help or harm each other. At this juncture, the error of following the comparative-advantage, product-specialization argument too far is clearly portrayed. The basis for international trade today is not only marked product differentiation, but also the capacity of the domestic market. Europeans, Americans, and Japanese sell the bulk of their goods in each other's markets, even though typical approaches to comparative advantage would have them import raw materials from and sell industrial goods to the less developed countries.[12] The products which major industrial countries offer are not highly differentiated in the Ricardian sense; they all offer automobiles, consumer electronics, and industrial equipment. Differences exist, however, in marketing, pricing, quality, and sophistication. As we shall see later, the exchange of manufactured goods for manufactured goods is becoming *more* typical in international trade, not less so. It therefore does not follow that interdependence is low today, even if Waltz's strict definition of the term is employed.

At the same time, Waltz correctly points to the fact that nationalism and national interests are not secondary or obsolete phenomena in the contemporary world. Indeed, nationalism is a far more prominent factor in economic and political arrangements today than it was in the halcyon days of the nineteenth century. Prior to 1914, economic internationalism was the order of the day. Passports were unnecessary. Tariffs had only been recently reintroduced. National secrecy in military plans and the demand for patriotic loyalty on the part of citizens were surely less stringent than they are now. Nationalism was in fact strengthened by the reformist orientation of modern politics: Franklin Roosevelt, a domestic reformer who tried to put the United States on the road to economic recovery after the Depression, did so at the expense of the international economic and, to some extent, political system. When governments are expected to regulate the economy to

[12] This approach is that of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem emphasizing factor proportions.

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obtain maximum welfare for their citizens, they must often slight the interests of economic and political partners. Citizens may also reflect such attitudes. They do not look to the international system for economic and political benefits, but to their national government. Socialism, nationalization, and domestic economic planning interpose national criteria on international economic forces. By almost any definition of the terms, economic and political nationalism have grown since the last decades of the nineteenth century. What effect has this development had upon interdependence?

By all three definitions, nationalism might have been expected to reduce interdependence. It might be argued that, if nations seek only to achieve their own goals without any reference to the rest of the system, the linkage between units must decline. If nationalistic goals depend on supportive actions by other members of the international community, however, nationalism cannot be achieved in isolation. Not only does interdependence not decline in such circumstances, aggressive nationalism may lead to higher negative interdependence. The greater nationalism of the twentieth century therefore need not entail a reduction of interdependence. We still do not know whether interdependence will rise or fall, whether it will be positive or negative. The rest of this paper will be devoted to an answer to these questions in economic and political terms, considering data and developments of the past century.[13]

The Trade Sector

If we are to gain a greater understanding of present-day interdependence, the trade sector is critical. One of the long-standing contentions of those who assert that interdependence is low or declining is that national industrialization, at least in its later stages, involves a decreasing reliance upon foreign trade. As manufacturing economies develop, states rely more upon themselves for necessary goods and less upon imports from other countries. Karl Deutsch and Alexander Eckstein, in a pioneering study, tried to measure this phenomenon by

[13] Interdependence may also increase due to scientific and technological developments. See Eugene B. Skolnikoff, *The International Imperatives of Technology* (Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, No. 16, 1972); see also his "The International Functional Implications of Future Technology," prepared for delivery at the 66th Annual Meeting, American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, September 8-12, 1970; John Gerard Ruggie, "Collective Goods and Future International Collaboration," *American Political Science Review*, LXVI (September 1972), 874-93; John H. Dunning, "Technology, United States Investment, and European Economic Growth," in Kindleberger (fn. 3).

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the ratio of foreign trade to GNP over time.[14] They concluded that the ratio of foreign trade to GNP increased during the early stages of economic development, but decreased in the later stages of national industrialization.

It is not certain, however, that Deutsch's and Eckstein's data support their conclusions. Ratios for the 1950's, as given by the two investigators, are sometimes quite close to the highest of the series for several countries.[15] Moreover, the Deutsch-Eckstein study is based on current dollar figures.[16] Over the last century, domestic rates of inflation have tended to inflate GNP figures while, due to revolutionary advances in transportation, export and import prices have not risen as sharply.[17] Robert E. Lipsey, therefore, recalculated the ratio of American exports to GNP in constant 1913 dollars. As Table 1 shows, there is no secular trend of a decline in foreign-trade ratios.

Calculations on other bases support the same conclusion. Table 2 shows that data to 1970 may even portray a slight increase in the ratio of American exports to GNP.

The conclusion that ratios have not fallen and may even recently have increased is strengthened by the knowledge that the ratio for the nineteenth century is inflated because of the downward bias in GNP calculations. Deutsch and Eckstein admit that their national-product

[14] Karl W. Deutsch and Alexander Eckstein, "National Industrialization and the Declining Share of the International Economic Sector, 1890–1959," *World Politics*, XIII (January 1961), 267-99.

[15] See also Robert E. Lipsey, *Price and Quantity Trends in the Foreign Trade of the United States* (Princeton 1963), 39-44.

[16] There are no criteria by which to decide which ratio of foreign trade to GNP is more valid, the one based on current dollars or the one based on constant dollars. In its limiting case, the ratio based on current dollars would go to zero, and it would be irrelevant to point out that in constant dollars there was still some foreign trade of consequence. (We are indebted to Richard N. Cooper for this point.) However, in the Deutsch-Eckstein case, where even in current dollars the ratio for the 1950's was relatively high, it is more illuminating to look at ratios based on constant dollars.

[17] The following table gives an indication of this phenomenon for the last decade:

EXPORT, IMPORT, AND CONSUMER PRICES FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1970
(EXPRESSED IN U.S. DOLLARS; 1963 = 100)

	Export	*Import*	*Consumer*
Japan	110	106	149.5
West Germany	114	110	120.4
France	112	107	130.9
United Kingdom	112	110	139.3
United States	121	120	128.9

Source: *International Financial Statistics* XXIV (December 1971), 32, 33, 35.

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TABLE 1

RATIO OF EXPORTS TO GNP AVERAGED BY DECADES, IN CONSTANT 1913 DOLLARS[18]

	Ratio of Exports to GNP
1880–89	6.25
1890–99	7.24
1900–09	6.64
1910–19	7.69
1920–29	6.35
1930–39	5.06
1940–49	7.93
1950–59	6.65

TABLE 2

RATIO OF EXPORTS TO GNP AVERAGED BY DECADES, IN CONSTANT 1958 DOLLARS[19]

	Ratio of Exports to GNP
1930–39	4.91
1940–49	4.34
1950–59	4.93
1960–69	6.06

estimates "tend to understate the subsistence sector of the economy."[20] They accurately point out that much of the growth in GNP in industrialized states is due to the growth of the service sector, and that that very sector was substantially underestimated in GNP calculations for the previous century. It is therefore very difficult to square the available data with the conclusion that foreign trade as a share of GNP has declined as a consequence of higher industrialization.

Changes in the structure of trade, however, may lead to lower interdependence even though the foreign stake of many developed countries is high or increasing. If interdependence existed only when the relationship would be costly to break, it might be contended that trade at the turn of the century was more truly interdependent than it is

[18] See Lipsey (fn. 15), 430-31. This table is constructed using Kuznets' estimate of the U.S. Gross National Product. Because the Kuznets estimates deflate GNP, official statistics cannot be used to extend the Kuznets series.

[19] Source: United States Government, *Economic Report of the President* (1972). The lower ratios in this table are due to the use of official (undeflated) GNP indices.

[20] Deutsch and Eckstein (fn. 14), 271.

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today. Before World War I, a typical trade transaction probably involved an exchange of manufactured goods for raw materials; today, much of world trade consists of the exchange of manufactured goods among developed countries. Since these countries could theoretically adopt programs of import replacement, it is contended that interdependence has decreased.[21]

It is indeed true that trade in manufactured goods has greatly increased with time. Table 3 shows the trend in world exports of primary products, petroleum, and manufactured goods since 1950. While primary exports have almost doubled and petroleum exports nearly trebled, manufacturing exports have grown by a factor of seven.

TABLE 3

TREND IN WORLD EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURES, PETROLEUM, AND PRIMARY COMMODITIES, 1950–1969
(IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)[22]

	Primary Commodities	*Petroleum*	*Manufactures*
1950	30.28	——	22.97
1955	31.13	8.59	33.77
1960	36.71	10.63	57.74
1965	46.02	15.05	92.45
1969	56.02	21.54	149.73

These trends are reinforced by Table 4, which shows that raw materials have dropped and manufactured goods have risen as a percentage of imports and exports among developed countries since 1954. The increasing trade in manufactured goods, not surprisingly, is linked with an increase in the trade among developed countries. Table 5 shows that trade among industrial states has increased most dramatically in the last three decades.

These trends are consistent with the conclusion that interdependence has not increased, however; industrial countries, with flexible economies, should be able to reduce their dependence upon each other without great cost. But this argument must take account of yet another

[21] See Waltz (fn. 3), 210.

[22] Source: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Trends in Developing Countries* (Washington, D.C. 1971). Beginning in 1955, petroleum is included as Section 3 of the Standard International Trade Categories. Data exclude trade among Communist countries. It is interesting to compare these results with those offered by Albert O. Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade* (Berkeley 1945), 141-45: He found either no percentage increase in manufacturing trade as a proportion of the total, or a slight decline for major powers from 1913 to 1937. Longer-term figures, however, point to secular increases since 1954.

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TABLE 4

RAW MATERIAL AND MANUFACTURED IMPORTS AND EXPORTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES[23]

		Imports		*Exports*	
		Raw/ Total	Manu./ Total	Raw/ Total	Manu./ Total
Germany	1954	71	27	15	84
	1968	43	53	9	90
Japan	1954	86	14	14	85
	1968	72	27	5	94
France	1954	70	24	28	65
	1968	39	60	22	74
Italy	1954	65	34	40	58
	1968	54	45	16	82
United Kingdom	1954	76	20	13	81
	1968	48	48	8	85
United States	1954	63	32	28	68
	1968	32	62	26	70

TABLE 5

VALUE INDEX OF DIRECTION OF EXPORTS, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (1950 = 100)[24]

	From Developed to Developed	*From Developed to Developing*	*From Developing to Developed*	*From Developing to Developing*
1938	42.1	31.0	31.3	28.3
1948	95.5	100.0	85.8	108.7
1950	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1954	143.7	134.5	119.4	117.4
1959	213.8	176.1	140.3	126.1
1964	352.2	223.9	185.8	158.7
1969	598.7	331.6	271.7	223.3

point. Not only do developed countries trade with one another mainly in manufactured goods: There is also, in trade among developed nations, an increasing dependence upon particular countries and particular commodities. Albert Hirschman has used an index running

[23] United Nations, *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1954* and *1968* (New York 1955 and 1970).

[24] Source: *Trends in Developing Countries* (fn. 22).

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from 100 (when a country's exports go solely to one trading partner) to very low numbers (when a country's trade is evenly divided among a large number of countries).[25] This measure is known as the Gini coefficient, which is the square root of the sum of the squares of the fractions of trade with each country, multiplied by 100. Its upper limit is 100; the lower limit, assuming trade is evenly divided among 100 countries, would be 10. In 1945 Hirschman used it to calculate the dependence of one nation upon the trade of another. Thirteen years later, Michael Michaely furnished an estimate of the dependence of countries on trade in particular commodities.[26] We have updated these estimates with figures for 1961 and 1968. The evidence is incontrovertible: the recent growth of trade in manufactures among developed societies has not freed economies from the thrall of a few suppliers, nor has it reduced their dependence on imports of particular commodities. Perhaps surprisingly, industrial countries have become more dependent on particular countries for their trade, and are generally more dependent on the supply of particular commodities. Less developed countries may have increased their independence within the system. Table 6 shows the change in Gini coefficients for selected

TABLE 6

CHANGE IN GINI COEFFICIENTS IN THE GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION OF TRADE FOR SELECTED DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (CHANGE FROM 1954 TO 1968)[27]

	Exports	*Imports*
Germany	3.5	4.2
Japan	9.9	−7.3
France	4.4	8.8
Italy	6.2	2.2
United Kingdom	1.9	1.0
United States	.5	4.9
Brazil	−4.7	−1.2
Mexico	−15.1	−17.1
Ghana	−10.8	−19.4
Turkey	−1.6	+3.2

[25] See Hirschman (fn. 22), 98-100.

[26] Michael Michaely, "Concentration of Exports and Imports," *Economic Journal* LXVIII (December 1958), 722-36.

[27] 1954 data based on Michaely, *ibid.*; 1968 data computed using D.o.T. totals from International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *The Direction of Trade Annual 1966–70* (Washington 1971).

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industrial and developing countries in dependence upon trade with particular states. Separate indices are given for imports and exports, indicating the degree to which trade has become geographically dependent.

It is noteworthy that among developed countries (with the exception of imports to Japan) the changes are all in a positive direction, indicating that trade has become more geographically concentrated among suppliers and markets with time. For the developing countries shown, with the exception of Turkey, trade has become less concentrated geographically, and therefore it reflects a smaller degree of dependence. Table 7 gives similar evidence of the dependence on trade in particular commodities.

TABLE 7

CHANGE IN GINI COEFFICIENTS IN THE COMMODITY CONCENTRATION OF TRADE FOR SELECTED DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (CHANGE FROM 1961 TO 1968)[28]

	Exports	*Imports*
Germany	1.21	.53
Japan	2.98	.93
France	1.18	— .95
Italy	.03	3.27
United Kingdom	.04	— .81
United States	2.86	3.86
Brazil	— .19	— 1.49
Mexico	— 21.14	— 2.92
Ghana	— 1.38	— 3.68
Turkey	+ 8.98	— 6.77

With the exception of changes in imports for France and the United Kingdom, commodity concentration for the major developed countries has increased in the past decade: Developed countries are now more dependent upon the import and export of particular commodities than they were previously. Developing countries show no such pattern, and Mexico's reduction of dependence on particular commodity imports and exports is striking. These findings modify conclusions about a reduction in interdependence among industrial countries. The concentration in trade among developed countries is growing. Diversification of suppliers and markets is harder to accomplish. To this degree,

[28] Source: *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1961* and *1968* (fn. 23).

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dependence and a mutual interdependence of all industrial countries has increased.[29]

There is a further point. The most satisfactory measure of interdependence is not the cost of breaking the relationship, but the degree to which economic interests are direct functions of one another. If the economic position of state *A* changes, will state *B* be affected? In the nineteenth century, there was a *de facto* interdependence of economic units, but political governors did not act in such a way as to maximize the economic interests of their unit. They therefore neglected external economic changes that had a great effect upon the domestic economic system. During the past half-century, political changes within society have made it impossible for political leaders to ignore the domestic impact of external economic forces. Today, therefore, they respond vigorously to external economic changes. Economic effects are now fully comprehended within the political realm. Thus, politically significant interdependence is much higher today than it was during the nineteenth century.

The Investment Sector

The investment sector reveals similar patterns. Those who argue that interdependence is decreasing can point to the change in the pattern of overseas investment over the past century.[30] Those who assert that it is rising can center their attention on the tremendous recent growth in foreign investment and on changing patterns of investment.[31] Much of the growth in foreign investment since World War II has been in direct investment (investment which results in an im-

[29] On balance, the foreign-trade sector does not appear to be quite as useful for the measurement of relative interdependence as previous analysts have maintained. Although foreign trade is increasing relatively and absolutely among developed countries, that trade represents an exchange of manufactured goods. As a number of economists have pointed out, if governments can find substitutes for import or export markets among a few industrial countries, the growing effects of concentration do not necessarily increase interdependence. But even if substitutability exists economically, the problems of the political costs of switching from one market to the other and of the circumscription of political latitude involved in the process remain. For the latest review of the literature on trade as a measure of integration, and an excellent bibliography, see Cal Clark and Susan Welch, "Western European Trade as a Measure of Integration: Untangling the Interpretations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XVI (September 1972), 363-82. Integration theorists might find it useful to examine other transnational economic sectors as well as trade, including those discussed below. One such attempt is outlined in Tollison and Willett (fn. 8).

[30] Kenneth Waltz notes, for example, that "in 1910, the value of total British investment abroad was 1½ times larger than her national income"; for the United States today, however, it is a meager 18%. Waltz (fn. 3), 215.

[31] See Cooper (fn. 4), chaps. 3, 4, and 5; Morse, "Transnational Economic Processes" (fn. 4), 36-37.

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portant share of ownership or control of a foreign corporation). By contrast, the leading authority on capital flows in the late nineteenth century observes that "portfolio investment was a far more important component of long-term capital movements before 1914 than direct investment; and it consisted much more of transactions in bonds and other debt instruments than in equities."[32] What direct investment there was in the nineteenth century tended to proceed from capital-abundant to capital-deficient areas.[33] While one-third of British long-term investments were in Europe, much of this was in capital-deficient areas such as Russia. Even when direct investment in other developed countries increased after World War I, investment in capital-deficient areas remained a large fraction of the total. In this period, American direct investment abroad typically flowed to Latin America.

The recent growth in overseas long-term investment has not only taken the form of direct investment, it has also increasingly gone to other developed countries. Tables B and C of the Appendix demonstrate this change. In 1936 and 1950, American investments were evenly divided between developed and less developed countries; in 1968, two-thirds of the book value of direct American investments were in developed countries. American direct investments in manufacturing have risen from 25.6 per cent of the total in 1936 to 40.6 per cent in 1968. These changes are revealed even more dramatically by an analysis of capital flows. In 1957, 55.5 per cent of the net capital flows from the United States went to less developed countries, with 46.9 per cent going to Latin America. In 1968, 58.4 per cent of American capital flowed to developed countries, with 31.2 per cent going to Europe—an increase of 11.6 per cent since 1957.[34]

With these changes, American investments have become more concentrated geographically and in terms of specific industries. Table 8 indicates this concentration.

TABLE 8

GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION OF U.S. INVESTMENT, 1929–1959[35]

	1929	*1936*	*1943*	*1950*	*1959*
Gini Coefficient	33.02	34.41	34.20	34.68	37.60

[32] Arthur Bloomfield, *Patterns of Fluctuation in International Investment before 1914* (Princeton Studies in International Finance, No. 21, 1968), 3-4.

[33] *Ibid.*, 2-3.

[34] See Tables D and E of the Appendix.

[35] Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, *U.S. Business Investments in Foreign Countries* (Washington, D.C. 1960), 92. Figures since 1959 would probably indicate

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The conclusion to be drawn from these trends is that the stake of the developed countries, and particularly of the United States, in the international economic system has risen as it has become more concentrated.[36] Direct investments imply a higher stake in a foreign country than portfolio investments. Investments in manufacturing enterprises and in other developed countries have narrowed the focus of American investor activity and concern. More is at stake in specific markets, and in specific kinds of enterprises; there is more to lose than there was formerly.

The absolute increase in American direct foreign investment is matched by its relative growth as compared to other GNP indicators. Measured against domestic GNP, in current or constant dollars, the foreign-investment sector has grown rapidly. Table 9 makes this clear.

TABLE 9

INDEX OF GROWTH OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND U.S. GNP, 1968[37]
(1959 = 100)

GNP in current dollars	179
GNP in constant dollars	148
Direct foreign investment	219

These comparative growth rates are even more remarkable if 1950 is taken as the base year.

TABLE 10

INDEX OF GROWTH OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND U.S. GNP, 1968[38]
(1950 = 100)

GNP in current dollars	303
GNP in constant dollars	199
Direct foreign investment	551

an even higher degree of concentration, but Department of Commerce statistics no longer give country-by-country breakdowns of investment figures.

[36] It could of course be argued that a reduction in the number of suppliers or buyers does not necessarily raise the costs of such transactions to the United States. A few sources may be cheaper than many sources. But the circumscription does diminish U.S. political initiative; it narrows America's political latitude and thus links her interests more closely with the remaining sources of supply or markets.

[37] Sources: *U.S. Business Investments in Foreign Countries* (fn. 35), 92; *Survey of Current Business*, L (October 1970), 28; *Economic Report of the President*, 1972 (fn. 19), 195-96.

[38] *Ibid.*

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This tremendous growth in the book value of American direct investment has been paralleled by a growth in the volume of operations of foreign affiliates compared with U.S. domestic concerns.[39] Domestic sales did not double between 1957 and 1968; however, the sales of foreign manufacturing affiliates rose by more than a factor of three. In 1968, the volume of sales abroad in manufacturing amounted to 10 per cent of domestic sales in manufacturing.

Foreign earnings on direct investments of American corporations have also increased more rapidly than domestic earnings. Since 1950, domestic profits of corporations have risen by about 50 per cent. But earnings on direct foreign investments have increased by more than 450 per cent.[40] By 1969, foreign earnings on direct investments had risen to 28 per cent of domestic earnings.[41]

This increased preoccupation with the foreign economic sector, moreover, was not confined to the United States. The growth of the multinational corporation has been so spectacular that today, "of the 50 largest economic entities (in the world), 37 are countries and 13 are corporations. Of the top 100, 51 are corporations."[42] It has been estimated that about one-quarter of the gross national product of the non-Communist world is earned by the business of such enterprises outside their home countries.[43]

It is of course true that foreign investment as a percentage of national income has decreased since 1913, but the type of investment which has occurred is such as to give its owner a substantial stake in the foreign sector. In contrast to the experience of the nineteenth century, current foreign investment is not simply credit, it is partial ownership. Control of productive facilities is involved. Today, transfers of technology are an exceedingly important part of direct investment. Since they are so important, it would be foolhardy for host countries to threaten them. But if the cost of breaking the relationship is so high, interdependence must also be high.

The political significance of interdependence is low when its salience is low. In 1913, economic interdependence had very low political salience; governments were not supposed to be responsive to or control external economic influences. Thus, the absolute high value of invest-

[39] See Table F of the Appendix.

[40] See Table G of the Appendix.

[41] This figure of 28% would be even higher if income from other (non-direct) foreign private assets had been included.

[42] Lester R. Brown, "The Nation State, the Multi-National Corporation and the Changing World Order," mimeo (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1968), quoted in John McHale, *The Transnational World* (Austin 1969), 8.

[43] Raymond Vernon, *Sovereignty at Bay* (New York 1971), 383.

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ment in 1913 had little political significance. Today the rate of increase of the foreign-investment sector and the increasing political responsiveness of governments have given high salience and significance to foreign investment.

The Financial Sector

The financial operation of the international economic system has changed greatly since World War I. Under the gold standard of 1880–1913, short-term capital movements were neither as extensive nor as disruptive as they have been in recent years.[44] The amount of funds available for "hot money" flows has now reached an all-time high. Table H of the Appendix shows that $71 billion is available in various currencies (mainly dollars) for short-term transactions. This huge pool of assets, sloshing from country to country, can easily undermine domestic monetary policy and strength. In 1968, an inflow of foreign funds into West Germany amounted to as much as 8.9 per cent of the domestic money supply, greatly circumscribing attempts at an anti-inflationary policy. In the same year, France suffered an outflow of 22 per cent of her international reserves, forcing her central bank to put a brake on expansionist policies.[45] In July 1972, speculation against the dollar was so intense that in just one day European central banks bought $1.5 billion to prevent the dollar from going beneath the level fixed by the Smithsonian Agreement of December 18, 1971.[46] Less than 14 months later, speculation forced a further 10 per cent devaluation of the dollar, and in one day Germany took in $2.7 billion in exchange for marks. The Smithsonian Agreement, which once appeared to be a long-term solution, has now been abandoned.

If the sudden speculative movements of this vast pool of currencies are not to undermine domestic monetary stability and economic progress, and perhaps to cause a collapse of the whole Western trading system, governments will have to concert their countermeasures. Increasing recognition of the problem in the past fifteen years has led to the General Agreement to Borrow (GAB), various currency-swap arrangements, an enlargement of IMF quotas, and the creation of Special Drawing Rights (SDR's). Yet it is by no means certain that these and various pending arrangements will fully control the short-term flow of funds among Western and developed nations. The inter-

[44] See Bloomfield (fn. 32), 87.
[45] See Lawrence Krause, "Private International Finance," in Keohane and Nye (fn. 4), 181-83.
[46] *New York Times*, July 19, 1972.

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dependence of the financial structure of trade is growing, but still higher cooperation among governments is necessary to ensure that it will not become a negative interdependence.[47]

Other changes have transformed the system since World War I. The old gold standard was based (not surprisingly) on gold as a medium of exchange. Minimum use was made of foreign currencies as reserves. At the end of 1913, the nations of the world held only $963 million in foreign-exchange reserves, and over half of these were possessed by Russia, India, and Japan.[48] Official gold holdings, in contrast, were more than five times as much.[49] With the move to a gold-exchange standard, the percentage of national reserves accounted for by foreign-exchange holdings has gone up dramatically. Table I of the Appendix makes it clear that in 1945 gold accounted for 70 per cent of international reserves, while foreign exchange totaled 30 per cent. By the end of 1971, on the other hand, gold amounted to only 30 per cent of world reserves, while foreign exchange represented 60 per cent, and a new category of international reserves (SDR's and gold *tranche*) represented 10 per cent.

These figures are even more instructive when analyzed in conjunction with the growth of world trade in the same years. In 1945, world exports in the non-Communist world totaled $34.2 billion. By the end of 1971, world exports were estimated at $334 billion, 977 per cent of the previous figure. This means that since 1945, the value of world exports has more than doubled every eight years. This growth is more than double the growth rate of foreign-exchange holdings, more than four times that of total international reserves, and almost eight times the growth rate of gold holdings. In 1945, total international reserves were 39 per cent greater than the value of world exports; by the end of 1971, total international reserves were only 40 per cent of the total value of exports in one year. Thus, while the holdings of international reserves have not kept pace with the growth in trade, the degree to which they have kept up is due to vast increases in the holdings of foreign exchange.

[47] See Susan Strange, "The Dollar Crisis: 1971," *International Affairs*, XLVIII (April 1972), 194.

[48] See Bloomfield (fn. 32), 7.

[49] *Ibid.*, 7. Peter Lindert disputes the traditional wisdom (and Arthur Bloomfield) by claiming that foreign currencies were used fairly extensively. However, even Lindert's data for 1913 show that only $1132 million were held in foreign-exchange reserves, which is 15.9% of the total world reserves. He also concurs that more than half of these official foreign balances were held in Russia, India, and Japan. See Peter H. Lindert, *Key Currencies and Gold, 1900–1913* (Princeton Studies in International Finance, No. 24, 1969), 12, 13, 76, 77.

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This change also represents an increase in international interdependence. Gold was an undifferentiated asset; it could be earned from any sector, and spent in any sector. A nation had to discipline its trade overall, but not with specific countries. Today, bilateral trading relationships are far more important, and among those trading countries interdependence has increased. What is more important, while the countries whose currencies are media of exchange have some responsibility for disciplining their own financial policies, other countries also have a direct financial stake in their solvency. These other countries have an interest in not allowing reserve currencies to sink too low on international exchanges. Hence the rescue operations for the British pound and the U.S. dollar. Now that Swiss francs, German marks, and Japanese yen are being held as reserves, other nations also have a stake in maintaining the value of such reserves. These currencies may be able to benefit from rescue operations at a later stage. Gold holdings in the nineteenth century did not produce this same stake, this same interdependence. Governments, recognizing this dependence upon currencies, have now gone so far as to create a new reserve unit, the SDR, the use and further extension of which will be entirely dependent upon international agreement. The interdependence of the financial system has now become formal.

The Political Sector

The development of political relations among states since 1913 has witnessed two major trends. Between 1919 and 1939, an essentially autarchic trend held sway, with nations striving to reduce their dependence upon others, first in political and later in economic terms. Because of the role of prewar alliances, World War I strengthened the tendency for nations to rely on themselves. The peacetime alignments which emerged in the thirties had little significance in time of crisis or war. Indeed, the only major powers which stood by their alliance commitments were Germany and Japan. The Soviet Union, France, Britain, and Italy all vacillated, and the United States remained out of the bargaining.

After World War II, however, nations came to believe that they could not ensure their own defense without help. National self-sufficiency would no longer provide security. In the wake of Hiroshima, many nations also concluded that major wars would be so horrendous that they could not be tolerated at all. Henceforth, minimal cooperation would be necessary even among adversaries. Arrangements were made for crisis communication and management.

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In recent years, however, intergovernmental cooperation and interdependence have grown apart from military stimuli. It can even be argued that the alienation of publics from their governors has strengthened such trends. Contemporary government depends upon such a wealth of information and specialized expertise that the man in the street cannot keep up with what is happening, to say nothing of being able to make informed judgments. Under these circumstances, elections have come to be symbolic processes, largely devoid of intellectual content. Since people do not fully understand their governments, they tend to distrust them and to become resentful toward those in authority. But distrust of those in power nationally does not lead to any new foci of international loyalty and support. If national bureaucracies are immobile, international or supranational institutions are either weak or unresponsive to popular demands. Even in Europe there has been no marked substitution of international for national loyalties.

The difficulties of domestic governance have, paradoxically, forced governmental elites together. Although the masses cannot fully communicate with elites, and elites cannot talk to the masses except in the simplest terms, elites *can* talk to each other. National leaders are coming to recognize that, with individual variations, they are all in the same boat. Among developed societies at least, they face similar problems: the problem of remaining in power as the electorate becomes sullen and resentful; the problems of economic progress and of making their way in international politics while avoiding major war. Leader-to-leader diplomacy has been a way of learning from each other.

The failure of ideology to cope with real governmental problems has also brought leaders together. The barrage of information and the communications revolution have today either destroyed or rendered irrelevant most ideological systems of belief.[50] Rigid doctrinal approaches are discredited by new information. Rulership requires so much expertise and detailed adjustment that ideological systems offer few guidelines. Elites learn from each other, perhaps more than they do from their own publics; in one sense they help each other solve the problem of domestic governance.

. . .

Increased communication among leaders has not, however, put an end to nationalism. It is true, as Kenneth Waltz argues, that "the progress of internal integration and the increased intervention of governments in their domestic economies means that for most states the

[50] See Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Between Two Ages* (New York 1970), Parts II-III.

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internal sector now looms larger than it once did."[51] While elites are looking outward, publics are turning to their national governments for the solution of social and economic problems. What Karl Kaiser calls "vertical interaction" (between government and society) has grown greatly in recent decades. Kaiser argues that "a high degree of horizontal interaction [between units of world politics] . . . does not lead to transnational politics unless there is vertical interaction." He goes on: "The higher the degree of interventionism on the part of national governments, the more vulnerable governmental policies become to processes on the level of transnational society which might thwart these policies. A democratic structure intensifies this relationship since it forces governments to be more responsive to disturbances."[52] He then concludes that a nation-state's participation in transnational politics is a function of the product of horizontal and vertical interaction:

$$tp = hi \cdot vi$$[53]

This equation suggests that, if vertical interaction increased and horizontal interaction remained the same, transnational politics would increase. But if transnational politics is any measure of the amount of interdependence among states, this conclusion can scarcely be accepted. If vertical integration and interaction were to increase greatly, as for example with the establishment of a totalitarian state, transnational politics would almost certainly decline rather than increase. Such an increase in vertical interaction would probably stimulate a decline in horizontal interaction with other states and societies, again preventing any increase in transnationalism. It is also not an accident that states convulsed by revolutionary impulses have been the least amenable to horizontal interaction with other states and societies. The domestic preoccupation of the vertical revolutionary process tends to cut links with other units. It is also not surprising that the Communist countries, with the highest degree of vertical integration, where "the permanent intervention of governmental institutions in the social and economic life of society" has gone farthest, evince the fewest horizontal ties with other states and societies. There can be no conclusion, therefore, that vertical interaction *always* increases transnational politics and interdependence.

[51] Waltz (fn. 3), 208.
[52] Karl Kaiser, "Transnational Politics: Toward a Theory of Multinational Politics," *International Organization*, XXV (Autumn 1971), 812.
[53] *Ibid.*

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Conclusion

The earth is today poised between a world of nationalism and a world of transnationalism. The vertical interaction of nationalist processes has moved to a new peak. The horizontal interaction of transnational processes is higher than at any point since World War I. Moreover, it is growing rapidly. As both Kaiser and Morse have pointed out,[54] vertical interaction has made horizontal interaction relevant for political and governmental purposes. If vertical interaction were not so great, the world would be witnessing a return to the *apolitical* interdependence of 1913. However, a rapid further increase in domestic social change and vertical interaction, far from increasing transnational politics, could put an end to them.

Domestic governments lie at the nexus of vertical and horizontal interaction. They are impelled in one direction by the desire to satisfy the electorate and to build domestic support. They are impelled in another by the high degree of horizontal integration of the system. If they are to cope with the great transnational phenomena of the current age—the multinational corporation, the unrivaled impact of private financial transfers, and continuing trade problems—they must cooperate with one another. In some measure the two influences are complementary: If governments are to satisfy the demands of the electorate in economic and financial policies, they may have to cooperate more fully with other nations. Under the stimulus of economic nationalism, however, nations may also occasionally act *against* the multilateral cooperative framework.

Intergovernmental cooperation has slowly increased since World War II to provide for a steadily increasing level of international trade and financial stability. The gold pool, GAB, and swap arrangements were the achievements of the early sixties. SDR's and last-minute rescue operations for the dollar or the pound are the remedies of today. Yet, given the huge pool of Eurodollars and other currencies which can spill in or out of the domestic economic reservoirs of Western states, it is by no means assured that intergovernmental cooperation will be great enough to meet the need. Devaluation has often been the practical recourse, even though it represents national action against an agreed set of currency values.

American economic nationalism stimulated the U.S. moves of August 15, 1971 and February 12, 1973. The first eventually led to the

[54] *Ibid.*, 811-12; Morse, "Transnational Economic Processes" (fn. 4), 44-45.

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Smithsonian Agreement of December 1971, but that agreement could not be maintained under the continued pressure of monetary speculation. A further 10 per cent devaluation of the dollar, on February 12, 1973, led to the float of European and Japanese currencies. Even after the second American devaluation, however, the dollar and a number of other currencies remained vulnerable to speculative assault. After each autarchic move, the damage to the Western trading mechanism has been patched or repaired. But it is not certain that intergovernmental cooperation will be great enough to meet all crises in the future. It is, for example, uncertain that the Common Market countries will be able to keep their currencies in fixed alignment under current pressures. Neither is it certain that the Europeans will be able to avoid import surcharges if their currencies float too high for domestic political acceptability. In this sense, the American precedent of August 1971 may now be employed by European states. The problem of speculative flows of hot money has by no means been solved.[55]

Today, therefore, whether interdependence will emerge as positive or negative will depend largely on old-fashioned cooperation among governments. Governments can heed nationalistic, autarchic, or reformist demands of the citizenry. Even if they do not do so, however, the onrush of economic transnationalism is so rapid that it is not certain that governments can keep abreast of it. When antiquated forms of cooperation fail, nationalistic alternatives may be substituted.

In the international system today there is a phenomenon akin to Ernst Haas's "spill-over" in the Common Market. Nations that strive to carry out existing functions required by the exigencies of transnational flows and domestic demands must move to a higher level of cooperation. Horizontal interaction is increasing so rapidly, however, that the past apparatus of intergovernmental institutions and policy is no longer adequate. Haas presumed that, within an already partially integrated structure, this would lead to further integration of policies and institutions. Whatever the mandates of functional cooperation within customs unions, however, the international system as a whole does not prescribe

[55] See Susan Strange (fn. 47), 215; Edward L. Morse, "Crisis Diplomacy, Interdependence, and the Politics of International Economic Relations," *World Politics*, XXIV (Spring 1972 Supplement), 123-50. As many have noted, one response to the failure of agreed currency values could be to move to freely floating exchange rates. So far, however, there is little evidence that nations would not try to extract the maximum national leverage from such a situation. After August 15, 1971 and after the failure of the Smithsonian Agreement, many nations engaged in "dirty floating," supporting the dollar and preventing their own currencies from rising to market level.

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such results. The failure to meet the challenge of higher necessary cooperation could mean a higher possibility of conflict. The objectives at stake are much greater than heretofore, but it is not certain that the current structure of interdependence will permit them to be achieved.

APPENDIX

TABLE A*

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF TRADE FOR SELECTED DEVELOPED AND LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE VARIOUS TYPES OF INTERCHANGE: 1954 AND 1968

		Raw-Raw	*Man-Man*	*Inv*	*Raw-Man*	*Total*
West Germany	1954	16	25	8	51	100
	1968	9	47	14	30	100
Japan	1954	12	16	20	53	100
	1968	5	27	1	67	100
France	1954	28	24	7	41	100
	1968	21	63	7	9	100
Italy	1954	32	41	20	7	100
	1968	16	45	2	37	100
United Kingdom	1954	11	22	16	50	100
	1968	7	54	17	22	100
United States	1954	34	26	23	17	100
	1968	26	61	7	6	100
Brazil	1954	37	1	13	49	100
	1968	37	8	7	48	100
Mexico	1954	2	28	27	44	100
	1968	16	22	22	40	100
Nigeria	1954	15	1	15	70	100
	1968	17	8	6	69	100
Panama	1954	38	1	65	—3	100
	1968	45	1	48	6	100

Raw-Raw: Exchange of foodstuffs and raw materials against foodstuffs and raw materials.
Man-Man: Exchange of manufactures against manufactures.
Inv: Exchange of commodities against "invisible items."
Raw-Man: Exchange of manufactures against foodstuffs and raw materials.

* Computed using Albert O. Hirschman's method, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade* (Berkeley 1945), chap. VII. Data from *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1954* and *1968* (fn. 23).

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TABLE B*

PERCENTAGE OF U.S. BOOK VALUE OF DIRECT INVESTMENT BY GEOGRAPHIC AREA: 1936, 1950, 1959, AND 1968

	1936	*1950*	*1959*	*1968*
Developed Countries	51.2	48.3	56.5	66.9
Canada	29.2	30.4	34.2	30.1
Western Europe	18.8	14.7	17.8	29.9
Less Developed Countries	48.4	48.6	39.1	28.8
Latin America	41.9	37.7	27.6	20.2

* The percentage not accounted for is due to a category called international, unallocated.

TABLE C

PERCENTAGE OF U.S. BOOK VALUE OF DIRECT INVESTMENT BY CATEGORY: 1936, 1950, 1959, AND 1968

	1936	*1950*	*1959*	*1968*
Mining and Smelting	15.4	9.6	9.6	8.4
Petroleum	16.1	28.8	35.1	29.1
Manufacturing	25.6	32.5	32.6	40.6
Public Utilities	24.5	12.1	8.1	4.1
Trade	5.8	6.5	6.9	8.1
Agriculture	7.2	5.0	2.2	—*
Other	5.4	5.6	5.5	9.7

* No separate category

Sources for Tables B and C: *Survey of Current Business* (October 1970), 28; U.S. Department of Commerce, *U.S. Business Investments in Foreign Countries* (Washington, D.C. 1960), 92-93.

TABLE D

PERCENTAGE OF U.S. NET CAPITAL FLOWS BY AREA: 1957 AND 1968

	1957	*1968*
Developed Countries	40.1	58.4
Less Developed Countries	55.5	35.7
Canada	28.9	19.5
Western Europe	11.6	31.2
Latin America	46.9	21.1

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TABLE E

PERCENTAGE OF U.S. NET CAPITAL FLOWS BY CATEGORY: 1957 AND 1968

	1957	*1968 (preliminary)*
Mining and Smelting	8.0	1.7
Petroleum	56.7	33.3
Manufacturing	17.4	36.5
Public Utilities	7.7	*
Trade	1.7	*
Finance and Insurance	7.8	*
Miscellaneous	.6	28.4

* No separate category

Sources for Tables D and E: *Survey of Current Business* (October 1970), 29; U.S. Department of Commerce, *U.S. Business Investments in Foreign Countries* (Washington, D.C. 1960), 137.

TABLE F

INDEX OF U.S. FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC SECTOR IN MANUFACTURING IN 1968
(1957 = 100)

Manufacturing Exports	189	
Sales by Direct Manuf. Affiliates	326	
Total Foreign Sales		262
U.S. Value Added by Manuf.	193	
U.S. Manuf. Sales	175	

Sources:

Domestic Sales: United States Government, *Economic Report of the President* (1972), 244;

Value Added: 1957: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Annual Survey of Manufactures 1966* (Washington, D.C. 1969), 11; 1968: *Annual Survey of Manufactures 1968* (Washington, D.C. 1971), Press Release #M68 (AS-6), 1 & 2;

Manuf. Exports: *U.S. Statistical Abstract* (1970), 480; *U.S. Statistical Abstract* (1963), 875;

Sales by Affiliates: *Survey of Current Business* (October 1970); U.S. Department of Commerce, *U.S. Business Investments in Foreign Countries* (Washington, D.C. 1960), 110.

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TABLE G

EARNINGS ON DISTRICT FOREIGN INVESTMENTS AND FOREIGN EARNINGS AS PERCENTAGE OF DOMESTIC CORPORATE PROFITS

	*Earnings on Direct Foreign Investments**		*Foreign Earnings as Percentage of Domestic Profits*
	Million $	*Index (1950 = 100)*	
1950	1,892	100	9
1951	2,365	125	13
1952	2,457	130	15
1953	2,386	126	15
1954	2,534	134	16
1955	3,036	160	14
1956	3,527	186	16
1957	3,799	201	18
1958	3,260	172	19
1959	3,589	190	16
1960	3,969	210	19
1961	4,278	226	21
1962	4,815	254	20
1963	5,247	277	20
1964	5,827	308	19
1965	6,384	337	17
1966	6,732	356	16
1967	7,170	379	19
1968	8,268	437	22
1969	9,497	502	28

* Earnings category was obtained by adding (1) earnings of U.S. direct investment abroad, and (2) direct investment receipts of royalties and fees. Income from other (non-direct) private assets has *not* been included.

Sources:

Profits: 1950–1962: *Survey of Current Business*, September 1965, 53; 1962–1963: *ibid.*, July 1966, 5; 1964: *ibid.*, July 1968, 24; 1965–1966: *ibid.*, July 1969, 22; 1967–1970: *ibid.*, July 1971, 18.

Royalties and fees: *ibid.*, June 1970, 34-35.

Earnings of U.S. direct investments abroad: 1950–1959: *Balance of Payments Statistical Supplement*, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics, 1963), 184; 1960: *Survey of Current Business*, August 1962, 22-23; 1961: *ibid.*, August 1963, 18-19; 1962: *ibid.*, August 1964, 10-11; 1963–1970: *ibid.*, October 1971, 28-29.

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TABLE H

NET* ESTIMATED SIZE OF EUROCURRENCY MARKET
(IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

	Eurodollar Market	*All Eurocurrencies*
1964	9.0	**
1965	11.5	**
1966	14.5	**
1967	17.5	**
1968	25.0	**
1969	37.5	44.0
1970	46.0	57.0
1971	54.0	71.0

* Net of interbank deposits within Europe. However, net includes banks' assets and liabilities vis-à-vis their own countries (foreign currency position vis-à-vis residents).
** Not estimated by B.I.S.

Source: *Bank for International Settlements*
1964–68 Eurodollar: *Thirty-Ninth Annual Report* (Basle 1969), 149;
1969–70 Eurodollar: *Forty-First Annual Report* (Basle 1971), 164;
1969–71 Eurocurrency: *Forty-Second Annual Report* (Basle 1972), 155;
1971 Eurodollar: *Forty-Second Annual Report* (Basle 1972), 148.

TABLE I

INTERNATIONAL RESERVES
(BILLIONS OF DOLLARS, END OF YEAR)

	1945	*1955*	*1965*	*1971*
Gold	33.3	35.8	41.4	39.2
of which: U.S.	(20.1)	(21.8)	(14.1)	(11.1)
Foreign Exchange	14.3	17.0	23.0	79.5
of which: U.S. $	(4.2)	(8.3	(15.9)	(51.1)
£ Sterling	(10.1)	(7.6)	(6.7	(7.8)
Gold *Tranche* position at the IMF	—	1.9	5.4	6.9
SDR's	—	—	—	6.4
Total	47.6	54.7	69.8	132.0
Addendum: World Exports	34.2	84.0	165.4	334.0*

* Estimated quarterly data expressed as annual rate.

Sources: For 1945, 1955, and 1965, Richard N. Cooper, *The Economics of Interdependence* (New York 1968), 51; for 1971, *International Financial Statistics* (September 1972).

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DECISION-MAKING IN AN AUTHORITARIAN REGIME:

Theoretical Implications from a Mexican Case Study

By SUSAN KAUFMAN PURCELL*

IN recent years, as political scientists have witnessed the establishment of non-democratic governments in an ever-increasing number of countries, there has been renewed interest in the concept of an authoritarian regime. Despite its frequent use, however, the concept of an authoritarian regime rarely has been defined so that it could be applied in a comparative analysis.[1] Furthermore, the theoretical utility of classifying a regime as "authoritarian" remains unclear. If the classification is to have some explanatory value, the way in which such a regime's defining characteristics produce distinctive political processes and behavior must be demonstrated.

In this article I propose to address myself to both these problems. First, I will define an authoritarian regime in terms of variables that will facilitate comparison with other types of regimes.[2] The framework will then be applied to one particular authoritarian regime, that of

* I am grateful to John F. H. Purcell for his valuable criticism of the present article, which is a revised version of a paper presented at the September 1971 meeting of the American Political Science Association. I would also like to thank Douglas A. Chalmers, Dankwart A. Rustow, and Ronald M. Schneider for their comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this work. The research for this article was carried out in Mexico between March 1967 and June 1968, with the support of a Fulbright-Hays Fellowship and a Columbia University Latin American Institute Travel Grant.

[1] The main exception is Juan Linz's article, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," in E. Allardt and Y. Littunen, eds., *Cleavages, Ideologies, and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology* (Helsinki 1964), 291-341. Recent works, including the present article, which borrow elements of Linz's definition, are Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston 1966); Charles W. Anderson, *The Political Economy of Modern Spain: Policy-Making in an Authoritarian System* (Madison 1970); Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, eds., *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems* (New York 1970); Ronald M. Schneider, *The Political System of Brazil: Emergence of a "Modernizing" Authoritarian Regime, 1964–1970* (New York 1971); and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil* (Stanford 1971).

[2] It should be noted that neither this writer nor the authors cited in the preceding footnote implicitly or explicitly include arbitrary use of power or unresponsiveness in their definition of an authoritarian regime.

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Mexico. Following this, I will proceed beyond classification and use the defining variables to elaborate generalizations regarding the decision-making process in authoritarian regimes in general, and in Mexico in particular. The generalizations will be tested against information obtained from the study of one major decision—that of Mexican President Adolfo López Mateos (1958–1964) to implement the terms of the Constitution of 1917 that provide for the distribution of a portion of industry's profits among the workers.[3] Finally, a model of the decision-making process in the Mexican regime will be presented.

It should be noted that not all students of the Mexican political system agree that the regime is authoritarian. Prior to 1950, it was considered authoritarian by the relatively few people familiar with it. Since the mid-1950's, however, the system has been termed authoritarian by some, and democratic, imperfectly democratic, or in transition toward democracy by others.[4] In part, the differences of interpretation are more apparent than real, in that one scholar's "imperfect democracy" is another's "authoritarian regime." There are, nevertheless, some basic disagreements regarding both the way the political system functions and the direction of future political change. The "democratic" theorists variously believe that economic growth, education, and urbanization will increase the strength of opposition parties, thereby changing Mexico into a competitive party system. The "authoritarian" proponents do not demonstrate such determinism.

In the present paper, I will attempt to elaborate and strengthen the argument in favor of the authoritarian interpretation, and to provide a definition of an authoritarian regime that can be used in comparative analysis. Most important, I will try to demonstrate the utility of classifying a regime (in this case, the Mexican regime) as authoritarian, in order to understand its political processes in general and its decision-making process in particular.

[3] The profit-sharing decision was selected for analysis because it involved the most important interest groups—the organized labor movement and the organized industrial and commercial interests (referred to as the "private sector" in Mexico), and their interaction with the executive branch of the government. Since the labor groups were officially members of the dominant political party, the PRI, and the private-sector groups were formally excluded from the party, the decision could elucidate the role of the PRI in the decision-making process. The decision was not chosen because it was typical, but rather because it was particularly complex. It was redistributive in that it proposed to transfer income from the private sector to the organized labor movement. Consequently, it had the potential for generating substantial opposition. The decision also embodied regulatory and distributive aspects, and thus could provide insight into the full range of decisions made in the Mexican political system.

[4] For a discussion of these differing interpretations, see Carolyn and Martin Needleman, "Who Rules Mexico? A Critique of Some Current Views of the Mexican Political Process," *Journal of Politics*, XXXI (November 1969).

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I. The Authoritarian Framework

The characteristics I consider crucial for the general classification of regimes are: (1) the nature and degree of political pluralism, (2) the nature and degree of mobilization of the population, and (3) the style of rulership. More specifically, an authoritarian regime is characterized by (1) limited political pluralism, (2) low subject mobilization of the population, and (3) the predominance of patrimonial rulership on the part of a single leader or a small group.

Limited political pluralism[5] is defined as a situation in which interest groups are partially tied to, and dependent upon, the regime. The leaders of the groups owe their primary allegiance to the regime's elite and are only secondarily dependent on the support of their followers. The limited pluralism of an authoritarian regime contrasts, for example, with the pluralism of democratic regimes. In the latter, interest groups are more independent. The continued survival of the leaders or the groups is not contingent upon their acceptance or sustenance by the government.[6]

Low subject mobilization is defined as a situation in which politicized individuals possess a "subject" rather than a "participant" (or independent) attitude. Citizens are mobilized on a temporary basis to ratify the decisions of the authoritarian elite and to demonstrate support for the regime. Much of the time, however, the regime does not encourage participation. As a result, the level of political participation is low. In a democratic regime, in contrast, mobilization is moderate, and of the participant variety.[7] Political participation is left to the discretion of the individual.

Patrimonial rulership refers to a style of rulership[8] in which the ruler grants privileges, goods, or similar "benefices" to a select portion of the ruled. In return, the individual recipients (clients or subjects) acknowledge the authority of the ruler and defer to him. As a result of the receipt of benefices, however, the recipients themselves are put in

[5] The concept of limited pluralism is borrowed from Linz (fn. 1), 297-300.

[6] Even if one rejects many of the arguments of the pluralists in the pluralist/power-elitist controversy, one must admit that interest groups in the United States, for example, clearly are *structurally* more independent of the government than they are in authoritarian regimes. One might question the *representativeness* of the interest-group system in democratic regimes, but that is not at issue here.

[7] The concept of low mobilization is borrowed from Linz (fn. 1), 304-11. The terms "subject" and "participant" are borrowed from Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston 1965).

[8] The idea of separating patrimonial *authority* from patrimonial *style of rulership* comes from Guenther Roth, "Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire-Building in the New States," *World Politics*, XX (January 1968), 194-206.

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a position analogous to that of their ruler. They are able to bestow a portion of their grant upon others below them who, in return, are deferential and obligated to their "patron." In a democratic regime, in contrast, legal rulership predominates. The individual who occupies an office is subject to the rules governing the exercise of that office's authority and "cannot appropriate the office . . . in the sense of private property that can be sold and inherited."[9]

Although there are writers who implicitly or explicitly equate authoritarian regimes with single-party systems, I would suggest that a dominant or "official" political party is not a defining characteristic of an authoritarian regime.[10] If an authoritarian party exists, its behavior parallels that of other groups in a situation of limited political pluralism.

I would also suggest that a specific kind and degree of elite consensus is not a defining characteristic of an authoritarian regime. Some degree of consensus is of course assumed, since there cannot be an authoritarian regime without a relatively stable center of authority. Particular authoritarian regimes, however, can range between low and high degrees of elite consensus. Such variations could affect both the number and kinds of decisions made (or not made) in particular authoritarian regimes.

II. The Authoritarian Regime of Mexico

LIMITED POLITICAL PLURALISM

The most visible groups in the Mexican regime are organized around labor, agrarian, middle-class, and business interests. All but the latter are formal members of the respective labor, agrarian, and popular sectors of the tri-sector *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI), the "official" party of the regime. The business interests are obligated to join either the National Confederation of Mexican Chambers of Industry (CONCAMIN) or the National Confederation of Mexican Chambers of Commerce (CONCANACO). All of these interests are characterized by limited pluralism. The strength of their ties to and dependence upon the regime, however, varies.

The group that is manipulated most easily are the *ejidatarios*, peasants who have been given communal lands (*ejidos*) by the regime and who are dependent upon the regime for the continued possession

[9] Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait* (New York 1962), 424.

[10] For an elaboration of this point, see Susan Kaufman Purcell, "Authoritarianism," *Comparative Politics*, v (January 1973), 301-12.

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of their land, for credit and technical assistance, and for the protection of their rights. All *ejidatarios* are subject to a detailed Agrarian Code, whose broad provisions are interpreted and applied by the regime. With minor exceptions, all are nominal members of the regime-created and -supported National Farmers' Confederation (CNC), which also includes small independent farmers and rural wage laborers. The regime determines who the CNC's leaders will be and what goals the organization will pursue.[11]

By comparison with the organized peasants, organized labor is more independent; its members are more mobile and educated, and are not formally dependent upon the regime in order to exercise their skills. All union members, however, are subject to the provisions of the Federal Labor Law as interpreted and applied by the regime. The regime controls the right to strike, and has substantial leverage over union leaders by virtue of the Ministry of Labor's ability to deny registration to undesirable leaders and their unions. The closed-shop provisions of the Federal Labor Law allow union leaders approved by the regime to deprive uncooperative union members of union membership, and thus of employment.[12]

The two million members of the CNOP (*Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Populares*), the umbrella organization of the "popular" sector of the PRI, appear to be significantly less dependent upon the regime, since they are relatively educated, are not regulated by a detailed federal legal code, and are not obligated to affiliate with a particular interest-organization to obtain a job. The CNOP's affiliates, however, constitute a diverse and fragmented population that includes groups of artisans, professional people, intellectuals, small merchants, youths, women, small agriculturalists, and small industrialists. The regime's relatively weak control of these groups is offset by its ability to play their demands off against each other. The main exceptions to this situation of lesser dependence are the government bureaucrats and the teachers. The first are organized into the FSTSE (*Federación de Sindicatos de Trabajadores al Servicio del Estado*), the largest group

[11] Patricia McIntire Richmond, "Mexico: A Case Study of One-Party Politics," Ph.D. diss. (University of California, Berkeley 1965), 190-91.

[12] Richard Ulric Miller, "The Role of Labor Organizations in a Developing Country: The Case of Mexico," Ph.D. diss. (Cornell University 1966), 293; Michael David Everett, "The Role of the Mexican Trade Unions, 1950–1963," Ph.D. diss. (Washington University, Missouri 1967), 71. The effectiveness of the above-mentioned mechanisms in the control of the organized labor movement is indicated by the low correlation between strikes and the economic cycle, and the high correlation between the number of strikes and a favorable attitude toward organized labor on the part of a Mexican president. Cf. Pablo González Casanova, *La Democracia en México* (Mexico 1965), 24.

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within the CNOP. In the absence of an extensive merit system, the approximately 400,000 FSTSE members are dependent upon the regime for their continued employment. The teachers, who are organized into the SNTE (*Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de Enseñanza*) are in a somewhat analogous position, since most educational institutions are supported by the national government.

The business interests, or "private sector," undoubtedly are the most independent of all the groups. They are able to generate their own financial resources, they frequently are supported by influential foreign economic interests, and they have the potential for undermining the stability of the regime by means of decisions that might prove detrimental to economic growth. The independence of the private sector, however, is limited by the considerable influence the regime can exercise over the economy. The government issues credit controls, grants loans, licenses, and tax exemptions, sets tariffs, and perhaps most important, allocates rights to import foreign-made goods. Its decisions regarding how and where to invest public funds, which at present account for approximately half the nation's total investment, often are crucial for potential or existing investments by the private sector. The fact that the Mexican government owns or controls many of the most important industries in the country, such as the railroad, telegraph, telephone, electric power, petroleum, natural gas, and petrochemical industries, as well as numerous sectors of the banking industry, further increases its ability to affect the private sector.[13]

LOW SUBJECT MOBILIZATION

The Mexican regime encourages a special, limited kind of political participation. Individuals are mobilized periodically on a temporary basis, either to vote in regularly scheduled elections or to attend regime-sponsored demonstrations. The purpose of such events is to allow the regime's "subjects" to show their support and to reinforce its legitimacy, which is based in part on the democratic norms expounded in the Constitution of 1917.

The "subject" nature of the mobilization is evident from election results. Since 1929, the "official" party has controlled the presidency. It has received an average of 88 per cent of the total vote cast during eight elections, with a high of 98.2 per cent in 1934 and a low of 74.3

[13] Frank Brandenburg, *The Making of Modern Mexico* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1964), 230. The Mexican government owns or controls other industries which, while not economically important, are politically significant, such as the manufacture and distribution of newsprint, and motion picture distribution and exhibition.

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per cent in 1952.[14] The PRI's nearest competitor, the PAN (*Partido de Acción Nacional*) has averaged 10 per cent of the total vote since 1952 (the first year the party ran its own presidential candidate), with a low of 7.8 per cent in 1952 and a high of 14.1 per cent in 1970.[15] Most of the PRI's opposition has come from the urbanized states and has been concentrated in the largest cities. In the most rural states, the opposition vote rarely has exceeded 2 per cent of the total vote.[16] Congressional elections follow the same pattern. The PRI has yet to lose an election for a Senate seat; it has won an average of 175½ of a possible 178 elected seats in the Chamber of Deputies in the four elections between 1961 and 1970.[17]

The behavior of PRI congressmen in their capacity as lawmakers is also of a "subject" nature. They have little incentive to defy the PRI in order to win support from their supposed constituents since their immediate reelection is prohibited by the Constitution and they are dependent upon the party for the advancement of their political careers. It thus is not surprising that between 1935 and 1961, an average of 84 per cent of the legislative projects sent to the Chamber of Deputies by the executive received unanimous approval.[18] In 1964 the Constitution was amended to guarantee token representation in the Chamber to minor parties. As a result, the unanimous votes on executive-sponsored legislation declined to approximately 50 per cent, although all executive-sponsored legislation continued to be passed by overwhelming, if slightly reduced, majorities.

The level of mobilization in Mexico is generally low, with the exception of elections, when it is moderate. The percentage of the eligible population that votes is a matter of some disagreement; it ranges between 52 and 57 per cent,[19] which is approximately the median for Latin America.[20] This level of electoral participation is the

[14] In 1970, the PRI received 86% of the total votes. All figures are from James W. Wilkie, "New Hypotheses for Statistical Research in Recent Mexican History," *Latin American Research Review*, VI (Summer 1971), 5.

[15] James W. Wilkie, *The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social Change Since 1910* (Berkeley 1967), 182. The 1970 figure is from Ronald H. McDonald, *Party Systems and Elections in Latin America* (Chicago 1971), 253. The significance and implications of the increasing electoral strength of the PAN will be discussed in Part VII of this article.

[16] González Casanova (fn. 12), 116-17.

[17] McDonald (fn. 15), 243.

[18] González Casanova (fn. 12), 27.

[19] According to González Casanova (*ibid.*, 240), the figures for 1958 and 1964 are 49.4% and 54.5% respectively. McDonald (fn. 15, 252), cites 56% for 1958, 52% for 1964, and 56.3% for 1970.

[20] On a list of 19 Latin American countries (excluding Cuba), Mexico ranked tenth. Venezuela ranked highest with 77.7%, and Guatemala ranked lowest with 18.4%.

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result of a strenuous effort on the part of the PRI; it is temporary, and, as noted, has a special significance in the Mexican political system. When other indicators of mobilization are used, Mexico scores substantially lower. Of the five countries studied by Almond and Verba, for example, Mexico scored lowest in political performance, "as measured by political information scores, voluntary association membership and political activity." Only 10 per cent of the Mexicans living in cities with populations exceeding 10,000 were members of trade unions, business or professional groups, or civic-political organizations. Only 4½ per cent of the people who considered themselves politically competent had attempted to influence their local government. Finally, the total population that does not participate at all (i.e., "parochials") amounted to 35 per cent.[21]

PREDOMINANCE OF PATRIMONIAL RULERSHIP

Mexican society is organized into interconnecting vertical chains of patron-client relationships. With increasing modernization, the national government has become the principal *patrón*, replacing the old-style *caudillos*, *jefes políticos*, and *caciques*, or transforming them into representatives of the regime in their localities.[22] In urban areas, the regime's representatives are fairly diversified and include bureaucrats, labor leaders, congressmen, and high-ranking PRI officials. Clientelism, *personalismo*, or what George Foster has called "the dyadic contract" between individuals of unequal status[23] thus are capable of surviving the transition from a rural to an urban, industrial society.

At the apex of the present patrimonial system is the Mexican president, the modern equivalent of the traditional patrimonial leader. When errors are committed, blame usually is attributed to his "incompetent" ministers. The president, on the other hand, is regarded as the source of all good things and is praised accordingly. During his six-year term, he goes on numerous, well publicized *giras de trabajo* (work trips) during which he formally "presents" the Mexican people with roads, schools, factories, experimental farms, drainage systems, and the like. As the source of all benefits and rewards, the Mexican

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Martin C. Needler, *Politics and Society in Mexico* (Albuquerque 1971), 96. Comparable figures for the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain are 99.6%, 64.4%, and 78.0% respectively. Bruce M. Russett and others, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven 1964), 84-85.

[21] Almond and Verba (fn. 7), 311, 247, 144, and 62, respectively.

[22] González Casanova (fn. 12), 39-41.

[23] George Foster, *Tzintzuntzan: Mexican Peasants in a Changing World* (Boston 1967), 214.

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president is forever being petitioned for favors by people in all stations of life. Newspapers are replete with stories reporting personal audiences which the president has granted to labor, business, agricultural, and party leaders, as well as to delegations of peasants, workers, and other "common people." During such audiences the president is presented with lists of the needs of the various "subjects."

The president clearly cannot oversee everything and is obliged to delegate a great deal of power to his ministers, who tend to appropriate these delegated powers to themselves. The Mexican constitutional provision against reelection of the president, however, ensures that the appropriation of presidential power remains temporary: After every presidential election most of the ministers are changed, and the powers that were delegated to them revert to the presidency.

DEGREE AND NATURE OF THE ELITE CONSENSUS

Although, as I have noted, the degree and nature of the elite consensus is not a defining characteristic of an authoritarian regime, the present description of the particular authoritarian regime of Mexico would be incomplete without a brief discussion of it. The Mexican regime is characterized by a relatively high degree of elite consensus. The elite regards the system as viable, functional, and desirable; as a result, the few recent attempts on the part of small groups of dissidents within the elite to change the "rules of the game" have met with resounding defeat. When Carlos Madrazo, the head of the PRI, attempted to democratize the party in 1965 by increasing grass-roots control over the PRI, he was forced to resign. His idea was perceived as a threat to the supremacy of the Mexican president, since it would reduce the executive's control over the party.[24] Between 1964 and 1965, the PRI's majority leader in the Chamber of Deputies led a campaign to allow the consecutive reelection of deputies. The Senate refused to take action on his proposal, which was viewed as an attempt to increase congressional leverage over the president: Deputies would be encouraged to be less responsive to the president and more responsive to their constituents in order to win reelection.[25]

In addition to its consensus regarding the rules of the game, the elite is united by its identification with the presumed goals of the Mexican Revolution of 1910. To speak of the Revolution's goals, however, is misleading: The Revolution was not an organized, ideologically

[24] L. Vincent Padgett, *The Mexican Political System* (Boston 1966), 56-57; *Excelsior*, Mexico City (March–November 1965); also, discussions which this writer had with PRI leaders, Mexico City, 1967–1968.

[25] *Excelsior*, Mexico City (December 1964–April 1965).

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coherent movement bent on achieving specific ends. It is possible, nevertheless, to identify several predominant themes of the "revolutionary" consensus. Among the most salient are nationalism, *justicia social* (social justice), economic development, and "constitutionalism." The last involves sanctification of the sometimes contradictory liberal-democratic and socialistic ideals of the Constitution of 1917.[26]

III. Decision-Making in an Authoritarian Regime: Some Structurally Derived Generalizations

The distinctive cluster of variables that defines an authoritarian regime should present decision-makers in such a regime with options and constraints which differ from those that confront decision-makers in regimes characterized by different clusters of variables. In the following paragraphs, generalizations regarding the decision-making process in an authoritarian regime will be derived from the three characteristics of such a regime—limited pluralism, low subject mobilization, and patrimonial rulership. The generalizations will be contrasted with propositions concerning the decision-making process in democratic regimes. These generalizations will also be derived from the three analogous characteristics specific to such regimes.

The first defining trait of an authoritarian regime—limited pluralism—may be expected to produce an erratic relation between the authoritarian leader's decisions and expressed group demands. Many decisions will involve issues that were never raised, while issues that are raised frequently may be ignored because groups lack sufficient resources and capabilities to support their demands. Interest groups in an authoritarian regime may also be expected to play a predominantly reactive (rather than initiating) role in the decision-making process, expressing support for the leader's decisions or seeking to modify them in their behalf. In a democratic regime characterized by relatively unlimited pluralism, the relation between group demands and the leader's decisions may be expected to be strong; groups will play a predominantly initiating role in the decision-making process and should be able to support their demands with substantial pressure.

The low subject mobilization of an authoritarian regime will reduce the number of demands made upon the authoritarian leader, provide him with substantial decision-making autonomy, and reinforce the erratic relation between group demands and the authoritarian leader's decisions. In a democratic regime characterized by moderate "participant" mobilization, the number of demands emanating from the polity

[26] Brandenburg (fn. 13), 10-11.

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will be greater. The autonomy of the decision-makers will be more limited, and the relatively strong relation between group demands and decisions will be reinforced.

Patrimonial rulership, the third defining characteristic of an authoritarian regime, may be expected to impede the formation of horizontal alliances among individuals and groups. We would therefore expect fewer demands to be voiced in terms of class interests. Interest-group confrontations will not be common, since the authoritarian ruler will be dealing directly with the various groups, rather than allowing them to work out their differences among themselves. Patrimonial rulership will make it difficult to trace the origins of a decision: The leader, as head of a set of patrimonial staff arrangements, will be able to require his immediate subordinates to forward all ideas for decisions to him and to refrain from taking credit for such ideas. In contrast, the legal rulership of a democratic regime will limit the prerogatives of the democratic decision-makers whose behavior must conform to legal rules. It also will make the decision-making process more complicated and of longer duration; the autonomous groups will therefore have numerous opportunities to form horizontal alliances among themselves and to initiate demands that reflect class interests.

Finally, because the specific authoritarian regime under examination in this paper is characterized by a high degree of elite consensus, we may expect the initiation of a greater number of decisions by the Mexican regime than would be the case in authoritarian regimes characterized by a more fragmented elite. The decisions would be related to the "revolutionary" consensus and thus should be more innovative than decisions characteristic of authoritarian regimes based on a consensus that is oriented more toward the status quo.

IV. The Profit-Sharing Decision[27]

On December 27, 1961, President Adolfo López Mateos sent an amendment to Article 123 of the Mexican Constitution to Congress.

[27] For a more detailed account of the profit-sharing decision, see Susan Beth Kaufman, "Decision-Making in an Authoritarian Regime: The Politics of Profit-Sharing in Mexico," Ph.D. diss. (Columbia University 1970). The major sources used to reconstruct the profit-sharing decision include Comisión Nacional para el Reparto de Utilidades, *Memoria de la Primera Comisión*, 3 vols. (Mexico City 1964); interviews with members and the technical staff of the National Profit-Sharing Commission, Mexico City and Washington, D.C., 1968; COPARMEX, Departamento para el estudio de la participación de utilidades y salarios mínimos, *Estudio sobre la participación de utilidades*, 11 vols. (Mexico City 1963); *Excelsior*, Mexico City (1950–1970); *Ceteme* (newspaper of the CTM), 1951–1970; CONCAMIN and CONCANACO Circulars (1960–1967); and Bulletins of COPARMEX.

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One of its provisions called for the elaboration and implementation of a national obligatory profit-sharing system. Article 123 always had included provisions for distributing a share of industry's profits among the workers. The 1961 amendment, however, proposed to remove jurisdiction over profit-sharing from the ineffectual *municipios* and grant it to the federal government.

According to President López Mateos, one of the reasons for his decision was that profit-sharing was "one of the legitimate aspirations of the working class." This assertion is highly questionable. Throughout the 1930's, when the Mexican labor movement was relatively radical, most labor leaders opposed profit-sharing because they believed it would weaken labor's class-consciousness. By 1950, the labor movement had become less radical, industrial profits had become more conspicuous, and some of the more moderate labor leaders began to demand the enforcement of the profit-sharing provisions of the Constitution. The demand, however, never ranked very high on their list of priorities.

The most concerted effort to have the profit-sharing provisions implemented was made by the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM), Mexico's largest labor confederation. In 1950 its leaders asked President Alemán to implement the profit-sharing provisions of the Constitution, and in 1951 they proposed to Congress that the right to profit-sharing be incorporated into collective contracts. Most of the leaders of the other labor groups were opposed to the CTM's project; it died in Congress.

The fact that profit-sharing had been demanded by the CTM leadership for a decade enabled López Mateos to justify his 1961 reforms as a response to "worker demands" and thereby to reinforce the legitimacy of his decision. To consider the president's action a result of demands by the CTM, however, would be inaccurate. The CTM leaders had been demanding profit-sharing since 1950, and Presidents Alemán and Ruíz Cortines had both ignored the demand. López Mateos could have ignored it also, for in 1961 the demand was still unorganized and low in saliency.

Groups other than organized labor showed even less enthusiasm for profit-sharing. The PRI was ambivalent and limited itself to including in its 1960 Declaration of Principles a commitment to work for the establishment of profit-sharing. The private sector, on the other hand, was relatively unified in its opposition to obligatory profit-sharing. Its leaders asserted that the best way to raise real incomes was not by means of profit-sharing, but through the expansion of production

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which depended upon private capital investment. The business groups also warned that if profit-sharing were introduced, Mexico's economic development might be endangered.

Given the absence of strong demands for profit-sharing by labor and the expression of opposition by business, the question of how to account for the decision arises. The answer appears to lie in an examination of President López Mateos' background, interests, and political beliefs, the political and intellectual climate which prevailed at the time of his decision, and Mexico's level of development.[28]

Adolfo López Mateos was the first Mexican who had served as Secretary of Labor immediately prior to assuming the presidency. This departure from tradition is attributable to the fact that previous presidents had ignored the demands of the labor sector throughout the 1940's and early 1950's in order to achieve an industrial economy. The selection of a man identified with the labor movement as president was an attempt to recapture the goodwill of the workers by signaling that the authoritarian elite finally was prepared to bestow some benefits upon the labor movement. For some elements of the labor movement, however, the change came too late. Between 1957 and 1959 these normally low-mobilized union members repudiated their "do-nothing" leaders in favor of more radical ones, who led them into a series of strikes which the government summarily suppressed. The strikes made it easier for López Mateos to justify passage of a relatively large number of reforms beneficial to the labor movement and thus to rebuild and strengthen his reputation as a friend of organized labor.

The implementation of provisions of Article 123 of the Constitution represented an optimal opportunity for López Mateos to accomplish his goal of benefiting the labor movement. First, Article 123 was the article which dealt specifically with the rights of labor. Second, almost all Mexican presidents seek an opportunity to implement portions of the Constitution because it symbolizes that the Mexican Revolution is not "dead," as some of its critics have claimed.[29] This may have been an important consideration, since one of the effects of the Cuban Revolution had been to make "revolutionary Mexico" seem unrevolutionary by comparison.

[28] The following interpretation supports the conclusion of Douglas A. Chalmers regarding the diffuse nature of "agenda-setting stimuli" in the Latin American policy-making process. See Douglas A. Chalmers, "Parties and Society in Latin America" (paper prepared for delivery at the 1968 meeting of the American Political Science Association), 17.

[29] See, for example, Stanley Ross, ed., *Is the Mexican Revolution Dead?* (New York 1966).

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Although there were numerous sections of Article 123 which López Mateos could have selected, the profit-sharing clauses were particularly attractive, for they would redistribute income. Since the late 1950's a number of prominent Mexican economists had been criticizing the inequitable distribution of income. Although none of them advocated profit-sharing as a means of attaining a more equitable distribution, López Mateos could, by implementing the profit-sharing clauses, assert that he was correcting a state of affairs which had been criticized by a segment of the intellectual elite. In addition, López Mateos was one of the first presidents to hold office at a time when it was technologically feasible to implement the profit-sharing provisions. Industrialization no longer was in a precarious state, and fairly accurate statistical information about the economy had recently become available. The government's ability to exact compliance with tax laws also contributed to making profit-sharing feasible by the late 1950's.

López Mateos apparently committed himself to the implementation of the profit-sharing provisions of Article 123 between late 1957 and mid-1959. The idea was discussed with several high-ranking officials in the Treasury, the Ministries of Agriculture, Labor, and Industry and Commerce, and the Bank of Mexico. Since these deliberations produced little dissension, an *ad hoc* commission was assigned the task of drafting a constitutional amendment. The amendment also was to include additional reforms beneficial to labor.

In order to avoid mobilizing potential opponents of the profit-sharing decision (principally the business groups), the government did not reveal that the reform was forthcoming. For the same reason, the provisions of the amendment were unspecific. Other steps were taken to keep the level of opposition low: provisions designed to preempt objections from business and labor groups were incorporated into the amendment; it was sent to Congress several days before the end of that year's session, making discussion of it impossible.

Following the unanimous approval of the 1961 amendment by Congress, the government went to great lengths to placate the private sector, which had been taken by surprise. It publicly praised the private sector for its increasing concern with social justice, and privately began incorporating the business leaders into subsequent phases of the profit-sharing decision, once the "decision in principle" (i.e., redistribution of a portion of the private sector's profits among members of the organized labor movement) had been made. In mid-1962, the Secretary of Labor sent separate invitations to the leaders of the private sector and the labor organizations to "exchange impressions" concerning

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revisions of the Federal Labor Law. Such revisions, which basically involved regulatory issues, were necessary because the 1961 amendment had caused the Constitution to become incongruous with the Federal Labor Law. On December 20, 1962, the president sent the reforms of the Federal Labor Law to Congress, which passed them unanimously. An analysis of the 1962 reforms indicates that the president accepted only some of the suggestions of the private sector and the organized labor leaders.

During the above phases of the profit-sharing decision, business and labor groups, and specifically their leaders, played a reactive rather than an initiating role. The leaders of the private sector directed their efforts toward building a case for their contention that the planned profit-sharing system should not be radically redistributive. Early in 1962, the presidents of CONCAMIN, CONCANACO, COPARMEX (The Employers' Confederation of The Mexican Republic), and the Bankers' Association organized a *Gran Comisión*, composed of several representatives from each of the above organizations. In May 1962, in response to an invitation by the government, several members of the *Gran Comisión* presented their opinions and suggestions regarding the technicalities of the profit-sharing system to be adopted.

In contrast to the leaders of the private sector, the labor leaders concentrated their efforts toward mobilizing support for the reforms among their rank and file, principally by portraying the private sector as being engaged in surreptitious efforts to sabotage the profit-sharing reforms. The task of the labor leaders was made difficult by the fact that the leaders of CONCAMIN, CONCANACO, and COPARMEX had avoided a public attack on the principle of profit-sharing, since it had been a constitutional right since 1917. Although the leaders of organized labor used the specter of a hostile private sector to rally their followers, they apparently did not perceive themselves as being seriously threatened. They refused to join forces, and presented separate opinions on the proposed Federal Labor Law reforms to the Secretary of Labor. The reforms were passed by Congress in December 1962.

The PRI cooperated with the leaders of the labor movement in their efforts to mobilize support for President López Mateos' reforms by criticizing the private sector's efforts to make the reforms more palatable to business interests and by applauding the president's decision. This limited supportive behavior on the part of PRI officials represents the only role the party played during all phases of the profit-sharing decision. Both the labor leaders and the leaders of the private sector worked directly with the Secretary of Labor and bypassed the party.

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The fact that organized labor officially belongs to the PRI while the private-sector organizations are officially excluded from the party was of no significance.

The 1961 amendment to Article 123 of the Constitution stipulated that the obligatory profit-sharing system was to be elaborated by an *ad hoc* National Profit-Sharing Commission composed of representatives of the government, the private sector, and organized labor. In February 1963, Hugo B. Margáin, a former head of the Income Tax Department of the Treasury who currently was serving as Under Secretary of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, was appointed president of the National Profit-Sharing Commission. President López Mateos' selection of an apolitical technocrat to head the Commission emphasized the fact that the remaining decisions were technical ones which were to be made on technical, not political, grounds. Margáin was granted considerable authority by President López Mateos, who apparently made no recommendations regarding the mechanics of the profit-sharing system he wished to establish. He did make clear, however, that the technical decisions to be made by the Commission must not undermine his main priority, which was a workable system for redistributing a share of business' profits among the workers.

Margáin and his technical staff saw their problem as two-pronged: to propose a viable profit-sharing system which would also give impetus to economic growth, or at least would avoid a slowing-down of economic growth. While López Mateos had focused primarily on the political implications of his redistributive decision, the technocrats were most concerned with the economic implications. Margáin's staff eventually decided that 5 to 7 per cent of total private profits could be distributed among the workers without adversely affecting the private sector's investment capabilities. These calculations were discussed with advisers from the private sector, who found them acceptable.

While Margáin was working with his technical staff, he also presided over the National Profit-Sharing Commission which began meeting on March 1, 1963. The ostensible function of the Commission was the elaboration of a specific profit-sharing system. There was no technical reason, however, for its establishment. A government ministry could have elaborated a profit-sharing system, and President López Mateos could have incorporated it into his 1962 Federal Labor Law reforms. There were, however, several political justifications for the creation of the Commission. If the leaders of the private sector contributed to the elaboration of the profit-sharing system, it would prove less objectionable, and ultimately might even prove acceptable to them. From

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the government's point of view, it was also necessary to unite and mobilize the support of the labor leaders so that President López Mateos would be better able to withstand opposition from the private sector. The National Profit-Sharing Commission thus was a device to force a confrontation of the divided labor leaders with the united leaders of the private sector in order to cause the former to unite and more actively support President López Mateos' decision.

The rate of return on capital investment to which a firm would be entitled was the most problematical question confronting the Commission. The representatives of the private sector demanded a deduction from profits of a percentage of the *total capital investment* of a firm. The profit-sharing law then was to be applied to the profits that remained, *if* any remained. Despite an intensive campaign on the part of the private sector, Margáin adamantly refused to allow a deduction based on *total capital investment*, since in many cases it would leave too few profits to be redistributed. To accept the private sector's demand would have been tantamount to undermining President López Mateos' profit-sharing decision.

The profit-sharing system proposed by Margáin as an alternative was based on the principle that whenever a profit existed, workers would receive a share of it. The government was, however, willing to allow business a series of deductions from total profits based on a percentage of the *amount of profits* rather than *total capital investment*. The desire of the regime's technocrats to give impetus to industrialization was realized by granting the largest deductions to the country's most capital-intensive firms. The amount of profits to be distributed under Margáin's system would equal the 5 to 7 per cent of total private investment to which the advisers of the private sector had agreed earlier. Following numerous separate talks between Margáin and the business and labor representatives, the Commission unanimously approved the proposed profit-sharing system on December 11, 1963.

The unanimous vote may be attributed to several factors. One was the skill of the head of the National Profit-Sharing Commission.[30] Another was the level of Mexico's development. The representatives of the private sector accepted Margáin's proposal only when he was able to show them that such a system would not redistribute more than the 5 to 7 per cent of total private profits originally agreed upon. In order to demonstrate this, it was necessary to have fairly credible statis-

[30] Margáin's skill as head of the Commission subsequently received formal recognition when President Díaz Ordaz named him Ambassador to the United States. He served as Minister of the Treasury in the Echeverría government until June 1973.

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tical data in addition to a pool of trained experts, which Mexico had at her disposal by the early 1960's. A final factor was the willingness of the labor leaders to drop their original demand that business be allowed no deductions from total profits. Labor's conciliatory attitude is understandable, for labor was more dependent upon the regime and was in the position of having received a "gift" from the president. This position made it difficult for labor's representatives to make demands regarding the amount of profits to be distributed. Moreover, the profit-sharing issue was complex; unlike the representatives of the private sector, few of the labor representatives possessed the technical training or knowledge necessary to take issue with the proposal. Nor did the labor movement have the economic resources to hire technically trained experts, as did the private sector.

During this final phase of the profit-sharing decision, the role of both the private sector and organized labor continued to be reactive. Business groups presented approximately twenty papers, including a 1733-page COPARMEX study reiterating the views of the private sector, to the National Profit-Sharing Commission. Labor groups, in contrast, submitted only six brief papers.

The extreme unity manifested by the private sector throughout the negotiations is not typical of its behavior at all times.[31] It is explained by the fact that profit-sharing was perceived as a "redistributive" issue by the members of the private sector.[32] It also was a multi-sector issue in that it involved members of *all* organizations of the private sector, whether industrial or commercial.[33] Redistributive, multi-sector decisions seem to produce active cohesion both *within* and *among* peak organizations (e.g., CONCAMIN, CONCANACO, COPARMEX) representing the class that perceives its interests to be threatened. Apparently, however, such issues produce neither active nor passive cohesion among the peak organizations of the class which *benefits* from the decision unless their leaders are forced to confront their opponents. The labor leaders joined forces only when the government required them to meet with the representatives of the private sector on the National Profit-Sharing Commission.

[31] Rafael Izquierdo, "Protectionism in Mexico," in Raymond Vernon, ed., *Public Policy and Private Enterprise in Mexico* (Cambridge, Mass. 1964), 245-89.

[32] Theodore Lowi, in his article "American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory," *World Politics*, XVI (July 1964), 707, hypothesizes that "issues that involve redistribution cut closer than any others along class lines and activate interests in what are roughly class terms."

[33] The term "multi-sector" is used by Constantine Menges in "Public Policy and Organized Business in Chile: A Preliminary Analysis," *Journal of International Affairs*, XX, No. 2 (1966), 358-59.

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The publication of the profit-sharing resolution resulted in expressions of satisfaction on the part of all the involved groups. Although the government had categorically rejected the private sector's persistent and most important demand for a deduction based on total capital investment, the private sector's representatives were satisfied that the system adopted would not distribute more than the 5 to 7 per cent of profits that had originally been agreed upon by Margáin and their advisers. Since they headed technologically advanced firms, the representatives of the private sector were particularly pleased that they would have to distribute the minimum rate, 2.8 per cent, of their taxable profits. Spokesmen for the more labor-intensive firms, however, were less satisfied since they would have to share the maximum, 12.6 per cent, of their taxable profits.[34] The leaders of organized labor applauded the resolution because, after forty-seven years of non-implementation of the profit-sharing provisions, workers would receive a share of industrial profits amounting to additional pay of between one week's and one month's wages per worker.[35]

Enforcement of the profit-sharing resolution followed a pattern similar to that of the original constitutional provision. Although the labor leaders charged employers with wholesale evasion of the law and demanded its stringent enforcement, the government initially did little more than establish offices to counsel the workers regarding their profit-sharing rights. Seven years after the profit-sharing system took effect, the government finally gave workers access to the computations from which a firm's taxable-profits figure was derived, thereby enabling labor to verify the accuracy of an employer's declared profits.

V. Decision-Making in an Authoritarian Regime: Mexico

The limited political pluralism, low subject mobilization, and patrimonial rulership which characterize authoritarian regimes allow the

[34] Since the 1940's, the Mexican government has been committed to industrialization based on capital-intensive technology. The preference given to capital-intensive firms reflects the congruence of interest between the Mexican technocrats and the representatives of the modern industries in the private sector. Furthermore, in comparison with labor-intensive firms, capital-intensive firms earn higher profits and have a relatively smaller labor force. If the latter had been required to distribute the same proportion of their profits among their workers as the former, individual workers in the capital-intensive firms would have received substantially more money than their counterparts in the labor-intensive firms.

[35] Frederic Meyers, "Party, Government and the Labor Movement in Mexico: Two Case Studies" (paper prepared for the International Institute for Labour Studies, Research Conference on Industrial Relations and Economic Development, Geneva 1964), 46; Lic. Ignacio Pichardo, "Algunas consideraciones generales sobre la participación de utilidades," *Comercio Exterior* (January 1964), 12.

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authoritarian leader substantial leeway in the decision-making process. His only major constraint is the need to avoid decisions that would permanently mobilize the opposition of a significant sector of the authoritarian coalition. The following is a series of generalizations concerning the decision-making process in the authoritarian regime of Mexico. They were suggested by the analysis of the profit-sharing decision and are explained in terms of the defining characteristics of an authoritarian regime.

The first stage of the decision-making process consists of the president's commitment to a particular idea. The president's commitment rarely is the result of specific group pressure. In an authoritarian regime, the autonomy of groups is limited; it is therefore difficult for them to support their demands with concrete pressures. The low subject mobilization of the population further reduces the ability of groups to pressure the president; patrimonial rulership makes it difficult for them to unite in order to increase their leverage. As a result, interest groups in an authoritarian regime play an essentially reactive role in the decision-making process, either supporting or opposing some or all aspects of a decision.

In the absence of concrete group pressures, the president has a relatively great latitude in deciding what course of action to pursue. As a result, the president's commitment to an idea may be attributed to numerous diffuse factors such as the goals, interests, and values of the president, the international situation, the sudden availability of a new solution to a persistent problem, the advent of fashionable ideas from abroad, and the president's desire to increase his support and legitimacy by implementing a goal of the elite consensus. In the case of profit-sharing, most of the above factors played a role. In an authoritarian regime, the inability of groups to exert significant pressure means that factors such as the above assume greater importance in accounting for presidential commitment to a particular decision than they would in a regime in which groups are relatively autonomous and highly mobilized.

Sometimes, however, the president's freedom of choice is restricted by indirect pressures from subject groups within the polity that have patiently watched the president's continuous neglect of their demands and interests. The president may finally decide that such groups can no longer be kept demobilized by means of promises of future rewards, co-optation of group leaders, or replacement of uncooperative leaders by more cooperative ones. He may therefore make a decision which he feels will placate them—ideally without sacrificing any of his other

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goals. The 1961 reforms of the labor article of the 1917 Constitution can be attributed in great part to such diffuse pressures.

There are rare occasions when the president may overestimate his ability to prevent the mobilization of opposition, usually because of faulty or insufficient information. The dissatisfied groups may become highly mobilized and determined to improve their situation by means of the only recourse they have at their disposal—disruptive or violent activity. When this occurs, the regime first will repress the leaders of the demonstrating groups and replace them with individuals who are willing to cooperate and who are able to demobilize their followers. Once order has been restored, the president may commit himself to a decision which will benefit the previously neglected group. The 1957–1959 labor disturbances are an example of the result of persistent neglect of organized labor by Mexican presidents. The profit-sharing reform of 1961 was part of a "payoff" to organized labor once the labor movement had been demobilized.

Once the president has committed himself to a particular course of action, a phase of deliberation follows. A small number of people participate in the deliberations, which are not made public. If a recommended decision is expected to provoke opposition, the president and his advisers will agree to make the decision, provided they believe they will be able to demobilize its opponents during subsequent phases of the decision-making process. In addition, they must be able to mobilize the sentiments of their low-mobilized supporters in order to balance the opposition which the decision is expected to generate. In the case of profit-sharing, President López Mateos apparently decided that he would be able both to demobilize the business groups and mobilize the support of the labor groups.

The mobilization of support for a decision may prove difficult because the potential beneficiaries of the decision are divided among themselves as a result of patrimonial rulership, and because their usual level of mobilization is low. These groups seem to have little incentive to unite against their opponents, for they may feel, as did the labor groups in the case of profit-sharing, that the president will safeguard their interests. If the regime must make too great an effort to mobilize support for its controversial decision, it is unlikely that the decision will be made.

Once the Mexican president and his advisers are in agreement regarding the wisdom of making the decision, the president publicly associates himself with it. All important decisions are formally initiated

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by the president and the president both claims and receives full credit for the decision. Because of the patrimonial set of staff arrangements, all individuals who participate in the decision-making process supposedly do so by virtue of the president's will and serve in the capacity of "subjects." In return for having been delegated with the power to serve, they attribute credit for their accomplishments to their patrimonial leader, the president. The authority of the president and, indirectly, the integration of the authoritarian coalition are thus reinforced.

Because the president usually is not subjected to strong group pressures, a decision he announces may or may not satisfy a demand or desire which had been expressed previously by a particular group or groups. If the president's decision does correspond to a previously expressed demand, as was true with regard to the profit-sharing decision, it cannot be directly attributed to the demand, which plays an informational rather than a causal role in the decision-making process. The time lapse between the initial expression of the demand and the president's decision is too great for the latter to be interpreted as a response to the former. The CTM first began to campaign for the implementation of the Constitution's profit-sharing clauses in 1951; the clauses were implemented ten years later. Furthermore, the president's decision was not announced in the period during which the group or groups in question were expressing their demand most vociferously; in the case of profit-sharing, this occurred in the early 1950's. This emphasizes that the president's decision is dependent upon his own will rather than upon that of his subjects. In this way, the patrimonial image of the president is reinforced, and the authoritarian coalition remains integrated.

If the announced decision is not expected to provoke significant opposition, the problem of demobilization of the opposition and mobilization of support does not arise. With a potentially controversial decision such as profit-sharing, however, a great effort is made to avoid the mobilization of opposition and to demobilize the decision's opponents. Opposition is kept minimal through the use of secrecy and vague, unspecific language. Controversial legislation is timed to allow minimal opportunity for public debate. All three tactics were employed in the case of the profit-sharing amendment.

The main device utilized by the authoritarian elite to demobilize its critics is the incorporation of the latter into the decision-making process. Incorporation only occurs, however, *after* the initial vague

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version of the controversial legislation has been approved by Congress. The opposition groups then are invited to participate in the elaboration of a more specific law which will implement the initially unspecific legislation. In the case of profit-sharing, the representatives of the private sector and organized labor were incorporated into the decision-making process after the 1961 Constitutional amendment had been passed, and prior to the drafting of the more specific Federal Labor Law reforms. By delaying the incorporation of group representatives, the president avoids subjecting his "decision in principle" to discussion.

Incorporation usually involves only consultations between the leaders of *relevant* groups and a representative of the regime. The various group leaders are not allowed to express their views in each other's presence. The representatives of the private sector and those of organized labor each met separately with the Secretary of Labor in the case of the profit-sharing decision. In this way, differences of opinion are not allowed to escalate and the level of mobilization remains low. The patrimonial divide-and-rule consultations also reinforce the ties of each of the groups with the center, while simultaneously avoiding horizontal clashes among the groups which would mobilize them and weaken both the coalition and its unifying central agent. Consultation of group leaders in no way obligates the authoritarian leader to accept all their suggestions. For him to do so would imply that the modern patrimonial ruler—in this case, the Mexican president—was subject to the will of his subordinates.

In the case of highly controversial decisions, incorporation includes a government-mediated confrontation of opposing groups during the *final* phase of the decision-making process. The potentially destabilizing and disintegrating effects of interest-group confrontation are thus avoided, since the remaining problems are highly specific and technical. Groups that are deficient in technical expertise defer to the regime's technocrats. Groups that possess or can purchase the services of technical experts defer to their experts. The remaining details are therefore resolved by technocrats, whose outlook and values often converge, rather than by politicians or interest groups.

The occasion for interest-group confrontation in Mexico is a government-sponsored *ad hoc* commission headed by a trusted subordinate of the president to whom the president delegates substantial decision-making authority. The commission is *ad hoc* because the president does not wish to risk a permanent appropriation of his decision-making authority. Once the specific task for which it has been created is com-

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pleted, the commission ceases to exist and its decision-making authority reverts to the president. The National Profit-Sharing Commission came into existence in early 1963 and was dissolved in December 1963, following the elaboration of a specific profit-sharing system.

The government-mediated confrontation on the *ad hoc* commission has political as well as technical functions. Without such a confrontation, the usually low-mobilized beneficiaries of a decision have no incentive to unite in support of the authoritarian leader, since his decision is regarded as a gift which they did not have to work actively to obtain. The authoritarian leader, on the other hand, may find it difficult to avoid making concessions to the more highly mobilized opponents of the decision unless the low-mobilized beneficiaries are united in his support. With regard to the profit-sharing decision, the confrontation served to unite the leaders of the faction-ridden labor movement and enabled the regime to avoid conceding its major point—that no deduction from profits based on a percentage of a firm's total capital investment be allowed. An additional function of the confrontation is the reintegration of the leaders of the recipient groups (e.g., the representatives of organized labor) with the leaders of the groups whose interests suffered as a result of the decision (e.g., the representatives of the private sector).

Once the specifics of a decision have been elaborated, attempts to perfect their enforcement will be incremental so as not to further mobilize the objecting groups and destabilize the system. Minor adjustments or corrections will be made first. With regard to the profit-sharing decision, the earliest attempts at enforcement involved the creation of offices to increase the workers' and employers' understanding of the mechanics of the profit-sharing system. Later reforms increased the workers' ability to verify the accuracy of their employers' declarations concerning the amount of profits. The poor initial enforcement procedures may be regarded as performing a demobilization function, for opposing groups will reduce their opposition if they believe that a decision to which they object will not be stringently enforced.

VI. Generalizing from a Case Study

The objection might be raised that the preceding generalizations are of questionable validity since they are based on the examination of a single case. In particular, the possibility exists that the issue selected biased the results in the direction of the generalizations. The first

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objection admittedly cannot be overcome; confirmation of the generalizations must await additional decision-making studies. I would like, however, to indicate several ways in which the specific case selected was more likely to disconfirm the generalizations than a number of other decisions that could have been chosen. The fact that the profit-sharing case confirmed the generalizations is therefore significant.

In Part III, several generalizations regarding the authoritarian decision-making process were derived from the defining characteristics of such a regime. I suggested, for example, that limited pluralism, low subject mobilization, and patrimonial rulership would provide the authoritarian leader with substantial autonomy in the decision-making process. One might expect that his autonomy would be greatest when making a non-controversial decision. The profit-sharing decision was chosen in part because it was a controversial decision which mobilized substantial opposition. Despite this fact, the authoritarian leader enjoyed substantial autonomy.

I also suggested that the defining characteristics should discourage the formation of horizontal alliances among individuals and groups. One might expect that such alliances would be discouraged by distributive decisions and encouraged by redistributive decisions.[36] Although the profit-sharing decision was redistributive, horizontal alliances among the leaders of the labor movement did not materialize until the president forced them to confront their counterparts in business.

I further anticipated an erratic relation between group demands and the leader's decisions. One might expect that an erratic relation would be most salient in decisions involving groups that are extremely dependent upon the regime and least able to pressure the president, such as the *ejidatarios*. Although the profit-sharing decision involved the most autonomous groups in the Mexican system—the industrial and commercial interests—the relation between their demands and the decisions taken was still erratic.

Finally, I suggested that interest groups would play a predominantly reactive, rather than an initiating, role in the authoritarian decision-making process. One might expect that interest groups would play such a role in a decision which they neither demanded nor supported. However, even though labor groups had originally demanded profit-sharing, they did not mobilize in support of their demand; instead, they played a predominantly reactive role in the decision.

[36] Lowi (fn. 32), 690-91.

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VII. Conclusions

Twelve years have passed since the initiation of the profit-sharing decision. During this time, Mexico's population has become more urban,[37] educated and prosperous, the percentage of the total population that votes has increased,[38] and electoral support for the major opposition party, the PAN, has steadily increased. It is tempting to relate these phenomena and to conclude that, as Mexico continues to develop, the political system described in the preceding pages will evolve into a democratic system characterized by competitive political parties.[39]

There are several problems with such an interpretation. Although high levels of urbanization appear to correlate with the percentage of votes received by opposition parties, principally PAN, the correlation is not strong.[40] Between 1952 and 1967, for example, PRI's percentage of the vote increased by an average of approximately 11 per cent in every Mexican state but three, with the greatest increases occurring in the more urbanized, developed states.[41] It also is debatable whether the PAN's urban vote is basically a middle-class vote which must inevitably increase as the Mexican middle class expands. One recent study, for example, found that PAN votes were evenly distributed throughout the city of Ensenada and could not be correlated with any particular economic or social group.[42] Furthermore, in the context of the Mexican system, a vote for the PAN is better understood as a protest vote against the PRI. It is not clear whether, if those who voted for the PAN believed that the party had a real chance of winning an election, they would continue to support it.

There is also some evidence that urbanization and PAN affiliation are correlated with lower, rather than higher, levels of political partici-

[37] In 1960, 38% of Mexico's population lived in cities of at least 10,000 inhabitants. It is estimated that by 1980, this figure will increase to over 70%. Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr., "Urbanization as an Agent of Latin American Political Instability: The Case of Mexico," *American Political Science Review*, LXIII (September 1969), 837-38.

[38] In 1940, 13.3% of the total population voted in the presidential election. By 1970, 27.6% of the total population was voting. Needler (fn. 20), 97.

[39] For examples of this argument, see *ibid.*, 14; John Walton and Joyce A. Sween, "Urbanization, Industrialization, and Voting in Mexico: A Longitudinal Analysis of Official and Opposition Party Support," *Social Science Quarterly*, LII (December 1971), 744.

[40] *Ibid.*, 732.

[41] Barry Ames, "Bases of Support for Mexico's Dominant Party," *American Political Science Review*, LXIV (March 1970), 165.

[42] Antonio Ugalde, *Power and Conflict in a Mexican Community* (Albuquerque 1970), 153.

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pation.[43] The expansion of the electorate thus may be due to efforts by the PRI to "get out the vote,"[44] and may be independent of socioeconomic forces. Finally, increased electoral participation in the context of an authoritarian regime does not necessarily imply more active participation in the decision-making process. There is no necessary conflict, therefore, between my model of the authoritarian decision-making process and trends toward higher electoral participation.

On the basis of the preceding discussion it seems premature, if not unwarranted, to conclude that the authoritarian regime of Mexico is in transition toward a competitive democratic system as a result of economic and social forces. Such an interpretation not only ignores significant evidence to the contrary, but also underestimates or discounts the capabilities of the regime to influence and control both the direction and the rate of change. Until now, the Mexican political elite has focused its mobilization efforts upon the rural, less developed areas and has paid relatively little attention to the Federal District which has provided the PRI with only 12 per cent of its national vote. The PAN, on the other hand, has basically ignored rural Mexico and has concentrated on building support in several major cities and in the Federal District; the latter accounts for between one-third and one-half of its total national vote. It is reasonable to assume that the Mexican political elite will not allow itself to be displaced and will direct its efforts toward strengthening its urban bases of support when it deems such a policy politically expedient.

[43] *Ibid.*, Walton and Sween (fn. 39), 735.

[44] Ames found that in general, the larger the PRI percentage of the vote, the larger the turnout. Ames (fn. 41), 167.

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THE EMANCIPATION OF CHINESE WOMEN

By SHELAH GILBERT LEADER*

"Proud and alert, they carry five-foot guns,
The first rays of the morning sun illuminate the drillfield

The daughters of China are filled with high resolve
To red garments they prefer the uniform."

—*Mao Tse-tung*[1]

BEFORE Mao Tse-tung joined the Communist Party, he had committed himself to the cause of Chinese women.[2] His belief that women constitute one of the most downtrodden social groups persisted throughout the revolutionary struggle for power.[3] He has continued to believe that the emancipation of Chinese women is an important policy issue.

In fact, the prominence attached by Mao and other top party leaders to the issue of women's oppression may be underscored by noting that the passage of the Marriage Law was the first official act of the Government of the People's Republic of China in 1950. In their quest to transform the Chinese polity, economy, and society, party leaders rarely lost sight of the fact that the family is a key institution in China. To change the Chinese, marriage customs and family life must be drastically changed. Such changes necessarily involve the emancipation of Chinese women.

Although the emancipation of Chinese women has been of serious and persistent concern to party leaders, this particular issue has received scant attention from American scholars. In the flood of recent research on the People's Republic of China, relatively few articles and books have explored what the Chinese consider to be a serious policy prob-

* Throughout this paper, the Chinese policy on women will be described as emancipation, liberation, or equality between the sexes. Translated sources use these terms interchangeably to describe Chinese policy. The increasing use by the Chinese of the word "liberation" may be a conscious attempt to identify Chinese women with radical feminists abroad.

Laurence Schneider, Roxane Witke, and Stefan Leader were kind enough to have read this article in draft form. I am grateful for their assistance.

[1] "Lines written on a picture of the Women's Militia," Mao Tse-tung, February 1961, in Stuart Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung* (New York 1969), 339.

[2] Roxane Witke, "Mao Tse-tung, Women and Suicide in the May Fourth Era," *The China Quarterly*, No. 31 (July–September 1967).

[3] Mao Tse-tung, "The Great Union of the Popular Masses," and "Report of an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan," in Schram (fn. 1), 239-41, 250-59.

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lem.[4] Generally, existing studies examine one particular aspect of Chinese policy toward women—for example, the Marriage Law of 1950, or the impact of the rural commune on family life. Each of these aspects, however, represents one facet of an enduring debate in high policy circles as to the appropriate means for emancipating women. Given the importance Chinese leaders attach to this issue, a complete understanding of their policy-making process requires that we examine how this issue has been handled.

It is the object of this study to explore Chinese policy towards women from 1950 to the present by tracing the evolution of policies and theories about women which have been advanced at various times by competing factions. For the period under study, I will describe the policy goals of the Chinese Communist Party with regard to women and will evaluate the success or failure of these policies in terms of the professed goals and standards of the Chinese leaders. The specific issues under consideration are: (1) the transformation of marriage and family customs and the creation of a new democratic marriage; (2) the induction of women into the paid labor force; (3) the creation of a new role and image for women; and (4) the continued suppression of female sexuality. Policies towards women are one aspect of the overall attempt to transform China. Each change in general policy (the mass line) has engendered a concomitant change in the mass line on women. Policy struggles in one sphere—for example, strategies for economic development—have also involved struggles and choices among competing approaches to the emancipation of women. Top party leaders have never been united by a common approach to this issue; it has been regarded as subordinate to the primary problems of political control and economic development, and the official policy toward women has therefore fluctuated wildly.

[4] In addition to the Witke article, there are several articles by Maurice Freedman on changes in marriage customs; for example, "The Family in China, Past and Present" in Albert Feuerwerker, ed., *Modern China* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1964), and "The Family Under Chinese Communism," in *Political Quarterly*, xxxv, No. 3 (1964). See also Chen Wen-hui, *The Family Revolution in Communist China* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 1955); C. K. Yang, *The Chinese Family in the Communist Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass. 1959); Marium J. Meijer, *Marriage Law and Policy in the Chinese People's Republic* (Hong Kong 1971); James Weakland, "Chinese Film Images of Invasion and Resistance," *China Quarterly,* xlvii (July–September 1971); Rebecca Kwan, "The Commune, the Family, and the Emancipation of Women," *Contemporary China*, iii (1958–1959); Lucy Huang, "Some Changing Patterns in the Communist Chinese Family," *Marriage and Family Living*, xxiii (May 1961), and "Re-evaluation of Primary Role of Chinese Communist Women," *ibid.*, xxv (May 1963); Aline Kan, "The Marriage Institution in Present-Day China," *China Mainland Review*, i (December 1965); C. T. Hsia, "Residual Femininity," *China Quarterly*, No. 13 (January–March 1963).

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Attempts to mobilize Chinese women, by attacking the institutions of the family and marriage and by offering women new roles to play, have followed a very erratic pattern. The zigzagging policy on women reflects several dilemmas faced by party leaders. First, the leadership is not united by a common vision of the nature of women and their proper role in society. There seem to be at least two factions with regard to this issue. One faction takes the position that women have special needs and interests which must be taken into consideration. Because of their physical weakness and household responsibilities, full emancipation of women depends on the mechanization of agriculture and industry, and the complete socialization of housework and childcare. The other faction argues that women are no different from men and can, if properly motivated, perform the same work as men.

Second, there are conflicts regarding the importance of women and the issues of marriage and the family. There have been strong tendencies among cadres to ignore women and to relegate policy on women to the women's organizations. Even at the highest cadre levels, there has been an enduring belief that marriage and family life are the private affairs of the individuals involved, and that the party ought not to interfere. Party organs frequently and frankly discuss the persistence, among cadres at all levels of the party hierarchy, of sexist beliefs and attitudes that impede or sabotage attempts to implement policies on women.[5]

Third, traditional Marxist theoreticians offer only vague guidance on the emancipation of women. Chinese explanations of the sources of oppression, sexism, and the means by which women will be emancipated are vague and contradictory. After more than twenty years of experimentation, Chinese theoreticians are still somewhat apologetic on the subject. The party is embarrassed by the fact that, by its own standards, Chinese women still are not emancipated. Engels and Lenin notwithstanding, emancipation is now said to have been postponed to the full Communist stage of Chinese history.

Fourth, conflicts over policy on women also stem from the fact that the emancipation of women has always been subordinated to the larger issues of economic development and political control. Therefore, whenever policy on a broad range of issues has been changed, policy on

[5] See Soong Ching Ling's frank avowal in "Women's Liberation in China," *Peking Review*, XV, No. 6 (February 11, 1972). The Chinese do not have a word for sexism. Rather, they speak of reactionary, feudal, or bourgeois thought and behavior. They also speak of a "big manism mentality" and refer to women's inferiority complexes and passivity. The word sexism is used here to denote a belief in the inherent inferiority of women.

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women has also changed. Since women are considered to be a subordinate but integral part of the broad revolutionary struggle, every policy conflict has involved a conflict over policy on women. Consequently, policy on women has been part of the continual tension between careful economic planning and mass movements such as the Great Leap Forward. Generally, an emphasis on policy on women has been present during periods of very intensive attempts to alter social values and mass behavior. The tension between social change and economic planning clearly emerged during the first major attack on feudal marriage customs.

The Attack on Feudal Marriage

According to Chinese Communist analysis, the traditional Chinese family was a feudal institution based on the unquestioned authority of the patriarch. This authority was bolstered by the political authority of the state, the spiritual authority of the gods, and the social and economic authority of the clan.[6] All women, whether belonging to the exploiting or the exploited class, were oppressed by the feudal patriarchal family. Because of their oppression, all women fall in the special category of "domestic slaves."[7] Consequently, women had two different class characteristics: as women they were slaves, and as members of families, they shared the class status of their husbands and fathers.[8] According to Chinese revolutionary theory, women would be liberated by the Communist onslaught on feudal marriages. Free from the shackles of arranged marriages, women would reveal their latent revolutionary strength and would flock to the Communist banner and express their gratitude by selfless struggle and sacrifice for the revolutionary cause. This, at least, is the image that was carefully created by the party's propaganda organs. The role of women in the new Chinese society is a prominent and persistent theme in Communist literature and art, and reflects the importance that party leaders attach to the subject.[9] The party's theme on women may be summed up in this way: once the totally oppressive old family authority is eroded and discredited, women will be free to form new attachments and loyalties.

[6] Schram (fn. 1), 257.

[7] Friedrich Engels said, "The modern individual family is founded on the open or concealed domestic slavery of the wife. . . ." *Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (New York 1942), 65.

[8] "How the Problem of Women Should be Viewed," *Red Flag*, No. 20 (October 28, 1964). This theoretical recognition that women do share common interests apart from their class and from men is important and must be recalled in light of the conflict between Mao and Liu Shao-chi; see p. 72.

[9] Weakland (fn. 4).

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The party proves its loving concern for women, provides them with a meaningful social role, and becomes the new source of authority and focus of loyalty and love. In effect, the party becomes the new family for women.

The Communist denunciation of the traditional Chinese family is not simply rhetorical; individual leaders such as Mao have long felt that traditional marriage customs were a tragedy for women. It is clear that at least some of the impetus for the reforming zeal of party leaders stems from their deep and abiding sympathy for the plight of Chinese women. Of course, there are practical considerations that stimulate the party's desire to alter the pattern of the family. First is the perception of the family as the basic cell of society: to change society, the family must be changed.

Second, women are a deeply conservative force; they have persistently opposed party-induced changes. For example, women opposed the introduction of Agricultural Producers' Co-ops[10] and were "vulnerable to the wiles of rightists."[11] The party has learned from experience that the support of women is necessary if new policies are to succeed.

Third, Mao believes that China's women are a vast reserve of labor.[12] The attack on marriage was expected to free women to participate in social labor. Mao has persistently argued that, until China can afford to mechanize, labor-intensive methods of production are desirable; the labor shortages created by expanding the scale of production in cooperatives and communes could be met by women. In contrast, the Soviet model of development tended to create unemployment which greatly affected women. Consequently, those Chinese leaders who continued to favor the Soviet approach to economic planning implicitly favored keeping women at home. Thus, part of the conflict over which method of economic development should be adopted involved a conflict over the role women could and should play in China's development.

Traditionally, most Chinese women did not work in the fields.[13] Only in a few southern areas, such as Kwangtung, Hunan, and Kwangsi did women engage in farm work. Even there, taboos restricted women to certain types of work. There has always been a strict division of labor on the basis of sex, backed by strong beliefs about

[10] *Union Research Service*, LV (April 4, 1969).

[11] *Jen Min Jih Pao* (hereafter cited as *JMJP*), editorial, "Educate Rural Women in the Spirit of the General Line of the State" (January 19, 1954).

[12] Schram (fn. 1), 338-39.

[13] C. K. Yang (fn. 4), 139, quotes a 1937 survey which indicated that women only supplied 16.4% of all farm labor.

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women's lack of skill and strength. In the cities, where work does not depend so much on sheer strength, the common forms of prejudice kept women out of work except in selected industries, such as textiles. Given this body of custom, the induction of women into the labor force entailed more than the mere creation of jobs; it necessitated an attack on social customs concerning the division of labor. To get women out of the house, marriage had to be attacked.

1950–1953. From 1950 to 1953, the party waged a national campaign to "smash feudal marriage" and liberate women from the shackles of arranged marriages. This was to be accomplished by the thorough implementation of the Marriage Law and the imposition of severe sanctions against offenders. This law forbade arranged marriages, granted women broad grounds for divorce, and restricted the right of marriage to freely consenting adults. To enforce these new rules, marriages had to be registered by government officials. The campaign was considered to be a major revolutionary struggle against feudalism.[14] One long-range goal of the campaign was to free women for work and political activity. However, the campaign was severely handicapped by two factors: the party had done no preparation of an organizational or educational kind to facilitate the implementation of the law, and the cadres and judicial personnel who were responsible for carrying out the law did not understand its provisions and were uniformly hostile to its intent. Cadres tended to view women as property, and they saw attempts to free women as efforts to rob newly *fanshened* peasants of their goods.[15]

During the campaign, cadres professed to be alarmed by the zooming divorce rate.[16] Although statistics indicate that the number of divorces increased dramatically, only a tiny fraction of the adult population actually obtained divorces. Based on a report from Fukien Province, one scholar has calculated the divorce rate at 0.3 per 1,000 in 1950 and 0.4 per 1,000 in 1951.[17]

The most salient product of the campaign was the violence, chaos, and social disruption caused by confused and occasionally criminal cadres. The most alarming and tragic result was the massive number

[14] "Attend Seriously to the Thorough Implementation of the Marriage Law," *JMJP* (October 13, 1951).

[15] *Current Background*, No. 136 (November 10, 1951), 4.

[16] The divorce rate was given as 186,167 in 1950, 409,500 in 1951, and 823,000 in 1952. These figures are based on available data on marriages terminated by court proceedings. Christopher Lucas, *Women of China* (Hong Kong 1965), 71.

[17] Meijer (fn. 4), 127.

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of suicides and murders of young women who sought divorces. Chou En-lai was quoted as saying that in the first year of the campaign (1950) ten thousand young women were murdered or committed suicide in four South Central provinces.[18] By the end of 1951, an annual toll of seventy to eighty thousand women was alleged to be a direct result.[19] Most of the victims were under twenty-five years of age, and some were found to have been horribly tortured by family members, often with the complicity of local cadres, for having sought a divorce.[20]

By the end of the third year of the campaign, party officials admitted that the law had barely made any positive impact. *People's Daily* stated that 15 per cent of the Chinese-speaking population had accepted the Marriage Law, 60 per cent were reluctant, and 25 per cent were untouched by it.[21] This is probably an optimistic estimate. The Minister of Justice alleged that the law had been carried out in only three of the 2086 counties in China.[22] In January 1953, the Government ordered a retreat from the campaign and devoted the next three months to an investigation of the causes and ramifications of the disaster.

It is indisputable that the campaign was a dreadful tragedy for a great many women and that it failed to achieve its avowed purpose even though the party had had twenty years of previous experience with carrying out marriage reform in the liberated areas. The Vice President of the Supreme People's Court admitted that it had been difficult to enforce marriage laws in the old liberated areas.[23] The judge quoted a report based on data collected in the second half of 1949, which found "that the feudal marriage system is still prevalent cannot be denied."[24]

Accordingly, when Liu Ching-fan, Vice Chairman of the Committee for Regulation of the Marriage Law Movement said, "we . . . erred gravely by not realizing . . . the feudalistic outlook on social customs still prevails among the masses," we may take this as deliberate obfuscation of the real purposes of the campaign.[25] In fact, top party

[18] Lucas (fn. 16).

[19] As with most Chinese statistics, the reliability of these figures is unknown. It is likely that these statistics (based on field reports) underrepresent the actual toll of victims. Government officials treated these figures as shockingly high, yet it is possible that they are not atypical. We know that suicide was fairly common among women in pre-liberation China. I have been unable to find any subsequent statistics on this subject.

[20] "Outline of Propaganda on the Thorough Implementation of the Marriage Law," published by the National Committee for the Thorough Implementation of the Marriage Law, *Current Background* (March 10, 1953), 236.

[21] *People's Daily* (November 19, 1953).

[22] *Ibid.* (July 4, 1952).

[23] Marcia D. Madian, *The Marriage Law of Communist China, 1950–1953*, unpub. M.A. thesis (Columbia University 1962), 36.

[24] *Ibid.*

[25] *China News Analysis*, XV (December 4, 1953), 6.

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leaders had spent two years in carefully drawing up the Marriage Law and in planning the timing of the campaign. Apparently, Mao used his influence in favor of the early introduction of the law even though he knew it would create confusion and disrupt family life. He is quoted as having said, "social conflict is a sign of the shaking up of feudal clan power, and the husband's power."[26]

One could argue that the party had deliberately and cautiously initiated a disruptive policy. The fact that the Marriage Law was not applied to minority areas or places where land reform had not been carried out would seem to indicate that party leaders had anticipated social disruption, and were willing to accept its cost where political control and economic policies were secure. The campaign is the first evidence that the emancipation of women was subordinate to the priorities of economic reform and political control.

1953–1957. Although it is possible that the party was somewhat taken aback by the scale of serious crime and disruption caused by the Marriage Law campaign, the coincidence of the retreat in January 1953 and the initiation of the first Five-Year Plan would indicate that the law was dropped not because of the human misery it engendered, but because it lowered morale and harmed production. This theme was repeated throughout the retreat and led to the proclamation of a new line on women. According to the Government Administration Council's Directive Concerning the Thorough Enforcement of the Marriage Law of February 1, 1953, "[the death of women] is not only an offense against the equality of the rights of women and their freedom of marriage, but it also affects solidarity among the people, and it badly affects national production and construction and the whole social order."[27]

By March 1953, the Marriage Law was abandoned; the regime stressed family harmony and reconciliation, and ordered that divorce be granted only in extreme cases. The new line no longer mentioned smashing the feudal family; instead, it encouraged united and harmonious families engaged in production. Although it was still admitted that the feudal family had to be destroyed in order to liberate women, marriage reform was now thought of as a struggle within the people. Marriage reform had become the responsibility of women's organizations which emphasized education and persuasion. In fact, marriage customs remained unchanged throughout the duration of the first Five-Year Plan.

[26] *JMJP* (March 20, 1953), 2.

[27] Meijer (fn. 4), 303.

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The first Five-Year Plan. While the Plan was being implemented, Chinese women were told to emulate Soviet women. Cadres were instructed to stress educational work among women so that they would not obstruct the growth of Agricultural Producers' Co-ops. The successful completion of the Plan was said to depend on the employment of women who must be made familiar with the general line. Cadres were told to stress the link between the emancipation of women, the general line, and the gradual transition to socialism. Women were told that, in order to raise their status, they had to participate in the economic sector. Still, there were admittedly many problems that prevented women from working. Since housework would not be socialized for many years, women had to strike a balance between housework and paid labor. And women were told that housework would not be socialized until after the full socialization of agriculture and industry.[28]

However, the Plan did not create job opportunities for women in the cities. There was, in fact, a high rate of unemployment among women. A great deal of confusion must have been engendered by the contradictory messages from the party. Women were told that the key to their emancipation lay in their joining the paid labor force, but the few who could find jobs were still stuck with the full responsibility for housework and childcare. At the same time, women were informed that the party was indeed emancipating them, and that they no longer needed to initiate a militant struggle for equal rights.[29]

By 1955 it was clear that there were no jobs for women. To justify this situation, a new mass line was offered: "If women who stay at home can encourage their husbands and children to take part in socialist reconstruction, and educate their children to become members for the next shift in the work of socialist reconstruction, then their domestic service already contains revolutionary and social value, the salaries and income of their husbands and other family members already contain their own labor."[30] Marx and Engels were turning in their graves.

For the next two years, women were encouraged to "manage households with industry and thrift" and were told that their duty was to build socialism by careful household management.[31]

During this period, most urban women did not work outside of the

[28] *JMJP*, editorial, "Educate Rural Women in the Spirit of the General Line of the State" (January 19, 1954).

[29] *New China Monthly*, No. 10 (October 1955), 18-23.

[30] "How Should Family Women Better Serve Socialist Reconstruction," *Hsin Chungkuo Fu-nu*, No. 10 (October 1955), 18-19.

[31] *JMJP*, editorial, "Mobilize all Women to Build up the Country and Manage Family Affairs by Industry and Thrift" (September 9, 1957).

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home. Only about 30 per cent of the rural women did agricultural work; they earned only 25 per cent of the Agricultural Producers' Co-ops total wage units. In addition, when women did work, they were forced to perform the same physical labor as men, with alarming consequences to their health. The incidence of miscarriages rose precipitously, and neglected children suffered accidents and death, which seriously depressed the morale of the workers.[32] It is no exaggeration to assert that the first Five-Year Plan sacrificed women for the sake of economic growth.

Women in the Labor Force

The Great Leap Forward. The Great Leap not only represented a sharp departure in economic policy, but it also drastically changed the assigned role of women. In fact, the Leap probably affected women more than any other group, for it led to a sudden change in their lifestyles and roles. For the first time, nearly every able-bodied woman engaged in commerce, agriculture, or industry. In support of this movement, a massive propaganda campaign was waged to convince both men and women that women were just as capable of work as men. In the cities, women replaced men in all commercial enterprises, thereby freeing them for heavy labor. In the countryside, up to 90 per cent of the women engaged in agriculture or other labor. With the introduction of mess halls, nurseries, and laundries, most of women's housework was socialized. By 1958, women constituted more than one-half of the total agricultural labor force; but due to wage discrimination, they still earned only 35 per cent of the total labor points.[33]

Mao's espousal of the Great Leap, with its implications for the role of women, was quite consistent with his long-standing belief that women must work in order to be freed from patriarchial authority, and that their labor power is a positive factor in economic development. The socialization of housework not only freed women for labor; it also weakened family life. The Great Leap, in its attack on traditional family life, provided positive new roles for women, which were designed to raise their status and prestige. Working women acquire economic independence and are not as susceptible to the authority of their fathers and husbands. Moreover, propaganda work was more easily carried out at the work place, and socialist education (often termed "raising the cultural level of women") is less handicapped by the conservative atmosphere of the home. Working women also have

[32] *People's Daily*, editorial (May 16, 1956).
[33] *Joint Publications Research Service*, No. 2608, 63.

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greater opportunities for meeting men and finding husbands on the basis of shared interests and experiences. Work thus provides a concrete alternative to the feudal custom of arranged marriages. In sum, the socialization of housework undermines family life; it frees women for paid labor; and it is the traditional solution to women's problems offered by Marxists and feminists alike.

However, the party concluded that the communes alone could not fully emancipate women in China. During this period, party theoreticians concentrated on two major problems that were sources of popular discontent: they had to explain why women were still not fully emancipated when all women performed paid labor and all housework in the rural communes was allegedly socialized. They also had to allay the commonly and frequently voiced fear that the commune was destroying marriage and family life.

At the onset of the Great Leap and even earlier, party organs had insisted that the key to women's equality lay in their participation in the labor force and the socialization of housework. During the conservative first Five-Year Plan, women were told that housework would not be socialized until agriculture and industry had been fully socialized and mechanized. The commune allegedly skipped over mechanization and went into socialism by emphasizing labor-intensive modes of production, decentralization, and small-scale industry based on minimal capital investment. However, once women had joined the labor force, they found that they were still not considered equal to men. Their status was lower than that of men, and they received fewer wage points, in accordance with the line, "from each according to his ability; to each according to the work performed." Since the evaluation of work performance was skewed in favor of physical strength, women were told that the key to their emancipation was the mechanization of agriculture and industry which would eventually permit the equalization of work assignments.[34] Not only was the continued division of labor on the basis of sex-related physical strength alleged to be an obstacle to equality, but Mao added another obstacle over which women had no control. He stated, "Only when a class society no longer exists, and cumbersome labor and agriculture have been made automatic and mechanized, will it be possible to realize equality between the sexes."[35]

[34] Ts'ai Ch'ang, "Party's General Line Illuminating the Road of Thorough Emancipation of Women in our Country," *JMJP* (October 7, 1959).

[35] Quoted by Tsao Kuan-chun, "Further Liberate Women's Labor Capacity and Channel This Force to Building up Socialism in a Better Way," *JMJP* (June 2, 1958).

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By 1960, women could still not be said to have been liberated. And, most discouraging, they were told that they would not be fully equal with men until China had achieved a Communist society. Up until that time, party theoreticians had insisted that the keys to emancipation were socialist revolutions in politics and the economy. Now women were finally confronted with the fact that their real equality had been postponed until the millennium. In a retreat from its earlier boasts, the party now described the commune as an intermediate stage that would speed the progress of socialist construction. Women were not free because their technical and cultural levels were too low to meet the needs of socialist development. Moreover, party theoreticians admitted that collective welfare was inadequate for mass needs.[36]

Model Women—As Good As Men?

The assertion that the cause of women's inequality was rooted in the inadequacy of their technical and cultural levels requires examination. During the Great Leap, when expertise was discredited in favor of peasant effort and enthusiasm, nearly everyone was learning new skills. Male peasants who made pig iron were just as inexperienced as were women who joined in agricultural production. However, the inexperience of women was negatively evaluated, while that of men was not. In addition, although all forms of social labor which benefitted the commune were held to be valuable, certain types of social labor—specifically those in which women are technically expert—carried neither the status nor the workpoints of labor performed by men. For example, socialized housework, in the form of mess halls and nurseries, was performed by women and by "bad elements" who were *punished* by such work assignments. So-called women's work was still regarded as inferior and degrading. The male "bad elements" who were assigned to work in mess halls were resentful and did the work so badly that the press carried numerous reports of deliberate food poisoning by former landlords now turned cook.[37]

The fact that the elimination of sex-related tasks only worked in one direction points to an important aspect of Chinese feminism. The Chinese attack on the eternal belief in the inferiority of women aims at proving that women are as good as men. The status of women is being raised by showing that women are equal to men in their ability to perform the same labor. Since physical strength and the amount of

[36] *Red Flag*, No. 5, "People's Commune—A Very Good Device for the Thorough Liberation of Women" (March 1, 1960).

[37] Ho Ch'eng, "Who Are to Work in Messhalls?" *JMJP* (November 6, 1958).

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manual labor performed was esteemed more than work zeal and performance of tasks that were vital but not based on brute strength, women could not compete with men. Rather than attack this hierarchy of values, the party argued that women could not be equal to men until physical labor was replaced by machinery.

Although housework was socialized, it was and remains women's work, and as such it is less prestigious than men's work. The following statement should be read as a description of what ought to be, rather than what is: "After collectivization, the social status of the people engaged in such labor (domestic work) is quite different from what it used to be. For the nature of their labor has undergone a basic change, and the tasks are no longer domestic chores, but social labor in the same category as that of the industrial workers in factories, and farmers. . . . This labor in the home made women ignorant and backward, now it makes them enlightened and progressive. This is the second liberation for women. The first was political and economic; now it is social."[38] Ideological struggle against sexism has always been aimed at eradicating the traditional belief that women could not do men's work, rather than at questioning the superiority of male values and work.

In addition, the assertion that women are unequal to men because of their "low cultural level" is a form of scapegoating. If male cadres had not ignored political work among women, they would not have had such low cultural levels. In other words, discrimination against women was being justified by the contention that women were inferior to men. Actually, women were deemed to be inferior only because the standard of values against which they were judged was biased.

The commune offered women new roles the status and income of which were greater than their traditional ones but lower than those of men. At the same time, the socialization of housework represented a massive attack on the family and married life. This attack on the feudal family came after five years of neglect of the subject. Until the Great Leap, traditional customs had been widely observed.[39] This time, the effort to change the family was aimed at eliminating its social and economic functions by asserting that socialized housework was necessary to resolve the contradiction between labor shortages and household responsibilities.[40] The socialization of housework was also defended on the grounds that it would change the relationship between

[38] Hu Chen, "Domestic Labor is Collectivized and Turned into Social Activities," *Red Flag*, No. 7 (September 1, 1958).

[39] Yang (fn. 4).

[40] Hu Chen (fn. 38).

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women and society by allowing women to become direct participants in socialist construction. By permitting women to develop in the same way as men, they would achieve equality with men, and all people would acquire a collectivist spirit.[41]

Despite the clear necessity for socialized housework, the press was filled with discussions aimed at allaying popular fears that family life was being destroyed. Apprehension and resentment by the people resulted in a torrent of theoretical works on the nature of marriage and the family in a socialist society.

Socialist Morality

To begin with, party propaganda insisted that communes did not destroy family life, but, on the contrary, made it united, happier, and more harmonious. Admittedly, the unreasonable, patriarchal system inherited from the past had been destroyed; now family members were said to be united by mutual love, respect, and equality. The power of the patriarch had been vested in his power to manage and supervise production and dispose of domestic property. Now, because of communal production, the family was no longer an economic unit of production, nor entirely one of consumption.[42]

Elaborating on this new vision of society, party theorists stated that family members would live together, love each other, and spend holidays together. Filial and parental love now included all members of society, for the commune was the extended family.[43]

And, although society was now responsible for the education of children, parents were urged to cooperate with state organizations to see that children were well brought up.[44]

Furthermore, marriages and families would continue to exist even in a Communist society. What the theorists failed to explain was the reason for the alleged continuance of family life during the period of full communism. That problem is dealt with below.

1961–1963. The retreat from the Great Leap necessarily involved a change in policy concerning women. With the dismantling of the mess halls, nurseries, and most of the small-scale industries, women were once again back at home, and occupied by the traditional chores.

[41] "A New Life in a New Era," *JMJP* (August 18, 1958).

[42] Fan Jo-yu, "Why We Have Abolished the Feudal Patriarchal Family System," *Peking Review* (March 8, 1960), 9-12.

[43] Tu Ko-fu, "On the Question of Family," *Kirin Jih Pao* (January 10, 1959).

[44] Ts'ai Ch'ang's Report to Women's Conference, *New China News Agency*, Peking (December 4, 1958).

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During this period of recuperation and conservative economic policies, an extremely conservative line on women was implemented. Women were exhorted, as they had been during the first Five-Year Plan, to keep house with industry and thrift so that their men could concentrate on their work.[45] The model woman was no longer a labor heroine, but rather the woman who patched her clothes so skillfully that she wore the same garment for ten years.

The key to the new line on women appeared in a *JMJP* editorial which emphasized that political work must take into account the special needs and problems of women. These special needs and problems were their household responsibilities and physical weakness.[46]

Taking a cue from this line, women's magazines, especially *Women of China*, devoted their space to endless discussions of child rearing, selecting a husband, housework, and the problem of working women whose primary loyalties were to their families. In 1963, *Women of China* devoted its space to questions such as "What do Women Live For?" "How to Choose a Husband," and "Which Comes First, Revolution or Family?"

The 1962–1965 campaign to inculcate socialist morality in the masses naturally involved love and family life. During this campaign, party theoreticians attempted to provide a clearer conception of the socialist style of love and marriage. In a sense, they were attempting to respond to some of the questions that arose in the debates on marriage during the Great Leap. The following homilies must be read in light of the fact that during this period arranged marriages, bride prices, and lavish wedding feasts were common practice throughout China. To combat the resurgence of these customs, the press cited glowing examples of young couples who resolutely refused to accept gifts or hold feasts.[47]

Party theorists explained that, according to socialist morality, love is based on a thorough evaluation of the individual's class stand, which constitutes a barometer of character.[48] And, in a socialist society, marriage and divorce must serve the people (instead of the family). Accordingly, differing politics are valid reasons for divorce; so is a marriage's prejudicial effect on production.[49]

"Marriage is a social form of the union of the two sexes. The family organization, which is the cell of society, is the result of such union."

[45] "Liu Hsiu-lan, A Model of a Miner," *Women of China*, No. 5 (May 1, 1961).
[46] *JMJP* (March 8, 1962).
[47] *China News Analysis*, No. 423 (June 1, 1962), 6-7; *Union Research Service*, XXXVII, No. 24 (December 22, 1964), 363-79; *Nan-fang Jih-pao*, Canton (May 12, 1962); *Chung-kuo Ching-nien Pao*, Peking (February 12, 1963).
[48] Quoted in Meijer (fn. 4), 150. [49] *Ibid.*, 152.

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Realistically, theorists argued that even in a socialist society (a socialist revolution being considered a *precondition* for sexual equality) not all women would be equal, because there would still be vestiges of bourgeois and feudal ideas, and not all women would participate in social labor. They insisted that ideological struggle over marriage and the family was rooted in the class struggle. Since the majority of "contradictions" in the realm of marriage and the family are "contradictions among the people," the proper solution lay in persuasive democratic education. Happy marriages would be conducive to the emancipation of women and zeal in socialist production.[50]

Following this attempt to define and rectify the institution of marriage, two important events occurred in 1964. First, *Red Flag* attacked Tung Pien, the editor of *Women in China*, for her editorial policies; she was dismissed from her post. Specifically, the charges against her were that she emphasized interests peculiar to women (love, marriage, and the family) while neglecting Mao's thought and the class struggle. Furthermore, she had refused to tell women to emulate Lei Feng on the grounds that as a man and a soldier, he wasn't relevant to the needs and interests of her readers. Articles such as "What do Women Live For?" were said to be subjective, personal, and bourgeois.[51] Obviously, the attack on Tung Pien represented an attack on the party faction that had ordered the retreat from the Great Leap and the espousal of the conservative line on women. In this respect, the attack on Tung Pien was perhaps as significant an event as the attack on Wu Han in augurring the Cultural Revolution.

At the same time, a didactic pamphlet, entitled *Between Husband and Wife*, was published and received extensive publicity. The theme of the pamphlet is that, "in a socialist society, love between husband and wife is built on the identity of political beliefs and on the foundation of struggling together for the revolutionary cause. The relationship between husband and wife is first of all comradely relations and the feelings between husband and wife are primarily revolutionary sentiments." The pamphlet also urges men to regard their wives as revolutionary comrades-in-arms, as class sisters, and as companions. Couples should not necessarily divide housework equally. The key is the husband's attitude. If a man views his wife as a comrade, they will naturally help each other. That is, the attitude of a husband is more important

[50] "On the Reform of Our Country's System of Marriage and Family," *JMJP* (December 13, 1963).

[51] *Union Research Service*, XLIV, No. 23 (September 16, 1966), 342-57.

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than a rigid division of labor which does not take into account specific conditions.[52]

As the Cultural Revolution blossomed into a massive campaign, it became clear that Mao had come to view sexism (which admittedly transcended regime, economic system, and class) as a universal phenomenon that could only be eradicated slowly by changing attitudes and beliefs. The enforcement of legal measures against sex discrimination had proved impossible and the commune system of socialized housework was an expensive failure which only aroused resentment and fear among the peasants. Mao's optimism in Hunan that political and economic change would invariably lead to cultural change had been severely shaken. By 1965, in a talk with André Malraux, he admitted that the liberation of women had barely begun. He said, "The Chinese woman doesn't yet exist either among the masses; but she is beginning to want to exist."[53]

The Cultural Revolution. The subject has been overlooked by Western scholars, but Mao's concern about the continued oppression of women was a factor in his struggle against Liu Shao-chi. The conservative economic and social policies attributed to Liu were also held to be the cause of the espousal of a reactionary line on women. In the course of the struggle against Liu, Maoists insisted that Mao had indeed maintained a consistent position on women and their role in China. According to the Maoists, the struggle between Mao and Liu over women revolved around the following points:

1) Mao paid great attention to the role of women as a revolutionary force; Liu did not.
2) Mao advocated the liberation of women and the use of women's labor power; Liu emphasized the special interests of women and the need to give them special consideration.
3) Mao required women to take an active part in the class struggle and in all political movements; Liu advanced the principle of "build the country with diligence and frugality, and run the household with diligence and frugality."
4) Mao emphasized political work among women; Liu neglected political work among women, and consequently, women were

[52] "What Attitude Should a Husband Take Toward His Wife?" *JMJP* (October 14, 1964).
[53] André Malraux, *Anti-Memoirs* (New York 1968), 373-74.

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> the weak link in the anti-rightist movement and were susceptible to the wiles of bad elements. Under Mao's leadership, women were organized to play a leading, rather than a supportive, role in political and economic movements. As a glowing example, Anhwei was cited as a place where most of the revolutionary committees had women members.[54] Mao's slogan was, "The time is different. . . . What man comrades can do, the women comrades can also do." If so, "why should we mitigate the role of revolutionary women on the ground of heavy household chores?"[55]

As part of the struggle against Liu, the Maoists elaborated their theories about women. The emancipation of women was now said to be a *component* part of the revolutionary cause of the proletariat, and the women's question was to be *subordinated* to the interest of the integral class struggle of the proletariat. In their view, the so-called "women's viewpoint" of the bourgeoisie deviates from this principle, and sees the women's question as a matter of sex distinction. Maoists argued that this position would obliterate the crucial class distinctions among women and sever the ties between the emancipation of women and the integral cause of the proletariat. This constituted a direct attack on Liu. Maoists now insist that there is no sex viewpoint, only a class view. Yet, this Maoist position is a contradiction of the distinction expressed in 1964 between women's status as "domestic slave" and their class status as members of families. As domestic slaves, women would have a legitimate common interest and viewpoint. But, since the Cultural Revolution, the party line has emphasized the similarity between men and women who share a proletarian outlook and revolutionary zeal. The implementation of this line since then has led to a renewed emphasis on political work among women and the advancement of many women to positions of leadership.

Today, the party denies that women cadres and comrades are "also women" with special interests in home and children. Women who are armed with revolutionary consciousness do not worry about their narrow personal lives, and they discharge all of their responsibilities while putting revolution first.[56] "Household chores are respected in our society and are regarded as rear services behind industrial and agricul-

[54] *Union Research Service*, LV, No. 2 (1969), 15.
[55] *Ibid.*
[56] "How the Problem of Women Should be Viewed," *Red Flag*, No. 20 (October 28, 1964).

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tural production. They constitute an indispensable part in the social division of labor."[57]

The campaigns and slogans of 1969 and 1970 emphasized production and Mao's belief that China's women are a vast reserve of labor, and no different from men in their ability to make revolution and engage in labor.

In order to mobilize the maximum number of workers, the slogan, "oppose early marriage and advocate late marriage" was advanced on the grounds that marriage is part of the class struggle. "Destroy the old and establish the new" was also applied to wedding customs. Revolutionary couples refused to accept gifts (other than the "little red book"), or to hold a feast. Rather, they turned their weddings into political rallies.[58] This attempt to politicize what many cadres considered to be the most intimate aspects of private life is based on Mao's fear that excessive preoccupation with private happiness is inimical to political fervor.

In a further attempt to politicize the family, campaigns were waged to urge people to hold weekly family repudiation forums in which families could engage in self-criticism. This was seen as a means of eliminating "paternal authority" and the view that "what the husband says goes."[59]

There was also a campaign to revolutionize the family by replacing patriarchal authority with Mao's thought and by carrying out the class struggle within the family. These efforts underline the fact that patriarchal authority did not simply derive from particular economic and political systems, but from cultural values. Even after many Chinese women had gained a measure of economic independence, husbands and fathers were still dominant.

A third major campaign was aimed at mobilizing women for work. Most women had been occupied by household chores since, after the Great Leap, there were few mess halls or nurseries in the rural areas. Women were now urged to emulate Tachai, work fiercely, and prove that they could do the same physical labor as men. Armed with revolutionary consciousness, they would be able to work and manage their household chores at the same time.

During the campaign to "emulate the People's Liberation Army," both men and women were encouraged to model themselves on the

[57] *Union Research Service*, XLIII, No. 2 (April 5, 1966), 25.
[58] *Ibid.*, LIV, No. 18 (March 4, 1969), 248-49.
[59] *Ibid.*, LVIII, No. 19 (March 6, 1970), 267.

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selfless, dedicated revolutionary hero, Lei Feng. Maoists insist that women can be just as brave and revolutionary as men.

In addition, several women heroines have been advanced as appropriate models for women. Cheng Sai-chi is held to be a model for all Kiangsi women. She carried heavy loads, saved others by disregarding herself, and heroically sacrificed her life in the revolution.[60]

Another description of a model woman is even more impressive. She "buries herself in revolutionary work, and cannot always look after her children at home. Her eldest son stopped breast-feeding early and is not very good in health." A bad fellow sent her glucose for her son, but she sent it back on the grounds that the gift was part of the class struggle.[61]

Obviously, these superhuman (or inhuman) models are meant to inspire women; we may assume that few women can emulate such deeds. By looking behind the campaign, we glimpse the reality. Women are once again being mobilized for labor, but the necessary relief from housework is not readily available in rural areas. Where possible, grandmothers are recruited to care for the children and do the housework. Otherwise, women are simply expected to do double duty through positive thinking. The key to equality for women is no longer the complete mechanization of agriculture and industry, but revolutionary consciousness. That is, women who are properly motivated can perform the same physical labor as men, thereby winning the respect of men and gaining the right to equal treatment. Part of the campaign to "learn from Tachai" aims at convincing farmers to implement equal pay for equal work—a rule which is still commonly ignored.[62]

If many women really are drawn into this kind of physical labor in the hope that they will thereby earn the respect and the privileges of men, the cost, in terms of their mental and physical well-being, is apt to be high. Such at least was the case in the early stages of the Great Leap, when children were neglected and women suffered miscarriages and other forms of strain. Furthermore, women were exploited during the Great Leap and will probably continue to be exploited. There is little evidence that sexism is really on the wane in China or that women no longer suffer from the age-old inferiority complex.[63] On the contrary,

[60] *Ibid.*, LXI, No. 21 (December 11, 1970), 284.
[61] *JMJP* (March 10, 1970).
[62] Soong Ching Ling (fn. 5), 7.
[63] See chapter entitled "Women" in *China! Inside the People's Republic*, by the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (New York 1972), for examples of sexism. Most striking are incidents at Tachai where women cooked and served meals, but did not join the diners (266-92, and esp. 283).

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even high-ranking cadres are rumored to continue to have children until a male is born, thereby undercutting the birth-control program.

Mao Tse-tung has struggled against the traditional oppression of Chinese women. His policies have consistently reflected his concern for the fate of women and his belief that women are valuable members of society and capable of making a contribution to the revolution. Why then are Chinese women still considered inferior to men? Why, after more than twenty years of socialist revolution, are women only *beginning* to want to exist?

The Dominance and Repression of Women

The answers to the above questions involve the methods used by the Communist Party to emancipate women, and the nature of the goals sought for women. No matter how committed individual party leaders have been to the cause of women, they have repeatedly subordinated it to economic and political policies. Their perception of what is good and desirable for women has always been filtered through economic and political priorities. Consequently, women have been manipulated for other purposes.

Furthermore, the campaigns to liberate Chinese women illustrate the tension between the imperatives of democratic centralism and self-liberation. The content and direction of policy on women is formulated by top party leaders (mostly men). The Communist Party, itself a tiny, elite organization, is primarily composed of men. Women's organizations are subordinate to the party and are expected to carry out party directives on women obediently. Since the new party line does not recognize a "women's viewpoint," the women's organizations cannot legitimately claim to have a more valid insight into the needs and interests of women than does the male-dominated CCP. Under the circumstances, women have had very little opportunity for self-liberation.

One possible consequence of male dominance of the women's liberation movement is the fact that party leaders and women organizers have not disputed the commonly held belief that women are inferior to men. They have argued that women can become *as good as men* if permitted to exercise their abilities and talents. Every model Chinese woman has been lauded because she has proven herself to be as good as a man by acting like a man. The emulation of men has always involved the glorification of stereotypically male values—courage, physical strength, manual labor—and a downgrading of the value and

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importance of child rearing and housework. The division of labor on the basis of sex has only been partially challenged: women's work is still generally women's work, but now women are expected to perform both men's and women's work. Although the CCP has vehemently rejected the Soviet model of development, Chinese women are now faced with the same problems that have confronted women in the Soviet Union.

The point is that there does not seem to be a *women's* liberation movement in China. The attempt to emancipate Chinese women is being led and defined by men. This attempt to impose revolution from above may help to explain why the party has been unable to eradicate the traditional values and beliefs about the natural inferiority of women. Moreover, women seem to acquiesce in traditional roles and discriminatory treatment. The party, despite its efforts, has continued to meet resistance from women who do not wish to change their role. It is possible that women have found that when they do join the paid labor force, they are more exploited than they are at home. So far, women's work experience has generally meant back-breaking labor for small reward. Furthermore, men seem to resist attempts by the party to persuade them to give up their privileges.

The CCP's emphasis on democratic centralism with respect to the women's movement may slow the pace of change. Yet, the party may prefer to accept this cost of party control when faced with the option of an autonomous women's movement. That is, the party's early experience with Chinese feminists may have persuaded party leaders that self-liberation is undesirable from the standpoint of economic development and political control. Specifically, a real liberation of women would necessarily entail the liberation of women's sexuality, a situation which the party has refused to allow.

Early Soviet and pre-liberation Chinese experience with the emancipation of women involved experimentation with nurseries, free abortion, and free love. This situation arose partly as a natural reaction to the restrictions of traditional marriage and morality. Chinese sexuality traditionally rested on the sadistic perversion of foot fetishism[64] and on the extreme glorification of female chastity. When these customs came under attack during the May Fourth movement, many of the young radicals advocated and practiced free love. They were supported by the influence of Kollontay in the Soviet Union, who cited Engels as a justification for free love. Engels had argued that family life is opposed

[64] Howard Levy, *Chinese Footbinding: The History of a Curious Erotic Custom* (New York 1966).

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to collective life, and that free sexuality and polygamy are characteristic of the collective.[65]

During his investigation of the peasant uprising in Hunan, Mao noted that the economic independence of poor peasant women not only gave them a greater voice in decision-making, but also liberated them sexually. He wrote, "[Women] also enjoy considerable sexual freedom. Among the poor peasantry, triangular and multilateral relationships are almost universal." He also stated that "the abolition of the clan system, of superstitions, and of one-sided notions of chastity will follow as a natural consequence of victory in the political and economic struggles."[66] These references to female sexuality were deleted in the 1951 edition of the Report.

During the Kiangsi Soviet period, when the Communists implemented radical marriage reforms, free love was commonly practiced. It sparked rumors that communism meant sharing wives. The commonly held belief that Communists were sexually immoral[67] created some hostility to the movement among conservative peasants (especially men), and this probably induced the party to suppress sexual freedom. In addition, party leaders may have been concerned about their image abroad.

If the party suppressed free love in pre-liberation days in an attempt not to alienate the peasants, the post-liberation puritanism stems from the belief that there is an inverse relationship between sexual activity and work zeal. Or, as one scholar put it, "The relation between emotional stability and economic potential has become clearly understood. . . . Thus from the economic standpoint sexual discipline is highly important, if not crucial. If women are to be the economic equals of the men the policy towards sexual behavior must lead in the direction of strict standards."[68]

The present repression of female sexuality is both a continuation of traditional values and a recognition that as long as men continue to regard women as erotic objects, the only way to integrate women into the work force is to unsex them. By creating a puritanical atmosphere in which male sexuality is also discouraged, the emergence of women from the home is somewhat facilitated.

The party is attempting, based on its previous experience, to liberate women from their traditional role. At the same time, it is seeking to avoid, by strict party control over the women's movement, the sexual

[65] Engels (fn. 7), 67, 149.
[66] "Report of an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan" (fn. 3), 258-59.
[67] C. K. Yang (fn. 4), 18-19.
[68] Meijer (fn. 4), 99.

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freedom which often accompanies the relaxation of rigid and repressive norms. In this way, Chinese women are prevented from defining the nature of their oppression and sexuality.

The party's marriage policy emphasizes happy, united, and *stable* marriages. Before the abandonment of the Marriage Law in 1953, the press was continuously bemoaning the immorality and irresponsibility of young people who married and divorced frivolously. Apparently, the new availability of easy divorce had led to free and easy sexual practices among some young people. Since the party did not want love and marriage to be too free, divorce was once again made very difficult to obtain. However, only a miniscule fraction of Chinese couples actually did obtain divorces; therefore one must interpret the meaning of a stable marriage differently. What the party seems to want is a form of marriage which is happy enough to preclude a search for lovers or a divorce. As long as most marriages proved stable, the party was willing to overlook the fact that, until recently, arranged marriages continued to be the norm.

The recent emphasis on socialist morality is consistent with the argument that the party seeks to create a form of marriage which will minimize sexuality. The Cultural Revolution advanced the position that love and personal happiness are bourgeois ideals. The real purpose of love and marriage is to serve the collective. The revolution must always come first; love and marriage come last. Consequently, during periods of intensive economic activity, young people are exhorted to marry as late as possible on the grounds that early marriage interferes with economic production. Although propaganda always cites the new burdens and responsibilities of marriage as the cause of this distraction, what is implicit is concern with the sexuality of newly married lovers who wish to spend as much time together as possible.

The party's desire to regulate and minimize sexuality may also account for its insistence that marriage will continue to be the social form of the union of the sexes, even in the Communist period. Since the economic and social functions of the family will allegedly diminish with time, and since the law recognizes illegitimate children, this would seem to be the best explanation for the continuation of the institution of marriage.

The CCP has deliberately sought to uproot women from traditional marriage customs and family life in order to recruit them for social mobilization and political activity. At the same time, the party has tried to prevent women from creating their own new beliefs and com-

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mitments: liberation from the past might mean the liberation of women's sexuality. Instead, the party has sought to guide women into stable marriages in which the party hopes that its authority will supersede patriarchal authority, and where work commitment takes precedence over family responsibilities. The party has clearly sought to avoid the intermediate stage of hedonism which tends to occur after old commitments have eroded and before new ties are formed. In a developing society, where labor-intensive modes of production are the key to economic success, hedonism is the enemy of self-sacrifice and hard work.[69]

Conclusion

Although Mao Tse-tung has consistently emphasized the importance of women as a revolutionary force and as a vast reserve of labor, he has viewed the emancipation of women as a subordinate but integral part of the broader revolutions in China in the spheres of economic, political, and cultural life. Consequently, party policy on women has always been subordinate to economic and political priorities.

Mao insists that women really are no different from men and can, if motivated, perform the same work. Therefore his policies tend to emphasize the participation of women in labor and in political work. Women, if allowed to take their place in socialist activities, will demonstrate their capabilities and thereby lose their inferiority complexes and gain equality with men.

However, Mao has found that sexist beliefs and values persist in the face of economic, social, and political change. Constantly adjusting theory to the unfolding reality, the party has been forced to alter its conception of the source and nature of sexism and now predicts that women will be truly equal only in the period of full communism. In other words, a meaningful liberation for women cannot be imposed from above.

[69] Ross Terrill reports that, during his recent visit to China, an official brought up the subject of sex. Terrill quotes the official as saying, "We notice the obsession with sex (in America). It is a sign of a crumbling order. The late Ming period was the same. Sex was everywhere. Soon the dynasty collapsed." Ross Terrill, "The 800,000,000: China and the World," Part II, *Atlantic Monthly*, ccxxix (January 1972), 62. The implied belief in the link between sexual repression and a dynamic authoritarian state was appreciated by Wilhelm Reich, *The Sexual Revolution* (New York 1969).

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THE SINGLE PARTY AS A SUBORDINATE MOVEMENT:

The Case of Egypt

By ILIYA HARIK*

THE single-party system of Nasser's Egypt belongs to a political *genre* widespread in Africa. It is a collaboration movement in which a nationally dominant leader enters into an "alliance" with regionally and locally influential persons; the party organization serves as a kind of "formal contract" between them. As a rule, the alliance is tacit in nature, based on each side's reading of political realities, and therefore tending both to be *ad hoc* and to involve a limited degree of direct interaction. The collaboration movement may be described as a transcendental organization with which individuals willing to deal with and support the regime may affiliate without necessarily making a total commitment to the movement.

David Apter and Ruth Schachter Morgenthau have viewed African single-party systems as mobilizational movements, an analytically derivative form of the Soviet model. More recently, this view has come under criticism as being inapplicable to African party politics.[1] Instead, the political machine model has been advanced as a more useful framework for explaining such movements.[2] Unlike the mobilizational model, where control is based to a large extent on ideological discipline, the machine-politics model is based on the personal control of leaders by other leaders. Such relations, and those between leaders and their constituents, are not based on ideological or normative constraints but on calculations of real or possible benefits—such as the exchange of favors and material rewards. Instead of dealing with general public problems, sub-leaders are concerned primarily with solving specific

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[1] See, for instance, Aristide R. Zolberg, *Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa* (Chicago 1966); and Henry Bienen, *Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development* (Princeton 1967).

[2] Zolberg (fn. 1); also Henry L. Bretton, *The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah: A Study of Personal Rule in Africa* (New York 1967); Bienen, *ibid.*, and "One-Party Systems in Africa," in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, eds., *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems* (New York 1970).

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problems of individual constitutents on a personal basis, using for this purpose their access to the chiefs of the machine organization in government positions.

The machine-politics model may seem attractive to students of comparative political parties in two respects: it stresses local party politics and it directs attention to the personal motives and self-serving orientation of many party cadres. However, it too suffers from shortcomings when applied to Africa. First, machine politics is characterized by a high degree of control, no less effective than in mobilizational organizations,[3] whereas political control within African party organizations tends to be ephemeral. In the second place, party leaders in African communities have fewer favors to exchange than do machine politicians. Indeed, where provincial party leaders are appointed by the national organization, their opportunities to dispense patronage are fewer than those of the higher state officials of the provinces. Finally, it is inconceivable to view single-party systems merely on the basis of personal control (as in the machine-politics model) without giving due attention to the ideological component that characterizes such movements.

By viewing the Egyptian party system as a collaboration movement, the emphasis is placed on a synthesis of ideological discipline and personal control, rather than on the polar extremes. A collaboration movement is a conceptual construct which rests on the principle of power concentration and dispersion. In Egypt, as in many other African states, political power tends to be concentrated at the center and dispersed marginally over the rest of the system. Major political actors therefore orient themselves toward capturing the armed forces and the bureaucracy, which they use to remove other national actors from the political arena. Once national power is captured and consolidated, subnational communities are left with no power that is of any consequence to national leadership. In the absence of a political base of support among the masses, and because of their preoccupation with national matters, regime leaders welcome locally influential persons into the official party. Under such conditions, the official party serves as a mechanism for identifying and organizing the regime's collaborators. Subnational leaders, aware that the safety and continuity of their position is contingent on conformity with the national regime, become readily inclined to collaborate through the official party—regardless of political principle or sentiment. The regime, in return, does not

[3] See, for instance, the description of control mechanisms in the machine politics of Chicago in Edward Banfield, *Political Influence* (Glencoe, Ill. 1961).

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have to expend scarce political resources on local issues and marginal battles.

As a rule, single-party systems originate in a conspiratorial or revolutionary situation; the major concern of their leaders is to consolidate power at the center. The ideological claims and emphases in most single-party systems are rooted in the revolutionary origin and national orientation of their leaders. As they almost invariably stand against a political system which they have overthrown, whether a colonial regime or a native system of government, the need to justify their actions and to make clear what they stand for tends to be expressed in ideological pronouncements for which conformity is sought. Ideological emphasis varies considerably from one system to another; in Egypt it has been neither excessive nor recessive but well balanced and instrumental.

Invariably, single-party systems are expressions of strong-man rule; in most developing countries the party serves to fulfill the dominant leader's political purposes and to assist him in implementing policies at subnational levels. Indicative of the pre-eminence of Nasser in Egypt were such common titles bestowed on him by his countrymen as "the leader" (*al qa'id*), "the combatant" (*al munadil*), and "the teacher" (*al mu'allim*). Single parties, whether they pre-date the assumption of state authority as in Tunisia, Tanzania, and the Ivory Coast or are created after the rise to power as in Egypt and Libya, are purposely kept subordinate to the leader and rarely allowed to develop actual autonomy or a sense of independence. Countries such as Egypt, where these political conditions have prevailed, will be described here as having dominant regimes.

Among the chief characteristics of a dominant regime are the extremely asymmetrical relations that hold between the center and the provinces. Although power is highly concentrated at the center, it is *residual* at the subnational level, in the sense of having marginal national outcomes. Since the political power of subnational leaders is residual, it is also *constituency-* or *community-bound*, i.e., applicable to members of the community only. To the extent that it is constituency-bound, power is also *non-transferable* to other leaders, making it practically impossible for a community leader to expand his influence beyond his basic constituency. A subnational leader must lack visibility outside his community; otherwise his power would assume a national dimension not possible for the regime to control. Subnational power is not allowed to become *cumulative* unless it adds to the power capital of the national leader. The single-party movement in Egypt has been

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shaped by such political realities and has remained a subordinate movement, operative mostly on subnational levels where leaders hold only residual and non-transferable power.

In this essay, Egypt's single-party movement, the Arab Socialist Union, will be examined. First, Nasser's theory of the movement will be briefly discussed to point up the disparities between the official theory and the actual pattern. A description of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) will then be attempted in some detail in order to highlight the main features of the movement. It is hoped that the model derived from Egypt will prove relevant to the understanding of other African single-party systems.

The Free Officers' coup d'état of July 1952 brought to power a group of angry young men whose expressed purpose was to clean up the corrupt government of King Farouk and re-establish a sense of national integrity. Only a handful of members—notably Nasser, Sadat, Husayn, Amer, and Khalid Muhiyddin—had had any experience in agitation, or political party connections, before they joined the military academy. Thus, when they came to power, their ideological perspective was limited; their goals were expressed in terms of Egyptian nationalism, a moderate land reform program, and an interest in developing industry by encouraging private enterprise.

Nasser's efforts to give expression to the political ideas of the Free Officers, in *The Philosophy of the Revolution* (1954), fell short of satisfying the vocal opposition groups in the country. Intellectuals, university professors, students, journalists, and national leaders of the banned political parties remained opposed to the regime. In particular, *The Philosophy of the Revolution* failed to alleviate fears that the military were bent on ruling the country without an ideology or legitimate popular participation.

The new regime was without a philosophy, but not without craftsmanship; without a legitimate political structure, but not without the determination to experiment and learn. Before 1956 it was based almost exclusively on control by the bureaucracy, the military, the internal security forces, and to a limited extent on small and unorganized mass support. Nasser, however, had a grandiose vision of the July venture; his long-term ambitions would not let him rest short of a revolution, for which he needed the support of the intellectuals. His initial success with the intellectuals stemmed not from his direct appeals or threats, but rather inadvertently from his success in breaking the Western arms embargo in 1955, and his almost unscathed emer-

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gence from the 1956 Suez fiasco. These national events rallied more nationalist support behind him and gave him the voluntary backing of a sizable number of intellectuals and university students. Simultaneously, Nasser extended his contacts with the outside world: the Bandung Conference, the Socialist *Ba'ath* party of Syria, as well as Tito and Nehru were among his most prominent contacts. His perspective expanded and his political views started to take a more definite form in the direction of Arab nationalism, socialism, and non-aligned foreign policy—three trends new to Egyptian public life and opinion.

Like most revolutionary regimes, this one started on the well trodden path toward destroying the old system: abolishing the monarchy, the Constitution of 1923, the political parties; purging the army and higher civil service; and undermining the power of the ruling class by means of a land reform program.[4] These radical steps, which were completed in the first two years of the regime, were justified by elaborate statements and writings by the Free Officers and some of their intellectual supporters in the press. Nasser, however, played the main role in providing the ideological justifications for these acts: he proved to be a wielder of ideological symbols and propaganda in his own right.

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE SINGLE PARTY

Nasser denounced the multi-party system and liberal constitutionalism of the old regime as a failure and as an instrument of reactionary landlords and capitalists whom he described as exploiters of the masses. He blamed the banned political parties for the dissension and chaos which prevailed in national politics before 1952.

Even before Nasser came to power, the reputation of political parties had been blemished: The term "party" (*hizb*) had become an anathema in the political lexicon of Egyptian politics, a point well understood by Nasser who instead used "rally" and later "union" as names for his mass movements. In making his indictments of the discredited multi-party system, Nasser disarmed his critics; and his plain rhetoric proved more effective than the learned treatises of the intellectuals.

The corruption of the old regime, Nasser argued, was not accidental: it was the natural result of foreign influence and slavish imitation of alien political systems, such as Western forms of democracy. It was his mission, he affirmed, to build a new system of democracy suitable

[4] These measures are well described in the literature. See Jean and Simonne Lacouture, *Egypt in Transition* (New York 1958); P. J. Vatikiotis, *The Modern History of Egypt* (New York 1969), and *The Egyptian Army in Politics: Pattern for New Nations?* (Bloomington, Ind. 1961); also Harry Hopkins, *Egypt, the Crucible: The Unfinished Revolution in the Arab World* (Boston 1972).

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to the national conditions and needs of the Egyptian people. The "new democracy" began to take shape between 1956 and 1962, and served as the basis for his theory of the single-party system.

In his statements on the single-party system, Nasser asserted that a broadly based mass movement was more suitable for Egyptian conditions than free competition of political parties. He argued that all Egyptians shared similar desires for security, prosperity, development, and freedom from oppression and exploitation. Common aspirations of the masses should be given the opportunity for political expression in one national movement, regardless of the differences in socio-economic background of the population. He maintained that in the liberal democracies, political parties represented class interests and conflicts in society; reforms introduced by his regime had already eradicated the extreme differences in economic levels and narrowed the gap between social classes which would eventually disappear under the guidance of socialism.

His design for a mass movement first materialized in January 1953, when the Liberation Rally was launched as Egypt's exclusive political movement. The Rally was loosely organized and practically devoid of ideological content, requiring for membership only an expression of loyalty to the Free Officers. It was launched to give supporters of the new regime and those who stood to benefit from collaboration the opportunity to demonstrate their backing. Nasser was the head of the movement, aided by colleagues from the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC); but, because of his preoccupation with the problem of consolidating his power, he was unable to give the Liberation Rally his full attention, and the movement never quite left the ground.

Once Nasser had securely established his leadership of the Egyptian republic, he started planning for a new mass organization and a constitution. The latter, promulgated in January of 1956, provided for the creation of the National Union, which, because of the Suez crisis later that year, was not launched until May 1957. For the leadership of the National Union, Anwar al Sadat, a member of the Revolutionary Command Council, was appointed Secretary-General. As head of the National Union, Sadat also assumed the role of official spokesman for the party and the Revolution.[5]

The national command structure of the party under Sadat consisted of the top leaders of the junta, Abdul Latif al Baghdadi, Zakariya Muhiyddin, and Abd al Hakim Amer. The first two were also Minister of

[5] See Sadat's booklet, *al Ittihad al Qawmy* (Cairo, n.d.).

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Planning and of the Interior, respectively, and the last was Chief of Staff.

The National Union was not an active organization on any level; it served mostly to bind locally influential people to the regime, and to prevent Nasser's opponents from running for political office. The Executive Committee acted as an instrument for screening party cadres, particularly candidates to the National Assembly. All policies were made by the national government under Nasser, and the party shared in decision-making only to the extent that officers of its national command structure were also ministers of the state.

The National Union was disbanded in 1961, and reorganized a year later under a new name, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). Reorganization of the official party of Egypt usually occurred once every three years without ever making a complete break with the previous structure. For instance, in 1962, seemingly dramatic changes did not result in any rupture with the major principles upon which the mass movement had always rested: a broad social base, an eclectic ideology, and a subordinate position to the executive branch of government. The changes pertained primarily to minor organizational matters and some reorientation in the party's ideology, making it more precise and sophisticated.

Nasser, for instance, advocated socialism and the elevation of lower-income segments of the population to a more prominent position in the political system. This trend reflected not only Egypt's gradual march toward state socialism, but also Nasser's need to clamp down on possible sources of counterrevolution within Egypt, which, after the setback of Syria's secession from the U.A.R. in 1961, could have come from the old privileged classes. Whatever the rationale for the change, it gave the official party a greater sense of importance, opened it up for new leadership elements, and provided it with a more comprehensive ideological doctrine. The new party doctrine of Arab socialism was formulated in the Charter (*al Mithaq*), which was presented by Nasser to the Congress of Popular Forces,[6] assembled especially for this purpose in May 1962.

Confirming the "broad-base" principle, Nasser defined the Arab Socialist Union as a coalition or alliance (*tahaluf*) of all the working forces (*al qiwah al 'amilah*): peasants, workers, intellectuals, soldiers,

[6] See, for instance, Leonard Binder, "Political Recruitment and Participation in Egypt," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton 1966), 230; also Alan Horton, *The Charter for National Action of the UAR—A Resume of the Complete Document*, IX, No. 5 (American Universities Field Staff, Northeast Africa Series, 1962).

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and native capitalists. This last group included retail traders, contractors, manufacturers, craftsmen, farmers, and service-oriented businessmen. He argued that relations between these different socioeconomic segments of the population should be peaceful, since the regime's reform policies had done away with the pernicious effects of exploitation prevalent under the capitalist system of the old regime. With the implementation of social and political reforms, the whole nation was being prepared for unity under the banner of the official party. Unlike the Communist parties of the Soviet Union and China, this single party comprised *all* adult citizens.

The five segments of the population defined as working forces had no separate corporate existence within the ASU; indeed, very few of them were organized in trade unions. Only individual membership was recognized: Nasser's theory of the working forces was just a classification scheme of the population, not a recognition of organizational autonomy for each group. Nevertheless, this distinction makes it clear that Nasser acknowledged socioeconomic differences in society as legitimate, and disavowed the Marxist doctrine of class warfare.

National leaders of the party were selected by Nasser to fill the posts in the Supreme Executive Committee and the Secretariat. As a rule, his aides and cabinet members were appointed to the Supreme Executive Committee, while the Secretariat was headed by an aide or a member of the original Free Officers' junta. The constitution of the ASU stipulated that a National Congress and a Central Committee were to be formed by elections, but these central party organs were not constituted until 1968—under the stress of national defeat in war.

One of the functions of the party secretariat was to screen candidates to the National Assembly, all of whom had to be members of the party. An aspirant to the National Assembly generally built a position of leadership within the ASU in his district but ran on his own; the party never endorsed or financed candidates. It was common practice, however, for the regime to give confidential instructions to provincial governors to make sure that a number of favored candidates were elected.

While the regime selected all national officers of the ASU, subnational leaders were elected in a relatively free atmosphere. Consequently, ASU cadres represented the distribution of influence in their own communities without being indebted to the regime for their election. The most prominent leaders of the ASU in the countryside were well-to-do farmers, headmen (*'umdahs*), and the educated who had urban occupations but had maintained their ties with the country-

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side. In provincial towns, the notables, civil servants, teachers, and professionals (some of whom were also absentee landlords) were leaders of the ASU cadres. Farmers and professionals may be considered as a new group of leaders whose emergence was advanced by the regime's policies since 1952. Earlier they had been blocked from assuming important leadership roles by the upper urban class and large landlords (often referred to in Egypt as "feudalists"). The regime's rural reform policies undermined the dominant upper class economically and circumscribed its political activities. As a competing elite, farmers and urban professionals stepped in to fill the gap created by the collapse of the influence of the upper class in the provinces, and thereby became allies of the new regime. By their collaboration, they checked the upper class from fighting back and, at the same time, drew benefits from the regime's policies. Especially important was the access which their position in the ASU gave them to all levels of the bureaucracy.

The political ascendancy of farmers and professionals did not remain unchallenged long. Peasants and workers soon proved to be a competing elite—especially after 1962, when the regime openly favored them in its new recruitment policy to the ASU and the National Assembly. Fifty per cent of all elective seats were reserved by law for peasants and workers; the rest went to the former allies of the regime among professionals, farmers, and small urban businessmen. During the first few years of this new system of corporate representation, subnational influentials found little difficulty in continuing their hegemony by means of elevating their clients among peasants and laborers to leadership positions. However, some excesses, plus the regime's move further left in the middle sixties, led to a brief period of official crackdown on previous allies. This policy was clearly reflected in the appointment of Ali Sabri as head of the ASU, and, in 1966, in the creation of a higher state body to investigate the "feudalists." The majority of indictments affected farmers who had benefited illegally from their favored position in the ASU and from access to the civil bureaucracy. The crackdown was precipitated by conspicuous acts of violence committed by some individuals in this group, and by subversion of the reform acts of the sixties. Out of 109 cases on which we have data, 41 involved individuals who had dominated the ASU basic units; the figure may be higher, since the relation of the accused to the ASU was not always cited. In so-called illegal transactions, 60 individuals had been receiving cooperation from the civil bureaucracy. The fact that the majority of the accused, 85 persons, had tried to evade the land reform law of 1961 is indicative of the restive attitude of influ-

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ential farmers under the socialist reform measures introduced in the sixties.

The tenuousness of the ties between the regime and the ASU subnational elite should not detract from the mutual benefits that accrued to both sides by virtue of their early cooperation. Even after the crackdown in 1966, most of the latter remained viable community leaders; after 1968, they made a comeback. The regime did succeed in promoting new leaders—whose interests were again well served—from among peasants and workers. The peasant leaders who were clearly attached to the regime profited particularly from the favoritism and protection extended to them. The benefits enjoyed by industrial workers were less evident, and their relations with the regime remained reserved. ASU leaders in workers' cells often deferred to trade union leaders; at a higher level in the party organization they tended to be subservient to the regime. Consequently, the ASU record was characterized by immobility more frequently among workers than it was among peasants.

Despite their limited suffrage, the freedom to elect subnational party leaders gave ASU members the opportunity to become politically involved in their communities and to affect local government. Although this degree of political vitality was enjoyed by the ASU at local levels, it remained a subordinate movement on the national level, lacking leadership and an independent voice of its own.

The assertion often made by Nasser that the ASU occupied a supreme position above the executive branch of government was part of the rhetoric of populism and is not substantiated by the facts. From the start, the regime relied for implementation of its policies on the civil bureaucracy which was expanded at all levels to meet new demands and challenges.[7] The remarkable expansion of the bureaucracy, the costs of its maintenance, and the resources with which it was trusted leave not the slightest doubt that it was pre-eminent in the political system built by Nasser.

The party remained an instrument of national reconciliation, theoretically encompassing all adult citizens and assisting the bureaucracy in the implementation of the regime's policies. As a broadly based national movement the ASU lacked cohesion and failed to become an effective instrument for political action. The search for a role for the regime's single party continued until the summer of 1965, when Ali Sabri was appointed its Secretary-General.

[7] Regarding relations between party and bureaucracy, see Harik, "Mobilization Policy and Political Change in Rural Egypt," in Richard Antoun and Iliya Harik, eds., *Rural Politics and Social Change in the Middle East* (Bloomington, Ind. 1972), 287-314.

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The ASU organization was supposed to have been built from the base up, by means of elections; in practice, elections were not held except at subnational levels (see Chart 1). The organizational structure of the party was nominal, incomplete, and loosely held together. In the first place, at the subnational levels higher party officers did not exercise authority over lower-echelon party cadres. The province, district, and basic committees were congeries of party organs, each practically independent from the other. Basic unit officers of the Committee of Twenty did not owe their positions to higher party structures, but to their influence in their native communities. Higher party officers of a province or district could not actually exercise power over lower units. They were primarily concerned with attaining higher positions in the official party for purposes of self-protection, influence, status, and privilege—especially when dealing with the government bureaucracy.

Nationally, the party consisted of the appointed bodies of the Supreme Executive Committee and the General Secretariat which constituted the command structure of the ASU. (The other central organs, the National Congress and the Central Committee, were not constituted.)[8] Policy was made by Nasser, his aides and his Cabinet (most of whom were members of the Supreme Executive Committee), and was then transmitted to the civil and party bureaucracies. The President and the Cabinet thus sat in dual capacities as heads of the government and the party. The Secretariat attended to managing the ASU and implementing policy drawn up by Nasser. Both the party and the civil bureaucracy were an extension of one and the same command structure, the President and his aides.

ACQUIRING MOBILIZATIONAL CAPACITIES

At the outset, Sabri took steps to revitalize the party and instill in it a sense of confidence and mission. The doctrines of development and grass-roots activism advocated in the Charter provided part of the answer to the nagging questions about the party's role. Nasser and his aides decided to revive the idea of mass participation in local development as the chief broad objective of the movement. The Arab Socialist Union was to involve the masses in national development programs by means of grass-roots participation, and by cooperation with and supervision of departments and officials of the government. The role of

[8] This was true also under Sabri. The first Party Congress met in July 1968, after Sabri's term came to an end, and under special circumstances.

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

CHART 1

FORMAL STRUCTURE OF THE ARAB SOCIALIST UNION, 1963–1965

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the ASU as a watchdog and as an auxiliary force[9] to government bureaucracies was enhanced by the creation of a new basic party unit, the Leadership Group, as we shall see later.

Nasser's move to inject life into the official party was neither accidental nor a matter of convenience, but an expression of felt needs that had been building up for several years. Basically, it stemmed from Egypt's conversion to state socialism which caused the responsibilities of official and administrative bodies to multiply. Industrial and, to a lesser extent, agricultural production was in the hands of governmental officials who acted in accordance with bureaucratic routine quite removed from the public. But the expanding role of the government in the life of the people required public understanding and cooperation. Only an active mass movement could generate the proper response and cooperation from the people.

In addition, political considerations prompted the regime to revive the mass movement. Many landlords, it had been disclosed in 1965, had been successful in evading land reform laws and had enjoyed favorable relations with the bureaucracy and the Agricultural Credit Bank. Their access to the Agricultural Credit Bank had led to the accumulation of enormous debts in excess of their security assets. Furthermore, many landlords had monopolized local and provincial party posts and used them to inactivate party organs while seeking material gain for themselves. Moreover, many of them were becoming assertive; in 1965 their intimidation of militant ASU members culminated in the assassination of a party leader in a village of Minufiyyah province. Following this incident, the leftist press,[10] which had been particularly active in exposing the fraud committed by these groups and their hostility to the regime, mounted a highly pitched campaign. As a result, the regime hastened its steps to activate the ASU as an alternative to the bureaucracy in spheres of public life with which the latter was not equipped to cope or could not be trusted to cope successfully.

For the success of his policies, Nasser considered it important to mobilize the masses and to involve them in national development plans. He expressed this sentiment clearly in a speech he made in Damanhur on June 15, 1966:

> We all know about the old social relations which prevailed in the countryside and how they were based on exploitation and coercion

[9] For the auxiliary role of the ASU, see Harik (fn. 7).

[10] Especially in the weekly, *Rose el Yusuf*; the monthly, *al Tali'ah*; and the daily, *al Gumhuriyah*.

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> in a manner similar to that under the state of nature when the population was divided into masters and slaves. . . . Can we as an executive authority or as a revolution which represents an alliance of all working forces put an end to these social relations by means of speech-making and the passing of laws only? Speech-making and laws will not end these old social relations. . . . Only by work and incessant struggle in every village and every hamlet will we be able to put an end to this state of exploitation through participation in the Arab Socialist Union, through political action. (Author's translation)

This statement reflects Nasser's realization that political transformation of the nation could not be fully effected without the political involvement of the masses.

In line with these developments, Nasser appointed his Vice President and former Prime Minister, Ali Sabri, as Secretary-General of the Arab Socialist Union to lead the new drive. Sabri, a Free Officer and a man who had acquired a reputation for efficiency and authoritarianism during the years of his association with Nasser,[11] was also known as a nationalist with leftist tendencies. He represented no distinct ideology of his own, but was a more ardent advocate of Egypt's official doctrine of socialism than his predecessors in the ASU, Zakariya Muhiyddin and Husayn al Shafi'i.

Sabri shared the view of leftist intellectuals that the ASU was sluggish and immobile due to its domination by men who had a vested interest in the status quo.[12] "The ASU basic committees during the first Five-Year Plan 1960–1965," he wrote in one of his books, "acted at the mass level like post offices. They [the basic committees] waited for complaints and problems to come to them and were simply satisfied to transmit these complaints and petitions in their original form to the executive branch of government or to their ASU superiors at the district or provincial levels, who in turn would do nothing more than pass them on to the executive and administrative bodies."[13]

As Secretary-General of the ASU, Sabri made it clear immediately that he meant to generate popular participation in politics within the framework of the ASU. In support of these efforts, Nasser appeared in

[11] Sabri was not a member of the Revolutionary Command Council; he met Nasser after the coup in 1952. He served as prime minister in 1964–65, while Zakariya Muhiyddin was responsible for the ASU; the two men exchanged jobs in 1965.

[12] See such views in the leftist *al Tali'ah*, and compare them with Sabri's views in *Sanawat al Tahawwul al Ishtiraki* (Cairo 1967), 161; also see Sabri's articles in *al Gumhuriyah*, January 1–May 30, 1967.

[13] *Ibid.*, 161. (Author's translation)

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several localities where he made speeches enforcing the Sabri drive and making it clear to civil servants that they were to respect and not obstruct the ASU. Sabri publicly expressed the hope that before long the ASU would become strong enough to make the executive branches of government subordinate to its leadership. It is not easy to determine how seriously he meant these assertions to be taken; it is certain, however, that Nasser's expressed aspirations were never realized.

SABRI AND THE MOBILIZATION DRIVE

Sabri set out to revamp the party structure with the purpose of instating a strict hierarchial order of authority and installing better-trained and more active party cadres in the ASU. His main point of departure from the earlier party organization was to abandon the elective system of party leaders practiced at subnational levels and replace it by a system of designation from above. On the national level, however, the ASU did not experience any changes except for the appointment of new members to the Secretariat. Unlike their predecessors, the new officers were prominent activists who shared Sabri's ideas about the party's role in the system. The Supreme Executive Committee continued to overlap in membership with the Cabinet and presidential aides whose direct involvement in the management of party affairs was nominal. Insofar as these were the national decision-makers, they bound the party to observe their decisions and to abide by them.

In contrast to the lack of changes in the national structure of the party, a completely new organization was created on the subnational levels consisting of Executive Bureaus for provinces and districts, and a Leadership Group at the basic levels of village, city ward, or place of work (see Chart 2). Each Executive Bureau was headed by a First Secretary who enjoyed authority over the rest of the bureau members and lower organs of the party. Appointments to the Executive Bureau of the province were made by the Secretariat in cooperation with the provincial governor. District secretaries in each province were appointed by the First Secretary of the Province Executive Bureau, and they in turn appointed secretaries to the Leadership Groups.

Officers of the province and district bureaus were full-time, salaried party officials paid mostly from state funds, and were given political training at higher party institutes. They were drawn from the civil bureaucracy, school system, universities, business management, and private occupations—lawyers, farmers, and workers. Material incentives were used to attract quality cadres from established career lines by adding a bonus to the salary such persons used to receive before join-

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

CHART 2

FORMAL STRUCTURE OF THE ARAB SOCIALIST UNION, 1965–1968

ing the party leadership and by guaranteeing their right to return to their original posts after completion of their term in the ASU, an action made possible by considering such cadres as being on temporary loan from their original posts. Incentives and assurances were necessary because political careers were considered less secure and more demanding in time, energy, and responsibility than other employment.

The process of activization of the ASU also included the establish-

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ment of training institutes for party cadres, starting at the national level with the Higher Institute of Socialist Studies, headed by Dr. Ibrahim Sa'd al Din, an American-trained economist with Marxist views and a member of the ASU Secretariat. Two other national training institutes were created: the Socialist Institute, in the industrial town of Halwan, whose graduates went for further training to the Socialist Institute of the Giza Pyramids. Similar institutes were established in provincial capitals, towns, and villages.

Another important development in the ASU under Sabri was the creation, in 1965, of a disciplined and militant Youth Organization[14] as an auxiliary body of the ASU, but with autonomous cadres and overlapping membership. Youth was rather liberally defined to include individuals between the ages of sixteen and thirty-three. The Youth Organization was supposed to move at a faster tempo than the mother organization and to give young men objectives and activities that suited their temperament.

Training in the Youth Organization had two aspects: indoctrination, and inculcation of practical qualities such as organizational skills and endurance under hardship conditions. Through lectures and discussion groups, trainees were instructed in the principles of socialism, the national struggle of Egypt and the Arab countries, the achievements of the Revolution, and the developmental needs of Egypt. The National Charter was the main text on these subjects.

On the practical side, the trainees were instructed in the principles of cooperatives as they functioned in Egypt, the organization and role of village councils and local government, and the importance of mobilizing the populace and leading them in self-help projects (*hulul dhatiyah*). To prepare them for these tasks, they were given assignments such as digging ditches, carrying sandbags, and working in factories and fields in surrounding neighborhoods. It was hoped that when they returned to their homes, these cadres would lead the masses and demonstrate an ability to solve community problems.

The Sabri reforms strengthened party leadership at all subnational levels and established firm lines of authority. Provincial party secretaries were invested with power over lower-level officers and given privileged positions in the governor's council. Particularly important in the new organizational scheme was the First Secretary of the district, who linked basic unit leaders with provincial leaders of the party, in addition to being the prime mover of party activities at the

[14] For a brief but comprehensive account of the Youth Organization, see *al Shabab al 'Arabi*, May 8, 1967.

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mass level. Under his supervision, local leaders were selected, trained, and given official duties. He also led political education drives, helped local cadres overcome political opposition, and assisted in solving local community problems. These varied activities were implemented by the Leadership Groups. The Leadership Groups consisted of the most active and prominent ASU members at the basic level and were headed by a Secretary. Their membership was fairly large and included key officials, provided they were politically oriented.

During the brief party drive considerable progress was made in solving community problems and in initiating self-help projects—an idea put into effect by Sabri. Self-help projects were tasks initiated by party cadres in the community and included such undertakings as draining pools, digging canals, and building schools, mosques, and roads.

Despite the secondary role of the ASU in national affairs, it created local political opportunities for many individuals and groups who had been without a political base, and introduced a new sense of political participation among the masses. It served to recruit and train responsive regional and local leaders who came to be in charge of organizing political participation and consolidating mass support for the regime. As an auxiliary body to the bureaucracy, it helped in implementing national policy and solving local problems.

The change which occurred in the ASU under Ali Sabri was primarily a transformation in which a collaboration movement acquired mobilizational characteristics. The experiment lasted two-and-one-half years before it had to be abandoned, not as a result of failure but of success. In most cases, activists took over political responsibility from locally established leaders; this resulted in conflicts with those whose power and interests were adversely affected by the new party organization. After Egypt's defeat in 1967, the regime was shaken up and Nasser needed to re-establish consensus. He disbanded the Youth Organization in the fall of 1967 and the Executive Bureaus in June of 1968, thus restoring the party organization to what it had been before the Sabri drive, this time convening all party organs including the National Congress and the Central Committee.

The secret apparatus. One of the curious aspects of the ASU was the existence of a clandestine organ in the movement. In 1964, well before his plan to revitalize the party, Nasser created a secret apparatus, the purpose of which still remains unclear. The first disclosure of its existence was made by Nasser in Alexandria in 1966 during a government-

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sponsored conference for Egyptian students abroad. No more was said about it in public, perhaps because of the poor reception the idea understandably had among students. Sha'rawi Gum'ah and Sami Sharaf, two presidential aides and former army officers, were in charge of the secret apparatus; they used it to appoint persons loyal to them as leaders in the ASU. Their relations with Sabri were close, as may be concluded from revelations made by the Sadat regime during the trials of Sabri, Gum'ah, and Sharaf in 1971. The membership of the secret apparatus consisted mostly of high-level leaders who were connected with the regular party cadres by overlapping membership, with the purpose, no doubt, of influencing the actions of the movement nationally. Gum'ah, who, during Nasser's last three years also became Minister of Interior and a strong man in the administration, used the secret apparatus as a power base from which he and Sharaf challenged Sadat after Nasser's death.

The creation of a clandestine organ in what was supposed to be a mass movement and the main democratic feature of the regime may be a reflection of Nasser's deep-seated conspiratorial tendencies and mistrust for free politics. It remains a paradox that the man who was a master of mass communications and did more than any other leader in the Arab world to utilize his talent in the art of winning mass support and confidence failed to be fully honest in his dialogue with the people who were devoted to him. The credibility gap between him and the public became quite serious after 1967. As a restless young man put it to this writer in 1968, "If our state-controlled papers are telling the truth, then we have no way of knowing; we can no longer discriminate between truth and falsehoods."

THE LIMITATIONS OF TRANSFORMATION

During the Sabri drive, the ASU movement acquired mobilizational characteristics and effectiveness on the subnational level; centrally, only the Secretariat was activated. However, the experiment did not last long enough to achieve full transformation, if indeed that was supposed to happen. Instead, the party continued to manifest some characteristics of a collaboration movement. It remained, for instance, subnational in function, without independence from the dominant leader; the command structure of the party continued to overlap with the executive branch of government. As for local party leaders, they became more active and more ideologically oriented, but the mobilization drive did not transform them into militants or devotees. As a member of the Executive Bureau of one province put it in 1966, albeit

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somewhat facetiously, he and his colleagues on the bureau were "socialists by presidential decree." In place of the previous notables and locally influential persons, subnational leaders became party officials whose collaboration with the regime was greater than that of their predecessors had been. Limited changes in the flow of communications within the party also occurred; they deserve special attention.

The hypothesis of a two-way channel of communications. Although there was some improvement in the flow of communications during the Sabri period, many of the earlier features of a limited exchange of information persisted. At no time did the situation approximate the model of a two-way channel of communications attributed to mass parties. Spokesmen for and students of the single-party system have suggested that mass parties such as the ASU serve to relay communications from the leadership to the base and from the base back to the leadership, thereby keeping authorities abreast of the needs and demands of the public. The two-way channel of communications was also stressed by Ali Sabri as the primary goal of the party's reorganization: "The main purpose of forming executive bureaus is to establish perfect communication channels between the base and the leadership . . . and vice versa on an every-day basis. In this way we can keep track of the party activities and learn about the demands of the masses. . . ."[15] After 1965, the flow of communications within the party increased at the subnational levels, as did the flow of messages emanating from the command structure. However, the change was not sufficiently effective to warrant the claim of free flow of communications within the ASU; before and after Ali Sabri's reforms, communication remained intermittent, discontinuous, and often in one direction.

The organizational discontinuity between national and subnational levels was paralleled by the discontinuity in the flow of communications. The opportunities for provincial party leaders to contact the Secretariat or the Supreme Executive Committee were extremely limited and in some cases practically non-existent. The following example will illustrate the distance between the national and subnational party leaders. In 1964, the governor of Beheira Province was transferred to another province as a routine change in governors' posts. The Provincial Committee of the party and most lower-level cadres were unhappy about the loss of a governor whom they had considered to be their best in a long time. A popular deputation from the province went to Cairo,

[15] See statement reported in *al Ahram*, December 12, 1965. (Author's translation)

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led by the ASU Provincial Committee, to demonstrate its disappointment and to plead for the return of the governor. Once in Cairo, the party leaders did not know what to do. None had any rapport or access to the Secretariat. In the absence of formal party relations, they resorted to personal contacts through a relative of Anwar al Sadat (then speaker of the National Assembly), who could not help them. Eventually, one of the committee members who was also a member of the National Assembly cornered President Nasser on his way out of the National Assembly hall, and pleaded with him not to transfer the governor. The request was granted, but in the tradition of Harun al Rashid and the princes of early Islam, not through the channels of an organized mass movement.

The ASU Secretariat which sent instructions down to the party cadres expected and received very little communication in return. In issuing directives and guidelines to party cadres, it used the mass media more often than party channels. Occasionally, a member of the Secretariat or one of its officers would visit a region or a community to explain important messages that had already been made public through the mass media, and to supervise the implementation of orders. Provincial party leaders sent written reports to the Secretariat, but on an irregular basis; indeed, party files at the headquarters of the Secretariat in Cairo are pathetically meager.

On the subnational levels, by contrast, communications between party officers increased; here, the information flow may be described as a two-way channel of communications. District Secretaries held weekly meetings with leaders of the basic units to supervise and instruct them, and to improve the performance and morale of local party cadres. The exchange of ideas and information came from both sides, and the District Secretary passed the concerns of the public on to the ASU Provincial Secretary. During that period, the purpose of party communication at the subnational levels was reasonably fulfilled; most of the demands and problems of local communities could be solved at the province level without resort to national party leaders.

A number of reasons explain why the two-way channel of communications in the ASU was neither continuous nor intensive—among them the fact that there were information agencies which competed with the ASU, such as the mass media, the civil bureaucracy, and the National Assembly. Also, organizational discontinuities in the ASU inhibited the regular flow of communications through the party apparatus.

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Political groupings within the ranks of the ASU often led to distorted political information, conveying news to personal favorites while withholding it from others. The ASU was particularly susceptible to such diversion because of its broad social base and the variety of social groups within the organization. In addition, since higher party cadres at the province level had the authority of appointing lower-level cadres, a degree of patronage developed between some party leaders and their subordinates. This intensified the trend of channeling information between personally trusted leaders rather than along formal lines of authority.

As a competing agency, the mass media reduced direct communication among party cadres. The media often went farther than the ASU in reporting popular grievances and disclosing problems of policy implementation, misdemeanor of public officials, fraud, corruption, and negligence. Reports of this kind were not limited to the performance of government officials but extended also to party cadres. Because such news had national circulation and could create public reaction, it received greater attention from the government than did party reports.

The mass media were not limited to covering news of officials and party cadres; they also served as instruments through which national leaders passed policy information and political injunctions to the party cadres. Party cadres learned to take their cues as to what was expected of them from announcements of policy or guidelines in the daily news media: the bi-weekly party organs such as *al Ishtiraki* and *al Shabab al 'Arabi* emphasized directives and doctrinal matters that had already been announced.

The "cue" shortened the communication circuit by reducing the steps through which communications flowed. Party cadres, journalists, and others involved in the dissemination of ideas and information obtained their guidelines from public statements made by top political leaders, mainly Nasser. Thus they interpreted for themselves the intentions and main concerns of policy-makers from their public statements, and were able to behave accordingly. Survey data show that not only cadres, but also politically aware citizens in general, responded directly to information cues.[16]

In brief, the upward flow of information ran through a variety of channels in addition to the party organization. The mass media, the civil bureaucracy, and the National Assembly competed with the official party in spreading information in both directions. The party

[16] The author conducted such a survey in a community in the Nile Delta in 1967.

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played merely a supplementary role in disseminating information to the Secretariat and the regime.

CONCLUSION

The mass movement created by President Nasser was, like similar movements in Africa, an auxiliary instrument of political action, subservient to the will of the leader. It remained a subordinate organization, not because of inability to transform itself into an effective instrument of political action, but by deliberate design of the regime's leadership. Efforts to revitalize the party movement occasionally took place but, as we have seen, the major step was aborted before the movement acquired autonomy and a will of its own. The organizational problems during the Sabri period, the failure to constitute the National Congress and the Central Committee, and the disjointed channels of communication indicate how limited the party organization remained. Some of the main features of a collaboration movement as we deduce them from the case of the Arab Socialist Union may provide a useful baseline for comparison with other single-party systems in Africa.

As a politically subordinate institution, the party is assigned an auxiliary political role—to recruit local leaders, support the regime, and watch and supplement the bureaucracy in implementing policy. (In places such as Tanzania, where the civil bureaucracy has not yet sufficiently expanded into the countryside, party cadres sometimes serve as substitutes for officials.) In view of its subnational orientation and the local character of its cadres, a collaboration movement is characterized by weak organizational discipline, few resources, and limited activities. Subnational leaders, who may be entirely new on the scene or of inherited political standing, are community-bound, locally influential persons rather than revolutionaries, devotees, or militant activists. Strict discipline and organization are not consistent with the local character of party cadres or with the subordinate political role assigned to the party by the regime.

The organization of a collaboration movement takes the following form. At the top is a *command structure* directly bound to the head of the regime and acting for him in guiding and directing party activities. The command structure is generally staffed with appointed aides of the leader; whether it is called a Secretariat as in Egypt, or a Political Bureau as in Tunisia, it stands for the highest authority in the party organization. It is to be distinguished from other party organs on the national level which often maintain only a nominal existence. A party

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constitution may provide for other central organs, for instance a National Congress and/or a Central Committee. But even if constituted, these are often not convened; and if convened, they may be performing only ceremonial functions, approving what has already been decided upon elsewhere. In other words, the national organization of the party has very little weight or relevance aside from expressing the leader's wishes.[17]

In contrast to the *pro forma* national organization of the movement, all party organs at the subnational levels are usually fully constituted and become operative with little delay. The basic units therefore tend to be most animated and to stir up considerable political action in a community; for although their power is marginal to national outcomes, it is locally important and reflects the struggle for influence in the community. Political participation by the people at this level is more meaningful and free than it is on the national scene. Community members are allowed to elect party cadres who become the link between the community and the regime from which they receive their endorsement. However, party units at the district or provincial levels—often elected by cadres of the basic units—tend to be less active and to lack strong relations with one another. Provincial committees exercise hardly any authority over district committees, which in turn have little or no authority over the basic units. In their relations to one another, subnational party units act more like a confederation than like units of a hierarchical system of authority. Local cadres seek higher party office to gain official legitimacy, standing in their communities and, above all, access to the provincial bureaucracy. In short, the cumulative effect of power within the party organization tends to be minimal.

Lines of communication among the various echelons of the party organization operate intermittently and discontinuously. Where an advanced system of mass communications exists, the national command structure more often conveys orders and collects intelligence through the mass media than by personal contact or direct formal communication. Although the party may serve to provide political information to the national leadership and in turn convey lines of policy to the masses, such functions should not be overemphasized.

A collaboration movement has other characteristics that deserve attention here. It tends to be broadly based, with the purpose of including all adult citizens while denying membership only to the regime's

[17] The present relations between Tunisia's single party and President Bourguiba are of particular interest in this regard.

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enemies and individuals who have been deprived of civil rights in a criminal or court action. Its membership therefore is not limited to the avant-garde or to carefully selected individuals, but is synonymous with citizenship. This tolerant attitude is expressive of the desire of dominant regimes in developing countries to become the repositories of national consensus.

Being all-inclusive, the single party may mitigate the effects of class or segmentary conflicts among the population by seeking to resolve such differences within the movement. It includes in its rank and file opposed social and economic groups, such as workers and employers, peasants and landlords, intellectuals and soldiers, as well as different ethnic groups. Thus, the single party is not so much a monolithic organization as it is a structure for the accommodation of divergent interests. Dominant regimes often take pride in being broadly based.

In line with the pluralist composition of the party membership, single parties often develop broad and eclectic ideologies that reflect the integrationist goals of the regime. The usual blend is one of populist, nationalist, and socialist elements based on cultural and religious traditions. In this way, party ideology provides the appropriate symbols with which each group may find it possible to identify, as well as the freedom to emphasize principles in the official ideological spectrum selectively. While peasants and workers may emphasize principles of social justice, employers and landlords may stress national unity. Within reasonable limits, the eclectic party ideology offers something for everyone.

Finally, collaboration movements are mobile in the sense of possessing the capacity to change, to grow, or to induce vitality into their organization. A study of single parties therefore must take note of the time element and avoid a static approach. Within the collaboration movement change may occur under several conditions. Since the power of party cadres is residual, a dominant regime can tolerate political competition for subnational offices and even for national ones that perform secondary and ceremonial functions. In time, free political competition may lead to changing personnel and newly emerging but loyal party leaders. Party cadres may also change—from locally influential persons to officials or agents of the party bureaucracy. Such a change often occurs as the regime becomes more established and better able to endow its party leaders with sufficient backing to command local respect and cooperation. The chief attribute of the leaders continues to be their willingness to collaborate with the regime.

Change may also occur if the regime seeks to implement policies

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that require the active cooperation of individual citizens. Under such conditions, it becomes necessary for the regime to step up the educational role of the party and induce organizational discipline in order to advance favorable mass response and cooperation. Party cadres may help carry out government policies and community development projects, or assume responsibility for municipal councils and other local organizations. In effect, a collaboration movement may have the capacity to become a mobilizing organization even for a temporary period, as was the case in Egypt. Here again, however, conformity with the regime's political purposes is certain to be an indispensable prerequisite for the transition. Even when a single party acquires mobilizational capacities, it remains subordinate to the executive branch of government; otherwise its life is likely to be short. The fact that most of the youth organizations created under African single-party systems, including Egypt's, were disbanded after only a short time is significant. A dominant regime is likely to have low tolerance for strong organizations that seek to free themselves from the subordinate position to which mass movements are condemned.

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Research Note

EAST-WEST TENSION IN EUROPE, 1946-1970:

A Conceptual Analysis and a Quantitative Description

By KJELL GOLDMANN[1]

I. INTRODUCTION

THE "political climate" in Europe has varied a great deal since 1945. Sometimes the outbreak of major war has seemed to be imminent; at other times it has appeared to be a very remote possibility.

Politicians and diplomats, journalists and researchers have found it useful to characterize such changes as fluctuations in "tension." Their basic assumption has obviously been that international tension can be measured. It is possible, they assume, to determine by way of empirical observation whether tension is high or low, whether it has increased or decreased. Moreover, it seems to have generally been taken for granted that the degree of tension tells us something about the probability of war: the higher the tension, the more likely the occurrence of war. This can be true either by definition (tension = probability of war) or by causal relation (tension → probability of war, or probability of war → tension). An analogy is sometimes made between measuring tension and measuring temperature.[2]

In the early 1970's the stability of the apparent East-West détente had become a key question to Europeans concerned about the foreign and defense policies of their countries. One way of improving our

[1] This article has benefitted from comments by my colleagues at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, particularly Katarina Brodin, Thomas G. Hart, Lars Häll, and G. Roger Wall, and by Bengt-Owe Birgersson, Sverre Lodgaard, Karl Erik Rosengren, Martin Saeter, Raimo Väyrynen, and Krister Wahlbäck, as well as by several participants in a seminar at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.

The empirical study summarized in the latter part of the article was designed by me in close cooperation with Lars Häll, and carried out by him. For a full report of the results, see Lars Häll, *Spänningen i Europa 1946–1970: en kvantitativ beskrivning*, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Research Report UI-72-3 (Stockholm 1972).

[2] Cf., for example, a statement made by Nikita Khrushchev in January 1960, quoted in Harto Hakovirta, *Regional Integration and International Tensions* (Institute of Political Science, University of Tampere 1972), 1; and Ole R. Holsti, "The Value of International Tension Measurement," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VII (September 1963), 615-16.

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ability to make this kind of judgment may be to explore how and why the détente came about. The present research note is derived from an ongoing project with that purpose. Our research questions made it necessary for us to try to describe fluctuations in European tension in a way more precise and less arbitrary than is usually the case.[3] This is not merely a matter of collecting data on military expenditures, number of war deaths, or the like. The real problem is to combine reliable measurement with theoretical relevance.[4] A fairly detailed conceptual discussion is necessary before meaningful measurement of tension can be undertaken. We hope that our conceptual analysis and our empirical data may be useful to others even if taken out of their theoretical context.

2. INTERNATIONAL TENSION: A DEFINITION

According to standard usage of the term in the social sciences, including international relations, tension is a psychological phenomenon.[5] Since we want our findings to be relevant to earlier discussions about international tension, we have deemed it necessary to stay within that conceptual tradition. Thus, to say something about tension is to say something about the feelings, the expectations, the perceptions of individuals. There are at least two alternative ways in which the notion of tension can be made more precise, however.

One is to define tension in terms of conflicting attitudes, goals, or values. It seems, however, that what is usually meant by tension in international politics can vary independently of such conflicts. Conflicting attitudes, goals, or values can exist between the actors *A* and *B* without relations between them being "tense." A change in the magnitude of tension does not necessarily presuppose that *A* or *B*, or both, change their attitudes, goals, or values. In any case, it appears to

[3] Earlier attempts at tension measurement include Gérard Bergeron, *La guerre froide inachevée* (Montreal 1971), particularly the diagram on p. 208; Alan G. Newcombe, "Towards the Development of an Inter-Nation Tensiometer," *Peace Research Society (International), Papers*, III (1970), 11-27; Raimo Väyrynen, *Dimensions of International Tension, 1948–1968*, Paper presented for the Fourth IPRA Conference (Bled, Yugoslavia 1971). Two researchers gave up the idea of using the concept "tension" because they found no way of operationalizing it meaningfully: see Richard A. Brody and Alexandra H. Benham, "Nuclear Weapons and Alliance Cohesion," in Dean G. Pruitt and Richard C. Snyder, eds., *Theory and Research on the Causes of War* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1969), 168.

[4] The theoretical background of our attempts to measure European tension are summarized in Kjell Goldmann, "Bipolarization and Tension in International Systems: A Theoretical Discussion," *Cooperation and Conflict*, VII, No. 1 (1972), 37-63.

[5] Cf. Julius Gould and William L. Kolb, eds., *A Dictionary of the Social Sciences* (London 1964), 718; Pruitt and Snyder (fn. 3), 50.

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be more useful analytically to regard such conflicts as hypothetical *causes* and *consequences* of tension rather than as *synonymous* with tension.

Instead, we shall proceed from another idea that is prevalent in the literature on international relations: the notion of tension as associated with perceptions of threat. Judging from the way in which most authors express themselves, the term "international tension" is commonly taken to imply that the actors *expect to become involved in conflict behavior*. We prefer the latter expression to "threat perceptions" for the reason that threat perceptions presuppose a potential aggressor and a potential victim; only the victim perceives a threat. Since threat perceptions are not always mutual, the notion of tension as synonymous with threat perceptions may become problematic when applied to *relations* between actors. The potential aggressor also expects conflict behavior to occur, and his expectations are as relevant to the tension between him and his victim as is the victim's perception of being threatened.

In the present study, tension is thus regarded as a function of the expectations of *both* parties, not as a property of a single actor. The concept is here defined as follows: *Between two actors, or coalitions of actors, tension exists to the extent that they expect conflict behavior to occur between them*. The expression "to the extent" is intended to suggest a gradation in three respects. Tension is assumed to vary with the *scope, likelihood*, and *immediacy in time* of the expected conflict behavior. Tension between *A* and *B* would be higher if they expected the outbreak of war rather than the imposition of economic sanctions. It would be higher if they believed war to be unavoidable instead of being one of several possibilities. And it would be higher if they expected the outbreak of war in the near future rather than at a more remote time.

This definition needs further specification and comment. For example, which individuals should be regarded as representing the actors to whose expectations the definition refers? If we draw a distinction between the authorities and the public, i.e., between those who govern and those who are governed, we can distinguish between authoritative expectations and public expectations. The extent to which they covary is an open empirical question. The expectations in our definition of tension are intended to be those of the authorities, not of the public. In other words, as is usual in political analysis, we assume that it is meaningful to ascribe to governing elites common or representative perceptions and to regard these perceptions as those of the collectivity

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they govern. Tension between the United States and the Soviet Union is a function of the expectations of the leaders in Washington and Moscow, not of the American and Soviet peoples.

Suppose now that the conflict expectations of actors A and B are known to us. They can be denoted as E_A and E_B respectively. As has already been pointed out, E_A has three components:

$$E_A = S_A \cdot P_A \cdot I_A$$

where S_A is the scope of future conflict behavior between A and B as perceived by A;

P_A is the probability of future conflict behavior between A and B as perceived by A;

I_A is the immediacy in time of future conflict behavior between A and B as perceived by A.

B's expectations, E_B, can be defined in an analogous way:

$$E_B = S_B \cdot P_B \cdot I_B$$

A crucial question is how to get from E_A and E_B to the tension between A and B, T_{AB}. Since threat perceptions and defense preparations are interdependent, sometimes creating an "armament-tension dilemma,"[6] we would expect E_A and E_B to be fairly similar, which would make it relatively unimportant how they are combined into T_{AB}. But there are exceptions to this rule. It must be made clear in what way T_{AB} is a function of E_A and E_B.

Consideration of an extreme case may be useful. Suppose that A expects conflict behavior, but B does not ($E_A > 0$; $E_B = 0$). Since tension is here regarded as a property of relations, not of actors, it seems strange to regard the relations between A and B as tense when B does not expect any conflict behavior at all to occur between them. But it would be at least as strange, and completely arbitrary, to define T_{AB} as the mean of E_A and E_B, in this case as $E_A/2$. The best solution is to regard tension as a reciprocal phenomenon. In order for a specific degree of tension to exist between A and B, *both A and B* must expect conflict behavior of a particular scope, likelihood, and immediacy in time. In the above case, T_{AB} is therefore zero: If A expects conflict while B anticipates peaceful cooperation, no tension exists between them. Generally, the following definitions apply:

$$T_{AB} = E_A \text{ if } E_A < E_B$$
$$T_{AB} = E_B \text{ if } E_A > E_B$$

[6] J. David Singer, "Threat-Perception and the Armament-Tension Dilemma," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, II (1958), 90-105.

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It ought to be clear by now what we mean by tension *between two actors*. The definition of tension also includes the possibility of tension *between two coalitions*, however. How to get from $E_{A1}, E_{A2}, \ldots, E_{An}$ to E_A, and from $E_{B1}, E_{B2}, \ldots, E_{Bn}$ to E_B will not be discussed here. It is a problem that is best solved *ad hoc*—everything depends on the structure of the particular coalition under study.

One problem remains. Tension has here been defined with respect to the relations between *two* parties. Nevertheless, expressions like "tension in Europe" are frequently used in this article. Such expressions are not meant to denote some summary measure of tension in all the two-party relations of which an international system consists. They will be used merely for the sake of linguistic simplicity to denote tension in the "most important" or "dominating" two-party relationship of a system. In the face of formulations like "tension between the European nations that belong to the Western and Eastern alliances respectively," synonyms such as "European tension" are quite useful.[7]

It should perhaps be emphasized that our use of the phrase "European tension" by no means implies that tension *within* the Eastern and Western alliances need be irrelevant to tension *between* them. We could have tried to develop a multidimensional concept, taking these and other dimensions of European tension into account. We have found it analytically more convenient, however, to regard inter-alliance tension as a unidimensional phenomenon that may or may not be causally related to phenomena like intra-alliance tension. This is clearly a semantical rather than a theoretical problem. Whether intra-alliance relations do in fact explain inter-alliance tension will be examined at a later stage of the project.

3. INTERNATIONAL TENSION AND THE PROBABILITY OF WAR

As has been pointed out in the introduction, a close relationship between international tension and the probability of war is usually assumed to exist. It would therefore be difficult to accept a definition of tension that makes it questionable to postulate such a correlation.

How does the above definition of tension meet that condition? Can it be maintained, using our definition of tension, that a higher degree of tension between two actors or coalitions implies a greater probability of war between them? Our answer is yes, but due to limitations of

[7] My present definition of tension differs from an earlier published version in this respect; cf. Goldmann (fn. 4), 51.

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space the point will not be argued in detail. The core of the argument is as follows.[8]

A positive correlation between tension and the probability of war may be assumed if at least one of the following two assumptions will hold: (1) an increase in the probability of war leads to an increase in tension (i.e., the expectations of the actors are realistic); (2) an increase in tension leads to an increase in the probability of war (i.e., the expectations of the actors are self-fulfilling). The plausibility of the assumptions is a matter of judgment. It does not seem very audacious to us to interpret variations in tension as variations in the probability of war. If we can explain why international tension increases and decreases, we can probably also say something about the factors that influence the probability of international war. And even if the assumptions are not universally true (the possibility of surprise attack cannot be ruled out, and such attacks imply by definition that tension is low immediately before they take place), they seem credible with respect to the East-West confrontation in Europe, which is our main concern here.

4. MEASURING INTERNATIONAL TENSION

Our next task is to give the definition of tension a valid operational interpretation—obviously not an easy assignment. It is difficult enough to specify how one government at a given point of time conceives of the scope, likelihood, and temporal immediacy of conflict behavior vis-à-vis some other party. It may be impossible to develop methods of observation that will allow us to make reliable and precise comparisons between different governments and different points of time. We can make rough judgments; the discussion in Section 2 points out the kind of information that is needed if such judgments are to be well founded. But it is not realistic to hope for meaningful and precise quantitative measures of the *absolute* level of tension at a given point of time, or of the absolute level or size of the fluctuations over a period of time.

Do we have to conclude that international tension as defined here is unmeasurable? Not necessarily. *If it is sufficient to measure variations in tension, but unnecessary to determine its absolute level*, it should be possible to develop a reasonably satisfactory measurement technique. All that is required is to find observable phenomena that *covary* with tension because they are expressions of governmental expectations about conflict behavior, or because they influence such expectations.

[8] For a somewhat more extensive discussion see *ibid.*, 48-50.

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After having experimented with military expenditures,[9] we decided to measure fluctuations in European tension by means of a quantitative content analysis of public governmental statements. Before our particular technique is presented, it is important to make clear *why* we consider content analysis to be a reasonable way of measuring international tension. We feel that the gap between what we want to observe and what we actually do observe, although large, is smaller with content analysis than with any other type of indicator. But why?

The answer is not that governments, in our opinion, tend to "mean what they say." The language of politics does not only perform an expressive function but also an instrumental one. We have every reason to doubt that the statements of politicians and diplomats correctly mirror their "true" state of mind. Yet, when other researchers have suggested content analysis as a way of measuring international tension, this crucial difficulty seems to have been ignored. The usual assumption appears to be that content analysis can provide valid information about the perceptions of the author of the document.[10] Whether the assumption is a reasonable premise for other empirical studies will be left open. The important point is that *the validity of the present study does not depend on whether governmental expectations of conflict behavior are truthfully expressed in public governmental statements.*

Our point of departure is less perilous: even if the contents of public governmental statements do not always truthfully express expectations of conflict behavior, they tend to *influence* such expectations. Irrespective of *A*'s expectations of conflict, *A*'s statements may to a large extent influence *B*'s expectations of conflict. Therefore *A*'s statements may tell us something about *B*'s expectations, regardless of whether they tell us anything about what *A* expects. An analogous relationship may exist between *B*'s statements and *A*'s expectations. Whether and to what extent this is universally the case is difficult to determine. If *A*'s and *B*'s statements provide *similar* images of variations in tension, however, one would be overly cautious to regard the exchange as a mere verbal spectacle. In this case, *but only in this case*, it seems reasonable to interpret the results of a content analysis as an indication of variations in tension.

Several discussions with colleagues have shown that the above ideas easily become misunderstood. Since they are crucial to the interpretation of our empirical results, they will be recapitulated in a more detailed way.

[9] *Ibid.*, 47-48.
[10] Holsti (fn. 2), 613-17.

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Content analysis may be used to determine to what extent A's and B's statements indicate tension. Whatever the analytical technique—i.e., whatever the rules for making inferences about tension from the statements—it must allow the results to be expressed numerically as the coefficients C_A and C_B for A's and B's statements respectively. C_A and C_B are then combined into the coefficient C_{AB}, and C_{AB} *is our indicator of tension between A and B.*

Let us now recall that A's expectations of conflict behavior are here symbolized as E_A, B's expectations as E_B, and the tension between A and B as T_{AB}. Our assertion that C_{AB} is a valid indicator of T_{AB} is, to begin with, *not* based on a belief that the value of C_{AB} tells us anything about the absolute value of T_{AB}. C_{AB} is regarded as a valid indicator of T_{AB} only in the sense that under certain conditions (which will soon be specified), C_{AB} can be assumed to *covary* with T_{AB}. Under certain conditions, we find it reasonable to regard *variations* in C_{AB} as indicating *variations* in T_{AB}.

Why? Not because A and B express their "true" expectations of conflict in their statements. We cannot take for granted that variations in C_A have been preceded by variations in E_A, or variations in C_B by variations in E_B. It is *possible* that C_A is a valid indicator of E_A, but such an interpretation seems naive and will be avoided here. One consequence is that the operational question of how to combine C_A and C_B into C_{AB} is distinctly different from the theoretical question of how to combine E_A and E_B into T_{AB}. Another and more important consequence is, in our opinion, that questions like, "who changed his expectations of conflict first?" cannot be answered by the use of data about variations in C_A and C_B.

We suggest that C_{AB} can nevertheless be used as an indicator of T_{AB} because, irrespective of whether E_A is reflected by C_A, or E_B by C_B, E_A is highly *influenced* by B's statements, and E_B by A's statements. The objection to this contention is that the effects of a statement depend on many factors other than its content. A threatens B but it is not believed; A attempts a "peace offensive" that fails. Assume, however, that we know how C_A and C_B have varied over a period of time, and that there is a perfect positive correlation between the two time series. In such a case it seems excessively sceptical to interpret the results as consequences of simultaneous incredible threats or simultaneous unsuccessful peace offensives. It appears more reasonable to accept C_{AB} as a valid indicator of T_{AB}.

If, on the contrary, the correlation between C_A and C_B is zero or negative, this must be considered a strong warning against interpreting

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the findings in terms of tension. As a matter of fact, in such cases *it is hardly possible to give* C_A, C_B, *and* C_{AB} *any definite theoretical interpretation at all*: Too many alternatives can be imagined. The correlation between C_A and C_B is a crucial test of validity. The closer it is to + 1, the more credible our results—if our hypothesis about the relationship between one actor's words and another actor's expectations is correct.

This is a big "if," but not one that is unusually big for social science. It is the kind of assumption that we are often forced to make when trying to obtain reliable measurements of theoretically interesting phenomena. The validity of our indicators usually stands and falls with the credibility of some causal hypothesis. Conclusive empirical tests of validity are rarely possible. This does not mean that empirical tests are pointless, however. So far, the validity of C_{AB} as an indicator of T_{AB} has been discussed as a purely theoretical problem; toward the end of this article we shall approach the problem empirically.

5. EUROPEAN TENSION 1946–1970: PROCEDURES AND FINDINGS

The type of content analysis used in this investigation is a technique developed by Janis and Fadner, known as the "coefficient of imbalance."[11] The technique is based on the following simple typology of "units of content" (the units of meaning selected for analysis, e.g., sentences or paragraphs):



The "total content" consists of the total number of units in the text to be analyzed. The "relevant content" encompasses those units that contain the characteristics we want to study. "Favorable content" consists of units containing favorable occurrences of the characteristics we want to study, whereas "unfavorable content" consists of units containing unfavorable occurrences. "Neutral content" consists of units that are relevant but are neither favorable nor unfavorable.

The coefficient of imbalance is designed to measure the degree of

[11] Irving L. Janis and Raymond Fadner, "The Coefficient of Imbalance," in Harold D. Lasswell, Nathan Leites, and others, *Language of Politics* (New York 1949).

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imbalance between favorable and unfavorable units in a given text, while also taking neutral and non-relevant units into account. It is computed by the following formulae:

$$C_f = \frac{f^2 - fu}{rt} \text{ when } f > u$$

$$C_u = \frac{fu - u^2}{rt} \text{ when } f < u$$

where f is the number of favorable units;
u is the number of unfavorable units;
r is the number of relevant units;
t is the total number of units.

The coefficient may range between + 1 and − 1 on a ratio scale.

If favorable units are those suggesting low or decreasing tension, and if unfavorable units are those suggesting high or increasing tension, the coefficient of imbalance becomes a useful "tension coefficient," with $C = -1$ representing maximum tension. The very simplicity of the technique makes it attractive. It may be objected that the *intensity* with which the units are favorable or unfavorable is not taken into account and that this will make the results misleading. It appears highly likely, however, that the correlation between intensity and imbalance is very high; this is probably a pseudo-problem.

A more important objection is that it may be misleading to let the proportion of non-relevant units influence our measure of tension. Other things being equal, the larger the number of non-relevant units, the closer the coefficient is to zero. From the point of view of tension measurement, non-relevant units would be those that contain nothing at all about present or future conflict behavior between A and B. Does it really matter to what extent the relevant units are "diluted" by non-relevant ones? Our answer is yes—but since the affirmation is very tentative, we decided to compute C_{AB} in *two* ways. One method is to calculate the coefficient of imbalance as described above; we call this *Method I. Method II* uses the following formula, in which the non-relevant units are ignored:[12]

$$C_r = \frac{f - u}{r}$$

[12] Dag Anckar, *Partiopinioner och utrikespolitik* (Åbo 1971), 34.

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The fourfold typology of the coefficient of imbalance was applied to a large number of public statements made between 1946 and 1970 by heads of state, government members, or their representatives (primarily ambassadors) in the North Atlantic Treaty and Warsaw Treaty countries.[13] To be more precise, we decided to examine all such statements that were reproduced, in whole or in part, in *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*. Our unit of content was the sentence. The coding comprised all sentences that formed parts of paragraphs in which something was said about *present or future relations* between *one or more North Atlantic Treaty countries* (*except the United States and Canada*), *and one or more Warsaw Treaty countries* (statements about relations between the two alliances as such were regarded as fulfilling these criteria).[14] A detailed presentation of our coding rules is impossible due to lack of space. Some examples may be useful in suggesting the general character of the coding.[15]

Favorable units consist of:

(1) favorable predictions ("I think that this agreement marks a beginning of better understanding between our countries");

(2) hopes ("The negotiations to be held early in 1965 for a renewal of the Anglo-Soviet agreement on cultural exchange should provide an opportunity to extend and improve these exchanges");

(3) favorable intentions ("As hitherto, we intend to work for the further improvement of our relations with Britain and France");

(4) favorable assertions ("The forces of peace have been considerably augmented").

Neutral units consist of:

(1) proposals ("We propose that a conference be called to convene before the end of the year");

(2) transitions between positive and negative units ("In these conditions it depends upon the U.S.A., Great Britain, and France whether

[13] All nations that were members of one of the alliances at any time between 1946 and 1970 have been analyzed as if they had been members during the whole period.

[14] Note that United States and Canadian statements are included in the total material only if they contain something about relations between *European* NATO members and some East European country or countries, or about relations between the two alliances as such. Statements that solely concern relations between the United States or Canada on the one hand and some East European country or countries on the other are *not* coded. The reason for the latter rule was our desire to measure European rather than global tension.

[15] For details, see Häll (fn. 1), 37-42 and 97-103.

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the negotiations will be disrupted or whether a satisfactory agreement will be reached").

Unfavorable units consist of:

(1) unfavorable predictions ("War may spread to other countries and become a third world war");

(2) unfavorable intentions ("The expansionist efforts of the Government of the G.F.R. with regard to West Berlin are a reflection of its general foreign policy, which is aimed at revising the status quo in Europe");

(3) unfavorable assertions ("We know that Soviet and Chinese Communism still poses a serious threat to the Free World").

All remaining units are *non-relevant.*

Five persons coded a total of circa 27,000 units. Almost all the material (89 per cent) was from Britain (30 per cent), the Soviet Union (29 per cent), the United States (15 per cent), France (10 per cent), or West Germany (5 per cent).[16] Almost 60 per cent of the units were coded as non-relevant, but the proportion of non-relevant units varied between 37 per cent in 1959 and 82 per cent in 1951. The difficulty in theoretically interpreting the latter variations was the reason for experimenting with both Method I and Method II.

The results of the content analysis are summarized in the form of four diagrams.[17] Diagrams 1 and 2 are based on yearly coefficients according to Methods I and II, respectively. It is immediately obvious that Western and Eastern coefficients covary strongly. As a matter of fact, the correlation between them is .90 for Method I and .92 for Method II. (Product-moment correlations are used throughout the present study.) Moreover, although the amplitude of the variations is greater with Method II than with Method I, the two methods obviously produce similar results. The correlation between them is in fact no less than .96.

Quarter-by-quarter variations are shown in Diagrams 3 and 4. Since the variations are sometimes very large within one single year (for example, in 1949, 1956, and 1963), the quarterly values are more in-

[16] For details see *ibid.*, 41 and 90-96. The high proportion of British statements of course reflects the fact that *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* is produced in Britain. Since we are only interested in measuring *variations* in tension, and since the "national" time series of the leading countries were highly intercorrelated (Häll [fn. 1], 61) the British "over-representation" is no serious problem.

[17] The figures upon which the diagrams are based are available in *ibid.*, 82-88.

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

DIAGRAM 1

COEFFICIENTS OF IMBALANCE, METHOD I
YEARLY VALUES, 1946–1970



DIAGRAM 2

COEFFICIENTS OF IMBALANCE, METHOD II
YEARLY VALUES, 1946–1970

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formative than the yearly values. Two caveats are necessary, however. One is that in a few cases the quarterly coefficients are based on a small number of units of content.[18] The other is that the East-West correlations drop to .68 for Method I and .65 for Method II, which is satisfactory but not impressive. Between Method I and Method II the correlation remains very high; it is .94 for the quarterly values.

The diagrams can be regarded as condensed descriptions of an important aspect of postwar European history. They show, for example, that tension was high (relative to later years) as early as the beginning of 1946, and that it continued to increase, with a few brief exceptions, until it peaked in the latter part of 1949. A temporary détente began in the early 1950's and lasted until the middle of 1956. Then came a period of large and rapid fluctuations between very high and fairly moderate levels of tension. After the middle of 1963, however, European tension never again reached the high levels that had been considered normal in the preceding sixteen years. It is worth pointing out that, judging from our data, the European détente of the early 1970's had lasted for almost a decade by then; the impact of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia seems to have been fairly limited, lasting only for about six months.

In at least one respect our findings are surprising. According to our data, tension in Europe *decreased* considerably in the summer of 1950, which is one or two years earlier than one would expect. The drop is much more obvious with Method I than with Method II; as a matter of fact, the only important difference between the two methods concerns the years 1950, 1951, and 1952. However, Method II also shows a definite decrease.

The reader may feel inclined to regard our results for 1950 as an error of measurement rather than as an interesting discovery. He may be inclined to question the reliability and validity of our results in general. Since we felt highly uncertain ourselves, several attempts were made to check the results.

6. CHECKING THE FINDINGS

Checking the reliability of the findings is a fairly easy matter. Controlling their validity is difficult. We have seen that the correlations between Eastern and Western data are very high for yearly values and

[18] The number of units is smaller than 50 for the following quarterly coefficients. Method I: 1962:2, 1962:3, 1965:3, 1969:3, and 1970:3. Method II: 1951:1, 1951:2, 1951:3, 1952:1, 1952:2, 1952:4, 1954:2, 1962:1, 1962:2, 1962:3, 1962:4, 1963:4, 1964:1, 1965:3, 1969:3, 1970:3.

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

DIAGRAM 3

COEFFICIENTS OF IMBALANCE, METHOD I
QUARTERLY VALUES, 1946–1970



DIAGRAM 4

COEFFICIENTS OF IMBALANCE, METHOD II
QUARTERLY VALUES, 1946–1970

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

DIAGRAM 3 (*continued*)



DIAGRAM 4 (*continued*)

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satisfactory for quarterly values. Moreover, the close correspondence between the results of Method I and those of Method II is encouraging. It is useful to experiment with other computational formulae as well as with material from some source other than *Keesing's*. To carry out a really convincing test of validity, however, one should measure tension in some other way than by content analysis and compare the results.

As has already been pointed out, it is one of the problems of research in international relations that such tests tend to be impossible. The reason, of course, is that usually *no* clearly valid indicator can be found. Suppose that we measure whatever we want to measure by using indicator I_1 and compare our results to those obtained with another indicator, I_2. If there is little similarity, the reason may well be that I_1 is invalid—but it may also be that something is wrong with I_2, or with both I_1 and I_2. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that if I_1 and I_2 give similar results, this does support the credibility of both indicators.

The various controls will now be summarized.[19]

Reliability. The coding was prepared and led by Lars Häll of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and was carried out by him and four students of political science at the University of Stockholm. Reliability was controlled by comparing each student's coding with Häll's. It was measured as the number of identical coding decisions relative to the total number of coding decisions. One test was made after each student had coded approximately 25 documents. Recoding by Häll showed that reliability varied between .89 and .95. Another test was carried out after the coding had been concluded and was based on a systematic sample of all documents coded by each of the students. In this case reliability varied between .85 and .97. This must be considered satisfactory.[20]

Different methods of computing "European" tension. One difficulty in going from "national" to "European" coefficients of imbalance is that there are many ways of aggregating the former into the latter. (As

[19] For a much detailed account, see Häll (fn. 1), 50-81.

[20] Since different individuals had coded the period July 1949–June 1950 and the periods immediately before and after, and since the empirical results seemed surprising precisely with respect to these twelve months, a special check was made in order to ascertain that our results were not produced by the idiosyncrasies of one coder. Reliability was .95 for the third quarter of 1949 and .94 for a sample of the period 1959–60, which had been coded by the same student. For the months immediately following the outbreak of the Korean War, reliability was .87. There is no reason to "blame" the results on low reliability.

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has been pointed out earlier, the theoretical discussion about T_{AB} as a function of E_A and E_B is of limited relevance here.) With both Method I and Method II, the problem is solved by regarding all that is said by *A and B* as a single set of units of content on the basis of which coefficients of imbalance are computed. The implication is that *A*'s and *B*'s "contributions" to C_{AB} vary with their share of the total content. Whether this is reasonable is an important problem: The United States' share of the total material varied between 3 per cent in 1967 and 33 per cent in 1953, and the Soviet share varied between 8 per cent in 1970 and 52 per cent in 1963, to mention two examples.

We therefore experimented with two other methods of computation. One was to compute European tension as the mean of the Western and Eastern coefficients. The other method went a step further: the Western coefficient was also computed as a mean, namely, the mean of the French, British, and United States coefficients. Because of a lack of sufficient number of units of content, the latter procedure was impossible for Method II. We thus ended up with five different ways of computing European tension on the basis of our material. The correlation between them turned out to vary between .87 and .99, and the mean correlation was .94. In our judgment, variations in a country's share of the total material should indeed influence our measure of tension, but it is comforting to know that this methodological decision seems to be of little substantive importance.

Content analysis of other texts. A weak point in the study may of course be that our material has in effect been selected by the editorial staff of *Keesing's* rather than by ourselves. There is no particular reason to expect a systematic error for this reason, but the possibility cannot be ruled out. Therefore, two controls were made.

First, all statements by the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense that were printed in the *Department of State Bulletin* in the years 1949 and 1950 were coded, and the results were compared on a quarterly basis with our *Keesing*-based United States coefficients. The years 1949 and 1950 were selected because of a desire to examine if the choice of *Keesing's* as our source of documents was the cause of the somewhat astonishing results for this period. There was a correlation between the two sources of .87 for Method I and .76 for Method II.

Second, the editorials and the articles signed "Commentator" in the Soviet journal *International Affairs* were coded for the years 1960–64. The results were compared on a semi-annual basis with the Soviet

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coefficients based on *Keesing's*. The correlation was .93 for Method I and .98 for Method II.

Comparison with data on East-West trade. Lodgaard has constructed an index of East-West trade that basically expresses the difference between the yearly change of West European exports to East Europe and the yearly change of total West European exports.[21] If our content analysis were a valid indicator of variations in European tension, we would expect a positive relationship between the change in East-West trade minus the change in world trade on one hand, and the coefficient of imbalance on the other. We did, in fact, find correlations of .46 (Method I) and .54 (Method II) between Lodgaard's data and our own. When Lodgaard's data were lagged one year, the correlations increased to .63 and .75 respectively.

Comparison with data on military expenditure. Although we felt *a priori* that content analysis is a much better way of measuring international tension than the examination of military expenditures (cf. Section 4), we decided to compare the results of our content analysis with the yearly changes of the aggregated military expenditures of the NATO countries, excluding the United States, and with those of the Warsaw Pact countries.[22] There was no significant correlation with Warsaw Pact expenditures; the correlation with NATO values was — .46 (Method II) when military expenditure was lagged one year, and — .52 (Method I) or — .48 (Method II) when military expenditure was lagged two years.[23] The difference between Warsaw Pact and NATO values may be a consequence of the fact that the expenditures of the Soviet Union, a world power rather than merely a European one, are included in the former series of figures, whereas those of the United States are not included in the latter.

Comparison with data on conflict behavior. Data about the positive and negative actions of France vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact countries in the period 1950–64 can be found in a study by Holsti and Sullivan.[24]

[21] Sverre Lodgaard, *Interaction Trends and Interaction Loads in the East-West System*, mimeo (Oslo 1970/71), 42-44.

[22] Data from *SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament 1969/70* (Stockholm 1970), 266-70. U.S. data were excluded because we did not want an indicator of *European* tension to be strongly influenced by the extent to which the United States took part in wars in Asia.

[23] For Method I, lagged one year, it was non-significant.

[24] Ole R. Holsti and John D. Sullivan, "National-International Linkages; France and China as Nonconforming Alliance Members," in James N. Rosenau, ed., *Linkage Politics* (New York 1969).

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The yearly proportion of positive actions was compared to the results of our content analysis for France (Method I). There was a correlation of .75.

7. CONCLUSION

The validity of our indicator of European tension cannot be proved conclusively. However, when we consider the tests reported in Section 6 in conjunction with the theoretical argument in Section 4, we feel convinced that the results of the content analysis reflect variations in European tension fairly accurately.

The reader who shares this opinion may now return to the diagrams. A closer inspection is likely to make him contemplate several hypotheses about the causes and consequences of international tension. The main point of measuring tension, as mentioned in the introduction, is to prepare the ground for the construction of theory and testing of hypotheses, rather than merely to describe international relations diagrammatically. In another context, we hope to be able to report the results of our attempts to explain why European tension varied the way it did in the post-1945 period.[25]

[25] Among other things, we will try to explain variations in European tension in terms of global and European "bipolarization." Cf. Goldmann (fn. 4); G. Roger Wall, *Bipolarization and the International System: 1946–1970*, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Research Report UI-72-2 (Stockholm 1972).

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Review Articles

NEW PERSPECTIVES ON BRITISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT

By HOWARD A. SCARROW

Noel Boaden, *Urban Policy-Making: Influences on County Boroughs in England and Wales*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1971, 150 pp., $7.50.

William Hampton, *Democracy and Community: A Study of Politics in Sheffield*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1970, 349 pp., £4.

Royal Commission on Local Government in England, Research Studies 9, *Community Attitudes Survey: England*. London, HMSO, 1969, 187 pp., 17s.6d.

Richard Rose, *Governing Without Consensus: An Irish Perspective*. Boston, Beacon Press, 1971, 567 pp., $12.50.

IT is both humbling and encouraging to recall notions that Americans once entertained of the British political system. Critics of F.D.R. looked enviously at the British Parliament for its reputed ability to hold the executive firmly accountable for its actions. Somewhat later, observers on both sides of the Atlantic supposed that Britain was blessed with an absence of pressure groups. Would-be reformers of the American party system further implied that British voters cast their ballots according to the content of party programs, and that party cohesion was the result of discipline imposed by a centralized party organization able to deny renomination to recalcitrant M.P.'s. Careful analyses of intra-party workings, pressure-group activity, and voting behavior have now dispelled these and other mistaken impressions, and it seems likely that the contours of our understanding of these subjects have now been established.[1] However, additional frontiers of knowledge of the British political system remain to be charted; one of these is government at the local level. Despite the voluminousness of the literature on British local government, the disappointing fact is

[1] The original observations and matching corrective conclusions may be found in Don K. Price, "The Parliamentary and Presidential Systems," *Public Administration Review* (Autumn 1943), as reprinted in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, *Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings* (Homewood, Ill. 1964), 399-410; Samuel H. Beer, "Pressure Groups and Parties in Britain," *American Political Science Review*, L (March 1956), 1-23; Austin Ranney, *Pathways to Parliament* (Madison 1965), esp. 9-11, 89-90; David Butler and Donald Stokes, *Political Change in Britain* (New York 1971), esp. chap. 12.

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that most of it has failed to provide satisfactory answers to major questions political scientists are likely to pose.

By far the most basic of these is the extent to which there exists in Britain anything that merits the label "local government" or, as the British refer to it, "local democracy." According to countless textbooks on the subject, the answer to this question is fairly simple. Among unitary states, Britain stands as the classic example of the extent to which political power can be decentralized to locally elected decision-makers, while France, with its Ministry of Interior and centrally appointed prefects, illustrates the other end of the spectrum. Italy is usually pictured as resembling France, and the Scandinavian countries as resembling Britain. In their five-nation study, Almond and Verba depict a local autonomy scale on which Italy is at one end, Britain and the United States at the other end, and Germany somewhere in-between.[2] To those brought up on the foregoing generalizations it will come as a surprise to learn that many British observers have drawn a picture that is precisely the opposite. In his deservedly popular account, Benham asserts that local government in Britain is "fettered and restricted" to a degree unknown in most of Europe, including France and Italy.[3] Brian Chapman returned from his study of France with the "totally unexpected conclusion that Britain was a more centralised country than France."[4] The same conclusion was reported by the official Committee on Local Government Management in 1967; having examined practices in Germany, Sweden, and Holland, the Committee urged that British local government be given similar autonomy.[5] That these statements should not be seen as simply revisionist conclusions based upon changed conditions is made clear by Ensor's volume in the Oxford series on the History of England. The author reasons that England missed an opportunity to establish a system of vigorous local government when it instituted the present plan in 1888, and that since that time Britain's system has suffered by comparison with that of the remainder of Europe.[6]

This lack of agreement on the extent of local autonomy is paralleled by conflicting evidence regarding the presence or absence of a suitable cultural basis for local government. In seeming confirmation of the

[2] Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston 1965), 123.
[3] Harvey Benham, *Two Cheers for the Town Hall* (London 1964), 26.
[4] As quoted in Ioan Bowen Rees, *Government by Community* (London 1971), 57.
[5] Ministry of Housing and Local Government, Committee on the Management of Local Government, *Management of Local Government, Volume 1: Report of the Committee* (London 1967), chap. 2.
[6] R.C.K. Ensor, *England, 1870–1914* (Oxford 1936), 126-27, 295.

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presence of an appropriate basis is the homage that is paid to "local democracy" by public officials and by most writers on the subject. Almond and Verba, moreover, rank Britain second only to the United States with regard to the mass attitudinal characteristics which they consider appropriate for local government.[7] Not all observers, however, have shared this opinion. In a widely quoted remark, Richard Crossman, then the minister in charge of local government, warned local officials that, if the British people had to choose between efficiently administered services and local government, they would have no hesitancy in choosing the former. An academic observer has concluded that, whereas in both France and Italy local loyalties provide support for local government, no such support exists in the more homogeneous Britain. "Why reform something which is already dying of natural causes?" he asks.[8] There is also evidence that support for local government is weak at the elite level: A few scholars, such as J.A.G. Griffith, have questioned the value of "local democracy." What is more significant, the two major political parties have not been able to reconcile that value with their own normative concerns. Predictably, Labour's bias toward economic and social controls usually leads it to favor centralization; the Conservative Party's emphasis upon the protection of individual freedom from government regulation, as well as its symbolic attachment to the Crown, has led it to the same position. Reflecting the Conservative bias, and in reverse of the American pattern, no more vigorous champions of centralization can be found than the British Medical Association and the Confederation of British Industry.

Contributing to the uncertainty regarding supportive attitudes is the fact that Englishmen have never developed a satisfactory constitutional theory able to reconcile the inherent conflict between "local democracy" and the supremacy of Parliament. For some critics the desirable model of local government is one which Americans would call "home rule": within certain policy spheres local government should enjoy a general competence of policy-making and spending which locally-elected representatives may use (or not use) as they see fit. It is with this model in mind that Benham and Ensor are critical of the system which was established in 1888. That system followed the strict principle of *ultra vires*, by which each action and expenditure by local government has to be specifically authorized by Parliamentary statute; there is no generalized legal competence. Clearly, however,

[7] Almond and Verba (fn. 2), 126-34.

[8] J. G. Bulpitt, "Are Local Elections Important?" *New Society*, May 9, 1968, pp. 669-70.

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most of the criticism that has been levied against the present system of local government begins with another model, one which is suggested by the title of Griffith's impressive study of *Central Departments and Local Authorities*.[9] From this perspective, local government is not a question of local autonomy, but rather of administrative relationships—i.e., how locally-elected councilors and their appointed officials interact with the central government departments in the administration of central government policy. Some critics have therefore suggested that the term "local administration" be used instead of "local government." Perhaps surprisingly, local authorities themselves appear to have accepted this "administrative" perspective. They have readily acknowledged that it is the duty of Her Majesty's Government to govern the nation, and they have based their case for autonomy on the necessarily subjective distinction between legitimate direction from the center on "key" policy points and illegitimate interference on matters which should be left to local discretion; the difference is between the respectable role of "partner" and the humiliating role of "agent." Their most conspicuous and easily justifiable complaints, accordingly, have been against central directives on matters such as how a local council should organize its committees or handle its paperwork. Much less conspicuous and less clearly articulated have been complaints regarding substantive autonomy in matters of policy.

Against this background of uncertainty and contradiction, Noel Boaden, in *Urban Policy-Making*, has provided the first empirical account of the extent and the dimensions of the autonomy of local government. Examining the policies pursued by the eighty-odd county boroughs (i.e., the most populous urban authorities) in England and Wales, Boaden reasons that if controls by the central government were as stringent as critics imply, the policies should be more or less the same from borough to borough, and the label of "administrative agent" would be appropriate for local authorities. Conversely, wide variations among the policies pursued would suggest that local government in Britain does indeed enjoy the autonomy that traditional lore has suggested; that, despite the absence of a generalized legal competence, local authorities have sufficient leeway in policy choices to be considered as political systems in their own right. The data presented by Boaden clearly demonstrate the latter perspective to be correct. Despite its brevity and despite several annoying lapses in tabular and textual clarity, Boaden's study thus provides a sound foundation and justification for future studies of local systems.

[9] J.A.G. Griffith, *Central Departments and Local Authorities* (Toronto 1966).

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Boaden uses as his chief measure of urban policies the per capita expenditures on eight services: education, housing, welfare, health, children services, libraries, fire, and police. This approach precludes consideration of policy choices that cannot be measured by expenditure, such as decisions on land-use planning and environmental controls; but data on expenditure do permit a readily measurable dependent variable. It could be argued, of course, that variation in per capita expenditure for the various services does not by itself provide adequate evidence of the absence of strong, centralized controls. One might make the assumption that Whitehall takes account of local needs when it exercises its supervisory controls—for example, allowing a local authority with a small school-age population to spend less on education than one with a large number of children to serve. Or it might be supposed that Whitehall is interested only in minimum standards, and that variations in expenditures are the result of wealthy authorities' (i.e., those with a high taxation base) using their resources to purchase services beyond those that are mandated. The crux of Boaden's analysis, therefore, is to be found in the organization of his independent variables around three conceptual components: "local need," as measured by characteristics such as size of school-age population or the physical condition of the housing stock; "local resources," as measured by characteristics such as value of the tax base; and "local disposition," measured primarily by the extent of Labour Party representation on the council. What clearly emerges from the analysis is that, while "need" is indeed the most powerful statistical explanation of expenditure in the various policy areas, it seldom explains more than a quarter of the variance in expenditure among the county boroughs. The variables used to measure "resources" are also shown to have some explanatory power; but variation in expenditure is shown to occur among both poor authorities and wealthy authorities. Thus the data seem clearly inconsistent with the hypothesis of rigid, centralized controls. This conclusion is strongly reinforced by the independent effect that the local political-party variable is shown to exert; one of the most important findings of the study is that, regardless of needs and resources, Labour councils levy higher taxes than do non-Labour councils.

The major portion of Boaden's study, then, is based on the premise that need, resources, and disposition are factors that exert influence at the *local* level; his is a comparative analysis of local political systems. He shows, through the technique of partial correlation coefficients, that each of his three conceptual variables has its own explanatory power, the relative importance varying with the type of service in question.

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This sort of analysis will be familiar to American political scientists who have read similar studies of policy variations among American states and cities. In one very important respect, however, Boaden's study marks a sharp break with these previous efforts. By organizing his data around the three concepts, Boaden is able to advance substantive explanations, not merely statistical ones. The statement that local councils in communities with crowded and run-down housing conditions will spend more on council housing (i.e., public housing) than will councils in communities that do not face these conditions is not the same as the statement that variance in housing expenditure can be statistically explained by economic variables. The first statement is compatible with the model of an elected council responding to the perceived needs of the community; the second suggests a model of crude economic determinism in which economic and not political variables are primary and causal. The Boaden study clearly articulates the former model; the American studies strongly imply the latter. Together with the demonstrated conclusion that a system of local government—as opposed to a centralized administration—*does* make a difference in policy outcomes, and that the political-party variable statistically accounts for policy differences, the Boaden study thereby brings back political variables to their place of rightful importance in comparative analysis.

Readers who may be wary of conclusions based on aggregate expenditure data will find in Hampton's *Democracy and Community* ample documentation, both of the importance of the policy choices confronting local decision-makers and of the political processes in which they are embedded. As an analysis of the county borough of Sheffield (and including, as it does, the results of a survey of the electorate and elected councilors), the work ranks as the most complete of the several community studies which have appeared. The four dominant policy issues analyzed in detail are an income-related rent scheme for council housing, the switch to comprehensive schools, the building of a municipal airport, and the closed shop for borough employees. With the exception of the airport project—legal powers for which were obtained through a private act of Parliament—the policy choices resulted from leeway built into national legislation and ensuing Whitehall regulation. Thus, Sheffield's switch away from the "eleven-plus" examination and toward comprehensive schools was begun several years before this became national Labour Government policy—even then only in the form of "requests" that local authorities submit plans—and reflected local interpretation of the 1944 Education Act. Sheffield's

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income-related rent scheme was induced in part by the conditions attached by Whitehall to grants for building more council housing, but it was also the consequence of Sheffield's own financial difficulties. The principle of income-related rents, moreover, was subject to a variety of interpretations and implementing schedules. In short, the citizens of Sheffield were directly and importantly affected by the choices made by their elected council, whether these choices be called a feature of "local government" or "local administration."

The strength of Hampton's account lies in his analysis of the processes that surrounded these policy choices. He documents the involvement of pressure groups—both the permanent groups (such as the Chamber of Commerce and the Trades Union Council), and the *ad hoc* groups (such as a tenants' association and a parents' association). About two-thirds of the councilors allowed that they had "frequently" or "sometimes" had contact with representatives of such organizations, and half of them acknowledged that such organizations exerted some influence on their opinions. Since some case studies of local politics in Britain have shown a surprising absence of organized group activity, the Sheffield findings are especially important, although it remains an open question how representative they are of the total universe of local authorities.

The author also emphasizes the role played by the respective party groups in the borough council. All important policy questions are decided by disciplined party votes, with the party position being formulated by the group-elected leadership. Of special interest is Hampton's account of intra-party factionalism, i.e., the division within the party group in the Council and the division between the group and the outside party organization. For instance, the Labour group was divided between younger and older members on the question of comprehensive schools; the rent dispute drove a wedge between the Labour group in the council and the borough Labour Party in which the local Trades and Labour Council was heavily represented. A major conclusion to be drawn from the analysis is that the generalizations pertaining to the national parties apply equally at the local level. In a dispute between the inside and the outside organization, the former will prevail; and in both Conservative and Labour Parties the elected council members, pushed by their party organization and supporters to adopt more "extreme" positions, will opt instead for the more centrist posture. Thus the Conservative councilors were in favor of the general principle of comprehensive schools, despite evidence that half of their supporters may have been opposed. Hampton's account is en-

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riched by other survey results matching the electorate's perceptions and opinions with those of its elected representatives.

Finally, by discussing the relationship between the local Member of Parliament and the local council, Hampton touches briefly upon what is perhaps the most conspicuous feature of British local government, i.e., organizational rivalries and organizational self-protection. Whether it be the local M.P. versus the council, local authorities (through their associations) versus Parliamentary Committees, one class of authorities versus another (e.g., county boroughs versus counties), or conflicts between neighboring authorities, inter-organizational politics at the elite level has constituted an important facet of British politics.

The paradox of British local government is that, despite its importance as a local policy-maker, as a pressure group upon central government, and as a participant in organizational politics, it does not give the appearance of resting on mass support. Functions are transferred from local to central government (utilities, hospitals, sewage) without a whimper of citizen protest. A redrawing of the local government map, being consummated in 1972–73, has been accompanied by cries of protest from adversely affected officials (appointed and elected) and their associations, but citizen interest has generally been conspicuous by its absence, and the American practice of submitting proposed changes to referendum has neither been demanded nor considered. Low and declining turnouts at local elections since 1945 have been amply documented. Hampton's figures for Sheffield, for example, show that participation in local elections is about one-third of that in national contests. Another characteristic of electoral behavior is that local elections tend to become popularity contests for the governing party at Westminster. Strikingly uniform swings are recorded throughout the country, regardless of local issues, and it is this aspect of the contests that is stressed by the media. Hampton's account of Sheffield's elections would thus have been strengthened had he shown the relationship between results there and results recorded in neighboring localities. Further, there is the undeniable fact that social leaders no longer offer themselves as candidates for local office as they once did—a trend that has particularly disturbed the local authority associations. The three last-mentioned characteristics—low participation, the nationalizing of elections, and the low status of elected office—sharply differentiate British from French local government, and no doubt at least partially account for the impression of greater vitality in the local governments of France.[10] It is possible, however, that British

[10] See Mark Kesselman, *The Ambiguous Consensus* (New York 1967).

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patterns of behavior are expressions of disillusionment, resentment, and dissatisfaction, rather than of an intrinsic lack of interest in "local democracy." To what extent, then, can it be said that the necessary supportive attitudes for a viable system of local government are present?

The attitude survey of the electorate, conducted for the Royal Commission of Local Government in 1967, has helped to open this question for discussion; it has not, however, advanced our understanding nearly as much as one might have hoped. This was the second such survey within a span of two years, the other having been conducted for a committee of inquiry into local government management.[11] Since a major objective of both surveys was to discover people's attitudes toward local government, one might have expected that some of the questions would have been designed to tap the electorate's attitude toward the idea of "home rule," i.e., the notion that a local government should have autonomy to determine its own policies on certain defined subjects. J. P. Mackintosh, for example, argues that the questions of comprehensive schools and council housing rents "are precisely the sort of issues" that local citizens wish to settle for themselves instead of having them settled by the central government.[12] Perhaps the most conspicuous feature of the two surveys is that neither contains questions which were designed to test assertions of this kind. Rather than being asked about policies, respondents were asked about "services"; rather than being asked whether they thought a local community should be able to determine for itself questions of schools, rents, or land use, respondents were asked whether they thought such "services" to be "quite well run." The findings showed that respondents evaluated locally-run services as being no better or worse than services administered by the central departments or statutory boards; but attitudes toward local legitimacy versus central legitimacy remained unexplored. In other words, both questionnaires were conceived in an administrative perspective—a fact that tells as much about entrenched perceptions of local government in Britain as do any of the results reported in the studies. For official commissions of inquiry as for academic critics, good local government is defined as a balance between "efficiency and democracy," as efficient administration achieved through the mechanism of locally-elected and appointed officials. The redesigning of the

[11] Ministry of Housing and Local Government, Committee on the Management of Local Government, *Management of Local Government*, III: *The Local Government Elector* (London 1967).

[12] J. P. Mackintosh, *The Devolution of Power* (Harmondsworth 1968), 47.

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boundaries of local authorities and the redistributing of functions among types of authorities—subjects that have been investigated and debated *ad nauseam* during the past decade—have had that goal as their articulated objective.

Despite its very basic limitation, the 1967 survey produced some significant findings. The answers to a number of the questions suggest that local government boundary lines then in force did not rest on strong identifications, attachments, and behavioral patterns. The findings will be of interest to all who are concerned with defining what constitutes a community and what might encourage community participation. Of particular significance to the purposes of the present discussion were the questions designed to explore the comparative prominence of the elected councilmen and the permanent officials employed by the council. In response to the question of whom they would contact *first* if they wished to inquire or complain about a "service," 67 per cent of the respondents gave replies that were coded as "administrative" (e.g., the permanently appointed official in charge), while only 14 per cent mentioned their local councilman; and as a first *or* second source of contact, the Member of Parliament was mentioned more often than the local councilman. These findings suggest that local government is indeed thought of by the mass electorate in an administrative rather than a representative "home rule" perspective; and, as if to confirm that such is also the perspective of the elite, the authors of the report refer to the 67 per cent who would go to administrative officials as persons who would "go to the top."

In his survey of Sheffield, Hampton included questions which replicated the Community Attitudes Survey, and his findings broadly parallel those reported by it for other county boroughs. Hampton also asked Sheffield respondents to name the person they believed to be the most important in local affairs. As much as any other data, the pattern of response to this question suggests the weak foundation on which British local government rests. There being no political executive—neither an elected mayor in the French or American style nor a "prime minister" in the national parliamentary style—a full 42 per cent could not answer the question. The highest score (23 per cent) was for the totally honorary post of Lord Mayor (and hence "incorrect"). The structure of British local government, without an executive, and with a council of seventy-odd members fragmented into policy committees in which they and officials work together on detailed administrative matters, has shown itself totally incapable of inspiring mass support and allegiance. It is doubtful whether the reconstructed boundaries

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and redefined functions can cure that ill. Indeed, all the evidence from the surveys suggests that the counties, which will now become the most important units of local government, are least able to meet the challenge.

Quite distinct from local government within the major island of Great Britain has been the arrangement for regional government in Northern Ireland. The Government of Ireland Act of 1920 bestowed upon the six northern counties of Ireland a generalized legal competence to be exercised by an elected Parliament modeled after Westminster. Until the suspension of the Act in 1972, therefore, the political system of Northern Ireland operated with a degree of institutional autonomy and visibility far in excess of any which had developed in other local governing units of the Kingdom. Indeed, the record of the government in the exercise of this autonomy, especially in relation to policies affecting the Catholic minority, is cited by those who argue against a devolution of power from Westminster to other existing or proposed units of local or "provincial" governments.

In *Governing Without Consensus*, an impressive work of scholarship, Richard Rose has provided an account of the Northern Irish regime that traces the development of discord up through 1970. More importantly, it examines the social and cultural basis upon which the regime precariously rested. Rose's book is an ambitious work of social theory, eclectic in method and scope, and oriented toward the questions of legitimacy, national identity, and social cleavage. As such, it merits a fuller and more critical analysis than is permitted by the focus of this review. Yet the study, pertaining not only to Northern Ireland but also to Scotland and Wales, puts into perspective some of the themes discussed up to this point. It amply documents strong attitudinal and cognitive supports for the community of Northern Ireland. The "loyalty survey" which the author conducted, and which forms the basis for the major portion of the book, revealed that large majorities of both Catholics and Protestants choose the term "Irish" or "Ulster" rather than "British" to describe themselves; large majorities within both groups considered themselves "much different" from people in England; and pluralities within both communities considered themselves "much different" from people in the Republic to the south. Even more surprising than the absence of significant differences between Catholics and Protestants on the foregoing questions is the fact that over two-thirds of the respondents within each group considered persons of the opposite religion within Northern Ireland to be "about the same" as they were. What clearly emerges from the

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analysis, then, is that the people of Northern Ireland, at least in 1968 when the survey was taken, considered themselves a distinct community, the basis for a separate political system.

The salience of the province's political institutions was also clear. More people knew the name of their Stormont representative than knew their M.P. at Westminster; there was a high turnout for provincial elections; respondents strongly identified with the distinctive political parties which Northern Ireland has produced; and the coincidence of party and religious identifications assured that one-party and one-religion monopoly of political power was itself a major issue of politics.

The problems besetting Northern Ireland, then, in dramatic contrast to those affecting local governments in Britain, stem not from an absence of community identity or lack of interest in local institutions, but rather from a lack of allegiance to the regime and compliance with its laws. Organizing his survey data around these two concepts, Rose found that support for the regime was weak among Catholics (e.g., one question showed 33 per cent of Catholics expressing support for the "constitutional position" of Northern Ireland, as contrasted with 68 per cent support among Protestants), and that among Protestants especially (52 per cent) there was a willingness to defy the laws of the regime, and if necessary use violence, in order to keep the province under Protestant control. The "non-bargainable" differences over religion in Northern Ireland are seen by Rose as placing that province in "the mainstream of modern European politics," since differences of this kind are precisely the sort which have disrupted regimes elsewhere in Europe.

In an introductory section of the book, Rose argues that Northern Ireland is not the only part of the Kingdom which possesses sociological distinctiveness and a national, communal self-consciousness: The people of Scotland and Wales also choose their own nationality rather than the term "British" to describe themselves. Rose presents other data—religious affiliations, migration patterns, population densities, transportation links—which in his judgment also refute the notion of the "social homogeneity" of the United Kingdom, and demonstrate that the United Kingdom is a "multi-national regime." That these sociological patterns provide a foundation for separate provincial governments is suggested by surveys, reported by Rose, which show Scotsmen and Welshmen (in contrast to Englishmen) favoring some form of self-government for their respective regions.

It was just such sentiments which appear to have been responsible

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for the appointment of a commission of inquiry appointed by the Labour Government in 1968 to examine "the present functions of the central legislature and government in relation to the several countries, nations and regions of the United Kingdom." The charge to the commission, which has yet to report, includes regionalism within England as well as within the Kingdom, and hence all discussions of local government reorganization have occurred in the shadow of the possible outcome of the commission's inquiry. Although Rose's account does not include data on regionalism within England, he does include one datum which merits careful reflection by those who press for a devolution of power from London to provincial governments. Support for political parties, measured in terms of national elections, is concentrated in different regions of England and the nation. Hence large regional units of government might well yield one-party governments, unrelieved by the partisan fragmentation which traditionally has characterized the smaller units of local government, especially between the levels of town and country.

A convergence of several disparate currents within British society has produced the concern with subnational government of which the volumes under review are reflective: a system of local government designed in 1888 and now deemed "inefficient"; a new interest in participatory democracy, nourished by disenchantment with the centralized welfare state; disturbances in Northern Ireland and signs of nationalism on the Celtic fringe; and a new concern with regional economic development, reflected especially in the policies of the last Labour Government. Overarching each of these currents has been a general questioning of the institutions by which the British govern themselves. For all these reasons it is likely that we may look forward in the next several years to additional studies that will enrich our understanding of and sharpen our perspective on British subnational politics.

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ORDER OR MOVEMENT?

The Literature of Political Development as Ideology

By MARK KESSELMAN*

Leonard Binder, James S. Coleman, Joseph LaPalombara, Lucian W. Pye, Sidney Verba, and Myron Weiner, *Crises and Sequences in Political Development*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1971, 336 pp., $8.00.

Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1968, 488 pp., $12.50; $3.95 paper.

> Was there ever any domination which did not appear natural to those who possessed it?
>
> —*John Stuart Mill*[1]

> In any society the dominant groups are the ones with the most to hide about the way society works. Very often therefore truthful analyses are bound to have a critical ring, to seem like postures rather than objective statements. . . . For all students of human society sympathy with the victims of historical processes and skepticism about the victors' claims provide essential safeguards against being taken in by the dominant mythology. A scholar who tries to be objective needs these feelings as part of his working equipment.
>
> —*Barrington Moore*[2]

I

THE term "political development" originated during the cold war. After World War II, the prevalent attitude in the United States toward the Third World resembled that toward Europe: Unless economic progress and political stability were encouraged by the United States, these areas would turn Communist. Underlying foreign aid was the sober calculation that communism would lose its appeal once men's bellies were full. Robert Packenham reports that when AID officials were asked in the mid-sixties how they viewed development, "one of the most common responses was, in effect, that political development is anti-Communist, pro-American political stability."[3]

* I am grateful to Arie Bucheister, Douglas A. Chalmers, Lewis J. Edinger, Andrew J. Nathan, James Scott, and Jonathan Sunshine for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

[1] *The Subjection of Women* (London 1965), 229.

[2] *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston 1966), 523. (But cf. Moore's *Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery and Upon Certain Proposals to Eliminate Them* [Boston 1973], 9, fn. 5.)

[3] "Political-Development Doctrines in the American Foreign Aid Program," *World Politics*, XVIII (January 1966), 213.

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The prevailing theory was that with affluence, nature would take its course and representative institutions, pluralism, political stability, a non-ideological style, and a pro-American foreign policy would be automatic concomitants. More specifically, progress was assumed to occur as a result of better communications, a transformation of values and political culture, and the development of specific institutional sectors—that is, political parties and the bureaucracy.[4] There appeared to be a happy coincidence in the scholarly perspective of value neutrality, pride in American institutions (justified by references to economic prosperity, democratic political institutions, and pluralism), and the national interests of the United States. Ironically, the implicit political theory was a crude form of Marxism, which saw economic and social development as fostering bourgeois democracy in the image of the West.

However, during the post-independence period of the 1950's and 1960's, disquieting evidence began to accumulate that economic growth and modernization were not as inevitable as had been thought at first. Quite the contrary: In many countries, the effects of urbanization, economic aid, and the development of modern sectors such as the military and the party system seemed to have effects opposite to those that had been predicted: Military takeovers, revolution, insurgent movements, urban disorder, economic stagnation, and political corruption were the unhappy result. The comfortable equation of pro-Americanism, political development, and stability was shattered following the realization that "the assumption that countries in the Third World, in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, were developing was as much a wish as an empirically determined fact."[5]

At first the problem was identified as a lack of skilled personnel. The result (within both the scholarly domain and the State Department) was development administration, which aimed at strengthening administrative capacity to carry out economic development programs.[6]

Development administration dealt with only one segment of politics, however. Two landmark works which extend their concern to the *generalized* capacity of rulers are *Political Order in Changing Societies* by Samuel Huntington, and *Crises and Sequences in Political Develop-*

[4] The examples all derive from the influential series of studies devoted to political development sponsored by the Social Science Research Council.

[5] Fred W. Riggs, "Introduction," in Riggs, ed., *Frontiers of Development Administration* (Durham, N.C. 1970), 3-4.

[6] For examples in the field of development administration, see *ibid.*; Dwight Waldo, ed., *Temporal Dimensions of Development Administration* (Durham, N.C. 1970); and Ralph Braibanti, ed., *Political and Administrative Development* (Durham, N.C. 1969).

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ment by Leonard Binder and others.[7] In contrast to the commonly held view that political stability and development are inevitable products of modernization, Huntington concludes that political development is distinct from modernization, is not inevitable, and—rather than being a correlate of modernization—is often *impeded* by the latter. The result, in preference to an emphasis on broad questions of nation-building or narrow questions of bureaucracy-building, is a shift to state-building —a focus on the particular political institutions and processes needed to maintain the primacy of the political sphere (Huntington), and the crises a polity has to confront in the course of political development (Binder).

Huntington's goal represents a shift in focus from development administration, for he is less concerned with the capability of political authorities to sponsor specific projects than with their ability to maintain hegemony and limit demands by subordinates. The process is so far from being unilinear that Huntington has subsequently advocated dropping the term "development" altogether in favor of the teleologically less biased term "change."[8]

Binder retains the term "development," but enriches its meaning. Political development becomes a multidimensional syndrome of governmental capacity, differentiation, and equality. Rather than resulting from a single takeoff or even from regularized stages, development is regarded by Binder as a process without an end point; it consists in a polity's finding satisfactory resolutions for its crises of identity, legitimacy, participation, capacity, and distribution. However, no crisis is ever fully resolved—it is only more or less surmounted, at a given time, by those in authority. A crisis represents the dramatic eruption of the core issues of political development, but the issues persist as perennial problems, potentially ready to erupt again, even in advanced polities.

Both Huntington and Binder diverge from a tradition in American social science (a tradition shared by earlier works in political development), which regards political order as dependent on value consensus. Precisely because consensus is unlikely and stability is problematic, Huntington and Binder stress the fundamental role that political power must play in maintaining political order. The fragility of politi-

[7] For the sake of simplicity, and since the foreword states that the authors take joint responsibility for the entire work (p. ix), I will refer to the authors of *Crises and Sequences* collectively as Binder. It should be noted that in this essay I intend to examine convergences between Binder and Huntington, not differences.

[8] "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development, and Politics," *Comparative Politics*, III (April 1971), 283-322. Binder differentiates between political change and political development (p. 16).

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cal order underlies the centrality of social science. Rather than allowing history to take its uncertain course, Huntington and Binder maintain that scholars should devise ways (through a kind of political technology) to buttress the dominance of established authorities.

Political Order is already one of the most influential studies in American political science; *Crises and Sequences* will no doubt be another. Given their importance as leading examples of how political scientists have been reflecting on large questions of contemporary political change, a critical examination is particularly warranted.

II

Huntington and Binder implicitly reformulate the first question of politics. Instead of "what is the good society and how may it be achieved?" the question becomes, "what is the stable society?" Order is not considered a prerequisite for achieving the highest political good, but itself becomes the highest political good. The distinction François Goguel makes, in surveying the history of the French Third Republic, between the *parti de mouvement* and the *parti de l'ordre établi* helps situate *Political Order* and *Crises and Sequences.*

Huntington singles out political order and stability as the concerns which inform his analysis (p. vii); suggests that "the most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government" (p. 1); and asserts that "the primary problem of politics is the lag in the development of political institutions behind social and economic change" (p. 5). Binder asks (in a modern-day version of the white man's burden): "What is it that we are offering the struggling peoples of the developing areas . . . ?" (p. 10), and replies that political scientists can contribute by studying the various crises that confront polities in the course of their development.

Despite Huntington's insistence on the importance of political order, both political order and disorder (decay) conceal ambiguities of critical importance.[9] Political order exists when everything is shipshape, when all's right with the political world. Its opposite, political decay, refers to praetorian politics, when the political arena is swamped by exogenous forces (organized interests, tribes, military, students, etc.). Political order appears to prevail when established authorities exercise control successfully. The concept thus obscures the legitimacy

[9] I have explored the point in "Overinstitutionalization and Political Constraint: The Case of France," *Comparative Politics*, III (October 1970), 21-44.

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of the means used by governments to maintain power.[10] It ignores the danger posed by government that is too strong (however firmly institutionalized), and the disorder that derives from officially sanctioned repression.

The concept of political order is not neutral: it places the burden of disorder on subordinates who challenge elites. Decay refers only to disruptions of the status quo by subordinates. Disorder that results because of rulers and ruling institutions who exert coercion falls outside the definition. Yet authorities may disrupt the status quo more than subordinates, and may create (or help perpetuate) a status quo that defies elemental requisites of the political community. To consider disorder a function of mobilization overlooks the disorder imposed by those seeking to safeguard privilege. As Barrington Moore points out, if revolutionary violence is open and dramatic, the violence stemming from ruling institutions (resulting in repression and preventable death) may be no less extensive.[11]

The terms "political decay" and "disorder" are also misleading. No consideration is given by Huntington to possible justification for challenging authorities. Revolutionary movements against dictatorial regimes, military coups against democratically chosen governments, Fascist takeovers, etc. are lumped together as "exogenous political forces." An approach that fails to distinguish between popular challenges to corrupt regimes and narrowly based military coups (radical and conservative praetorianism) does not reflect objectivity but confusion.

Greater clarity might emerge if one were to adopt the perspective of those in authority. From this vantage point, dilemmas that stem from the tension between order and freedom, between the powerful and the powerless, diminish; all challenges, from whatever source, appear similar, and political order appears to be equivalent to the *délices du pouvoir*. Yet is not something awry if scholarly concepts are intelligible only from the narrow, partisan perspective of those who benefit most from established arrangements?

[10] The need for further clarification is underlined by a nineteenth-century anarchist's definition of order: "Anarchy is order, government is civil war." (Quoted in Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* [Boston 1966], 34.) One is tempted to suggest that political order may be in the eyes of the beholder.

Huntington has admitted, in "The Change to Change" (fn. 8), that his concept of political mobilization is overly broad. He now confines the term to demands for political participation, excluding economic and social changes such as industrialization, economic growth, and urbanization from the definition of mobilization. Such a shift modifies the central argument of *Political Order*.

[11] Moore, *Social Origins* (fn. 2), 104.

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In the literature on political development, perspectives of power-holder and scholar are often fused. Sidney Verba defines a crisis as a "change that requires some governmental innovation and institutionalization if elites are not seriously to risk a loss of their position or if the society is to survive" (*Crises and Sequences*, 302). For Lucian Pye, a legitimacy crisis originates in a growing spirit of equality which "may leave them [the people] less prepared to accept the apparently arbitrary distinctions associated with those claiming authority" (p. 135). Myron Weiner defines a participation crisis as "a conflict that occurs when the governing elite views the demands or behavior of individuals and groups seeking to participate in the political system as illegitimate" (p. 187). (Note that even a crisis in participation is viewed from the elite's point of view.) But it is the penetration crisis that probably has the most repressive overtones. According to Joseph LaPalombara, "for any political elite, penetration refers to whether they can get what they want from people over whom they seek to exercise power" (pp. 208-9).

My objection is not to describing how authorities attempt to maintain dominance, but rather to the implicit espousal of their cause: the literature of political development might be assigned reading in Silone's school for dictators. For Huntington, stability (his major concern) is preserved by insulating rulers from successful challenge. LaPalombara aims at "improving [elites'] crisis-management capabilities" (p. 275), and suggests principles on which "responses to a penetration crisis should be based . . ." (p. 229).[12] Following the section on "Crises of Participation," Weiner provides a section "On the Prevention and Resolution of Participation Crises." For Pye, a resolution of the legitimacy crisis lies in the fact that "once power has been transformed into authority by the process of legitimation it requires less physical input [repression?] to achieve the same effect. Thus it is

[12] In another essay, "Alternative Strategies for Developing Administrative Capabilities in Emerging Nations," LaPalombara advises scholars, "Unless those who propose administrative reform or increased capacity are committed to the overthrow of the existing political regime, it is necessary to demonstrate how proposed changes will either enhance existing power or at least not greatly diminish it. . . . Any proposal for improving administrative capacity that threatens the existing power structure must include persuasive analyses regarding how such losses in power base can be quickly replaced." Riggs (fn. 5), 195. On the other hand, LaPalombara also cautions social scientists not to make value judgments; *ibid.*, 224-25.

The historians writing the volume on sequences in the S.S.R.C. series on political development are less partisan. "Nor should so important an historical process [as crisis] be assessed merely in terms of crisis management whether 'successful' or not." Raymond Grew, "Crises of Political Development," paper presented to the 1972 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (Washington, D.C., September 1972), 2. The broadened definition of crisis directs attention to political "changes not made and threats not faced." *Ibid.*, 3.

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that out of excessive power struggles leaders seek to transform their naked power into an acceptable form of legitimacy" (pp. 142-43).[13]

III

What, then, is so desirable about political order and so undesirable about political disorder? Why should it be preferable to help leaders prevent or overcome crises instead of helping challengers create or perpetuate crises? Why not opt for a position that supports neither side but, instead, seeks (as does Robert Dahl) to balance the two?[14]

[13] Huntington and Binder are not unique in their advocacy of the powerholders' cause. In "Popular Participation in Development Administration," *Journal of Comparative Administration*, III (November 1971), 362, John D. Montgomery and Milton J. Esman state, "we are considering participation from the development administrators' point of view. . . ." Their essay explores how participation can be manipulated without endangering the goals of administrators.

Raymond F. Hopkins, in a review of literature in comparative politics, suggests, "Taking the viewpoint of those in authority has an inherent conservative bias since their *sine qua non* is preservation of their position of power." "Securing Authority: The View from the Top," *World Politics*, XXIV (January 1972), 275-76.

In implicit contrast to much of the literature in political development, Robert Dahl asks, "What circumstances significantly increase the mutual security of government and opposition . . . ?" *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven 1971), 16. Dahl seeks conditions that foster the growth of polyarchy, defined as participation (inclusiveness), and the right to oppose established leaders (contestation).

From another perspective, Ivo K. Feierabend and Rosalind L. Feierabend define instability as aggression, both by officeholders against non-officeholders and the reverse. Stability would apparently require limiting aggression by both sectors. "Aggressive Behaviors within Polities, 1948–1962: A Cross-National Study," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, X (September 1966), 249-71.

Other critiques of literature on comparative politics include Gideon Sjoberg, "Ideology and Social Organization in Rapidly Developing Societies," in Riggs (fn. 5), chap. 8; Charles C. Moskos, Jr. and Wendell Bell, "Emerging Nations and Ideologies of American Social Scientists," *American Sociologist*, II (May 1967), 67-72; A. R. Dennon, "Political Science and Political Development," *Science and Society*, XXIII (Summer 1969), 285-98; and Christian Bay, "The Cheerful Science of Dismal Politics," in Theodore Roszak, ed., *The Dissenting Academy* (New York 1967), 208-30. For two useful discussions in related fields, see Frederic J. Fleron and Lou Jean Fleron, "Administration Theory as Repressive Political Theory: The Communist Experience," *Newsletter on Comparative Studies of Communism*, VI (November 1972), 4-41; and Herbert Reid, "Contemporary American Political Science in the Crisis of Industrial Society," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, XVI (August 1972), 339-66.

[14] I am here equating Huntington's conception of political order with Binder's conception of crisis management. This is an oversimplification, but for the purposes of this analysis I am more interested in the shared elements.

It might be asserted that the issue being raised is irrelevant to the authors' concerns. Huntington asserts that the validity of his analysis tracing the conditions that promote stability is independent of whether one shares his preference for that goal (p. vii); Verba recognizes that there may be "ambiguous normative implications" deriving from the expansion of governmental capacity, but he does not choose to explore the question (pp. 293, 303). Yet in both volumes there are repeated attempts (both implicit and explicit) to justify as well as describe: It is to these efforts that the present discussion is directed. Moreover, I am not taking issue with the fact of advocacy (on the contrary, more elaboration would have been desirable), but rather with the par-

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The mere fact of orderliness may not be desirable in itself: Depending on the definition of the concept, on political circumstances, and on one's values, political disorder may be preferable to order. As Hugh Stretton points out in questioning the value of integration, "the good and bad things in society have an almost random relation to their functional characteristics. There can be integrated, perfectly functional systems of tyranny or inequality or exploitation."[15] To measure the value of political order and development, one must also calculate the costs involved. Furthermore, political values do not exist in isolation from one another. The achievement of one value may facilitate or impede the achievement of others. What are the consequences of confining concern to political order and development?

1. Huntington and Binder offer several reasons for preferring political order and development. One is that political order is a prerequisite to other political goods. This is implicit in Pye's definition of crises as " 'problem areas' that either plague a society or demand the attention of its leaders and aware citizens" (p. viii). For Huntington, "the primary problem is not liberty but the creation of a legitimate public order. Men may, of course, have order without liberty, but they cannot have liberty without order. Authority has to exist before it can be limited . . ." (pp. 7-8).

That order must precede liberty can be questioned on logical and empirical grounds. Logically, one might ask why creating order should take precedence over safeguarding liberty. It might be preferable to create authority and safeguard freedom simultaneously.

One should also distinguish historical and functional requisites: what is necessary to bring about, and what is necessary to maintain a situation.[16] Even if one grants that order *logically* precedes liberty, this need not dictate that order *chronologically* should precede liberty. Indeed, countries where strong political authority developed early (e.g., Prussia) have turned out to be less liberal than countries where order and liberty developed simultaneously (England), or where liberty preceded order (United States). In any case, it may be difficult to generalize about such matters. Barrington Moore's analysis suggests

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ticular position that is advocated and with what I suggest are inadequacies in its defense.

[15] *The Political Sciences* (London 1969), 177-78.

[16] Dankwart A. Rustow, "Modernization and Comparative Politics: Prospects in Research and Theory," *Comparative Politics*, 1 (October 1968), 37-51; and "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics*, 11 (April 1970), 337-63.

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that, if there are broad patterns irrespective of country which affect the likelihood of certain outcomes, there are also factors peculiar to each country, e.g., development of specific forces, coalitions among forces, and the particular international context at a given time, which must be analyzed case by case.

In this connection, *Crises and Sequences* appears more sophisticated than *Political Order*. Verba's essay on sequences draws attention to variability; the order in which crises are treated throughout the volume implies that participation may precede penetration.[17]

2. A second justification for the priority Binder and Huntington assign to political order and development is that, especially in the modernizing stage, political order is extremely fragile, and governments are in constant jeopardy. As noted above, for Huntington the "primary problem of politics is the lag in the development of political institutions behind social and economic change" (p. 5). Pye maintains that, "to the extent that a more developed society is less plagued with instability and conflict than a developing country, it is only because more effort and resources can be mobilized for coping with the inherent tensions in the development syndrome" (p. viii). One cause of a legitimacy crisis, he explains, is that "national leaders with great responsibilities do not have an easy command of power, and there is not an automatic and complete acceptance of the authority of governmental institutions" (p. 141). And LaPalombara assures us that "the nagging issue of power" is put to rest by "our persistent observation . . . that the most striking aspect of political power in developing nations is how little of it most elites have at their disposal" (p. 273).

Granted, political order is less secure in changing societies than in modern societies; yet so too are liberty, freedom, and other core values. A predominant concern for political order would be warranted only if it could be shown—and no such attempt is made in these volumes—that, compared to other values, it was *disproportionately* endangered.

The authors, however, may be overestimating the tendency toward political decay because they do not distinguish the *sources* of challenges to regimes. It is terribly misleading to treat all anti-regime opposition

[17] The forthcoming S.S.R.C. volume on sequences will deal with the question in greater depth. However, Raymond Grew's paper suggests that the theoretical rationale underlying *Crises and Sequences* is not shared by historians who apply the theory to empirical cases: "Few historians found it reasonable to treat sequences as causes or apply the concept with precision. A means of describing political systems over time, the sequence of crises becomes a process of change primarily as the historians make it so through independent analysis. But prediction does not follow for the variables remain infinite." Grew (fn. 12), 14.

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as being alike and to equate the intervention of army generals (or colonels) with the challenge posed by an indigenous guerrilla movement or rebellious students. David E. Apter asserts, "revolutions from below in the form of people's revolts that begin in armed rebellion and end in general social disruptions are less likely than we might assume."[18] And Aristide R. Zolberg states: "Although coups which result in changes of government have attracted the most attention, the most frequent coups in Africa have probably been those initiated by an incumbent government against threatening individuals or groups (real or alleged), and those launched by rulers or dominant factions against their associates."[19] Indeed, political order in developing countries is probably jeopardized more by those in positions of authority than by social mobilization from below. James Scott notes,

> In most of the third world we have what I would call "profligate" elites who are willing, even anxious, to undermine the survival value of political institutions in the interests of continued dominance. If so, then the problem of "threatened institutions" as Huntington sees them is not a problem of being swamped by "socially mobilized masses of unwashed" but of an artificial cloture or rigidity produced by incumbents. In fact, most third-world elites are quite happy to *dismantle* existing institutions (parliament, elections) in the interests of continued rule.[20]

3. In part, political stability appears endangered for the semantic reason that change and crises are given such prominence. The image conveyed is a ceaseless whirl, in which established authorities and processes are constantly being undermined. Yet, despite the emphasis on change, no satisfactory explanation is given in *Political Order* and *Crises and Sequences* for the dynamics of change: The *origins* of social mobilization are never explained and the critical aspects of mobilization are never specified. Under the rubric of social mobilization, Huntington lumps together such diverse processes as literacy, urbanization, economic growth, and demands for political participation.[21] He portrays a continual conflict of social mobilization and political institutions, with variable outcomes: e.g., institutionalization versus praetorian politics. Binder specifies three constituents of the development syndrome and five crises; but whatever the heuristic utility of these

[18] *Choice and the Politics of Allocation* (New Haven 1971), 67.

[19] "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa," *American Political Science Review*, LXII (March 1968), 77.

[20] James Scott, private communication. The point is underlined by the presidential coups of Marcos in the Philippines and Park in South Korea.

[21] In "The Change to Change" (fn. 8), Huntington explains why he would now substitute political participation for social mobilization. He also provides a useful analysis of political change (pp. 316-19, esp. 317).

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elements, they do not provide a model to explain how demands originate.

In the absence of a theory of structural change, change appears to occur in a random, inexplicable, and ahistorical fashion. Without understanding the origins of mobilization, we cannot understand the dynamics of change. Moreover, assertions that change is always occurring—or, for that matter, that it never occurs—are meaningless and non-testable unless the criteria for measuring change are specified.

With regard to empirical matters, how adequate are generalizations about political order in the Third World following World War II which ignore the origins of modernization—especially if history and sequence play an important role in the analysis? Can one disregard the influence of international forces on mobilization and political order in changing societies? Given their stress on history, sequence, mobilization, and development, it is curious that the two analyses virtually ignore the impact of imperialism, decolonization, neocolonialism, and the cold war.[22]

Political development in the Third World cannot be dissociated from its colonial origins and the contemporary international context. Western military, economic, and spiritual conquest has been a major cause of instability. Moreover, the fragility of rulers is due as much to external intervention and the cold-war context (ignored in both volumes) as to internal factors. The picture is less than complete if one treats developing countries as isolated and autonomous, without reference to foreign military assistance, covert external political intervention and overt military invasion, the power of multinational corporations over the political and economic processes of third-world countries, dependency relationships more generally, and the manipulation of the international monetary system and trade relationships to favor the interests of the wealthy and powerful nations.[23] In particular,

[22] Cf. Norman Birnbaum, *Toward a Critical Sociology* (New York 1971), 107.

[23] Moskos and Bell point to "the failure by social scientists to explore the contingencies on political and social development resulting from the growing gap between the rich and poor nations" (fn. 13), 71. Also see C. R. Hensman, *Rich Against Poor: The Reality of Aid* (Cambridge, Mass. 1971); Gustavos Lagos, *International Stratification and Underdeveloped Countries* (Chapel Hill 1963); and Suzanne Bodenheimer, "The Ideology of Developmentalism: American Political Science's Paradigm-Surrogate for Latin American Studies," *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*, xv (1970), 95-137. For another perspective, see literature on transnational organizations, e.g., Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, Mass. 1972). Huntington also perceptively explores the domestic political effects of external penetration in the Third World (ignored in *Political Order*). "Transnational Organizations in World Politics," *World Politics*, xxv (April 1973), 333-68, esp. sections III and V. However, he appears to exaggerate the benefits accruing to the host country (pp. 364-68).

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by failing to consider the destabilizing (and occasionally devastating) effects of American power on other nations, the literature of comparative politics abstracts theoretical processes of modernization, development, and change from contemporary reality.

A comparable (and associated) failure to relate international and domestic factors concerns the analysis of the military—perhaps the major internal threat to established political processes in changing societies. The army constitutes a disproportionately powerful force (and is thereby tempted to intervene) because of the technological, administrative, financial, and ideological boost it is given by foreign countries. None of the other sectors—labor, political party, administrative, or entrepreneurial—receives such generous support from external sources.[24] Given the potential threat represented by the military, one might expect that a study devoted to maximizing political stability would examine how the military's power could be reduced. And, since the foremost supplier of foreign military assistance is the United States, might not a study of political order in changing societies usefully begin at home?

4. Binder and Huntington share the comforting assumption that, in transitional societies, an excess of power held by the elite is less significant than its lack of power. Following Talcott Parsons' view of power as the generalized capacity of a system, such a position implies that, once leaders are equipped with adequate power, they will not be tempted to misuse it.

For Pye, the problem is not to democratize power but to increase "the total level of power in the system" (p. 140). James S. Coleman suggests that "political development refers to a special capacity. It is

[24] In an essay questioning the rationale of military assistance programs in Africa, Henry Bienen suggests that "military assistance in Africa is not merely the provision of material and services to another state but often means giving aid that can tip domestic political balances precipitously." Further, "Twentieth-century foreign aid may be as significant for domestic political change in recipient countries as nineteenth-century colonialism was." "Foreign Policy, The Military, and Development: Military Assistance and Political Change in Africa," in Richard Butwell, ed., *Foreign Policy and the Developing Nations* (Lexington, Ky. 1969), 95, 69. Also see Miles D. Wolpin, "External Political Socialization as a Source of Conservative Behavior in the 'Third World'," (unpub.). Dahl points out that both the United States and Great Britain lacked a strong army during the period in which they were undergoing liberalization (fn. 13), 48-50. Pye, however, warns readers "to avoid being excessively influenced by ideological considerations which may be relevant only in advanced societies. . . . The military in the underdeveloped countries can make a major contribution to strengthening essentially administrative functions." "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in John J. Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton 1962), 86, 89. Although Huntington favors party rule, not military rule, his recommendations appear to have as much likelihood of producing the latter as the former.

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an integrative, responsive, adaptive, and innovative capacity. It is a capacity not only to overcome the divisions and manage the tensions created by increased differentiation, but to respond to or contain the participatory and distributive demands generated by the imperatives of equality. It is also a capacity to innovate and manage continuous change..." (pp. 78-79).[25]

Yet focusing on the generalized capacity of a political system overlooks conflicts of interest within the system. Like many writers in comparative politics, Binder and Huntington implicitly adhere to a trickle-down view of political power. As in the economic counterpart of the argument, it is assumed that increasing the total supply of power (or wealth) will automatically resolve problems of distribution and reduce inequality. Yet, take as an example the most powerful and wealthy country in the world: power and wealth have not significantly trickled down to the bottom in the United States. Vastly increased aggregate power and wealth have not reduced the relative inequality in the distribution of these resources between the most and the least privileged segments in American society. Moreover, although the government's power and capacity for penetration have increased, it is unlikely that the average citizen's power and ability to control the government have kept pace. (A better case could be made postulating an inverse relationship between the two.)

In addition to the fact that economic growth and political stability may not only fail to reduce inequalities, they may also produce downright undesirable effects (ecological damage from economic growth, repression from political stability). Neither growth nor stability are unequivocally valuable; one needs to ask, "what *kind* of growth and stability?" Their value cannot be determined, in other words, without reference to their particular character in a given context.

5. A fifth reason for favoring political order (suggested by Huntington, not Binder) is that institutionalization embodies attractive values: coherence, autonomy, complexity, and adaptability. However, these values are deceptive: Ideally, a government should try to maximize all four, but they may be divergent in their requirements. Given a conflict between autonomy and adaptability, rulers will no doubt prefer the former over the latter—if they can get away with it. Furthermore, Huntington evinces more alarm about the product of over-

[25] Coleman also uncritically adopts Wilbert Moore's view of stratification as being functional and equitable: "The type of creative capacity we are talking about is clearly impossible without the stimulus of individual and collective motivations and striving, and only status differentiation can produce that" (p. 82).

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adaptability—political decay—than he does about the consequence of excessive autonomy in the political sphere: over-institutionalization and repression. It is insufficient to defend the increased capacity of rulers, in other words, unless one can demonstrate that the result will benefit public interests—not only rulers' interests.

6. Huntington's attempt to show how institutionalization serves public interests begins with the assertion that strong institutions are instrumental in promoting public interests: "Without strong political institutions, society lacks the means to define and to realize its common interests. The capacity to create political institutions is the capacity to create public interests" (p. 24). Granted, strong governments may be better able than weak governments to create public interests; they are also, however, better able to *thwart* public interests. The question is whether and why, on balance, the net outcome will be positive.

In the absence of evidence that strong governments will achieve the public interest, Huntington suggests, immediately following the passage just cited, that "one partial way out of the problem [of defining the public interest] is to define the public interest in terms of the concrete interests of the governing institutions" (p. 24).

> In contrast to the theory of representative government, under this [Huntington's] concept governmental institutions derive their legitimacy and authority not from the extent to which they represent the interests of the people or of any other group, but to the extent to which they have distinct interests of their own apart from all other groups. Politicians frequently remark that things "look different" after they are in office than they did when they were competing for office. *It is precisely this difference in perspective that legitimizes the demands of the officeholder on his fellow citizens* (p. 27; italics mine).

By sleight of hand, the problem of giving concrete meaning to public interests is thus defined out of existence. The argument begins by suggesting that strong government can *promote* public interests; it ends by *equating* the two. Yet, however much ignored, classic problems of control of government, conflicts of interest between officeholders and subordinates, representation, inequality, and repression remain. Instead of defending the superiority of political order compared to equality, liberty, or justice, Huntington suggests that one can have one's cake and eat it. Once we accept the ruler's imperative, we learn that order and liberty are different sides of the same coin. Binder also implies that, to the extent that crises are satisfactorily resolved, a nation will thereby have achieved identity, legitimacy, participation, penetration, and distribution, as well as the fruits of the development syndrome.

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However, all that may have been gained (given the definition of crisis reviewed above) is the *rulers' judgment* that these issues are laid to rest.

IV

In the years during which a vast literature on political development has accumulated, there have been few critical analyses of the fundamental premises underlying these works. One approach (with many variations) has dominated comparative politics: the search for order. The concepts of development and order suffer from what David Ingleby has termed normative reification: terms "which imply an ideal state from which deviations are 'incorrect'. . . ."[26]

Institutionalization and order, however, involve costs. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann point out that "the more conduct is institutionalized, the more predictable and thus the more controlled it becomes."[27] Ultimately, despite a stress on change, Huntington's and Binder's goal appears to be ideological (in Mannheim's sense): to freeze alternatives and reduce irregularity (both within nations and in the international arena). But social science need not accept as its goal the search for order, predictability, and control. Stretton suggests, "For us, the purpose of knowledge is often to erode constants, escape from regularities, reduce the certainty of prediction. . . ."[28]

As a result of Western political and cultural hegemony, the ethnocentric notion has been encouraged that only the West's political development represents a valid model. The works analyzed here are, like much scholarly literature, permeated by an implicit belief in the superiority of American political values, institutions, and processes. Because it is assumed that the United States is free and democratic, the need for strong government becomes justified—both to safeguard America's freedom from subversion internally and aggression externally and to enable the United States to "protect" other countries. Strong government thus comes to be valued in its own right, as an essential characteristic of America and as a hallmark of modernity to be emulated by developing nations. If the message of development is freedom, the medium, ironically, is power. As a consequence, the rulers' dominance is legitimized while the possibility is ignored that, in the process of creating a strong state, freedom and democracy may

[26] "Ideology and the Human Sciences: Some Comments on the Role of Reification in Psychology and Psychiatry," *The Human Context*, II (July 1970), 169.

[27] Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (Garden City, N.Y. 1967), 62.

[28] Stretton (fn. 15), 262.

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be forfeited. The United States, at first regarded as the freest, has gradually become regarded as the strongest; the implicit criterion for measuring political development is thus the security of rulers (institutionalization for Huntington, penetration or capacity for Binder). In essence, development and order come to mean what prevails in the United States.

At the extreme, one may discern a continuity in perspective between scholar and policy-maker—a perspective related to America's power position. The common dimension is evoked by Richard J. Barnet's description of what he calls the national security manager:

> At what can only be described as a religious level, the real enemies are chaos and disorder, which threaten to undermine one's power. Despite his devotion to the rhetoric of "freedom," the national security manager puts his trust in hierarchy. . . . Structures must be maintained within which people will know and keep their place. The most threatening political development of the postwar period is revolution, because the essence of revolution is a redefinition of place. For the number one nation any disturbance of existing power relations (even in the enemy's domain) holds certain risks.[29]

Ultimately, political development and order refer to a particular vision of the nation-state: highly organized, centralized, stratified, and controlled (penetrated) by large institutions (both public and private). It is not a revolt against modernity to question the inevitability or desirability of this vision and to suggest the need for alternatives.

The concept of political development originated during the cold war, a war the United States was never in danger of losing. But an examination of the way political development and order have come to be defined suggests that America may have won a Pyrrhic victory.

[29] *Roots of War* (New York 1972), 74.

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

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